In The Courts

Fifth Circuit Holds That Plea Agreement Defines Scope of Conduct for Restitution Purposes

In United States v. Adams, 2004 WL 435053 (5th Cir. Mar. 10, 2004), the Fifth Circuit held that the restitution properly awarded under the Mandatory Victims Restitution Act should be defined by the scope of the conduct agreed to in the plea agreement rather than by the conduct charged in the indictment. In Adams, the defendant had been charged with conspiracy to mail fraud, wire fraud, and interstate carrier fraud after allegedly orchestrating car accidents to collect insurance proceeds. The defendant refused to agree that the accidents had been staged, but pleaded guilty to a narrower scheme of exacerbating the damage after accidents had occurred. The district court imposed restitution for the full value of the damage caused by the car accidents. The Fifth Circuit vacated the restitution order, and remanded the case to the district court with instructions to order restitution only for the amount of the value of the damage done to the vehicles after the accident. The court explained that for the purposes of punishment in the wake of a guilty plea, the scope of an underlying scheme should be defined by the parties themselves.

Ninth Circuit Holds District Court Need Not Make a Specific Findings to Reject Obstruction of Justice Enhancement

In United States v. Alvarado-Guizar, 2004 WL 547945 (9th Cir. Mar. 22, 2004), the Ninth Circuit joined the Second and Eighth Circuits in holding that a district court need not make specific findings of fact that a defendant had not committed perjury during trial in order to reject application of the obstruction of justice sentence enhancement. U.S.S.G. ' 3C1.1. In so holding, the court recognized disagreement by the First and Fifth Circuits.

In Alvarado-Guizar, the defendant was convicted by a jury of conspiracy and possession with intent to distribute methamphetamine after testifying in his own defense that he did not know about the conspiracy. First, the Ninth Circuit determined that despite some statements by the district court during sentencing recognizing that the jury had clearly not found the defendant's testimony to be credible, the district court had not articulated its own belief that the defendant had committed perjury, which would have mandated application of the guideline. Second, the Ninth Circuit rejected the government's argument that the case should be remanded on the ground that the district court had an obligation to articulate specific facts to support rejection of the obstruction of justice enhancement. The panel acknowledged that under Supreme Court precedent, a district court applying the obstruction of justice guideline to false testimony must articulate specific findings of fact that the elements of perjury have been satisfied. However, the Court reasoned that the purpose of the specific-finding requirement is “to safeguard the constitutional and statutory right to testify on one's own behalf in a criminal proceeding”; because a rejection of the sentence enhancement does not threaten that right, specific findings that there was no perjury need not be made.

Fifth Circuit Holds That Plea Agreement Defines Scope of Conduct for Restitution Purposes

In United States v. Adams, 2004 WL 435053 (5th Cir. Mar. 10, 2004), the Fifth Circuit held that the restitution properly awarded under the Mandatory Victims Restitution Act should be defined by the scope of the conduct agreed to in the plea agreement rather than by the conduct charged in the indictment. In Adams, the defendant had been charged with conspiracy to mail fraud, wire fraud, and interstate carrier fraud after allegedly orchestrating car accidents to collect insurance proceeds. The defendant refused to agree that the accidents had been staged, but pleaded guilty to a narrower scheme of exacerbating the damage after accidents had occurred. The district court imposed restitution for the full value of the damage caused by the car accidents. The Fifth Circuit vacated the restitution order, and remanded the case to the district court with instructions to order restitution only for the amount of the value of the damage done to the vehicles after the accident. The court explained that for the purposes of punishment in the wake of a guilty plea, the scope of an underlying scheme should be defined by the parties themselves.

Ninth Circuit Holds District Court Need Not Make a Specific Findings to Reject Obstruction of Justice Enhancement

In United States v. Alvarado-Guizar, 2004 WL 547945 (9th Cir. Mar. 22, 2004), the Ninth Circuit joined the Second and Eighth Circuits in holding that a district court need not make specific findings of fact that a defendant had not committed perjury during trial in order to reject application of the obstruction of justice sentence enhancement. U.S.S.G. ' 3C1.1. In so holding, the court recognized disagreement by the First and Fifth Circuits.

In Alvarado-Guizar, the defendant was convicted by a jury of conspiracy and possession with intent to distribute methamphetamine after testifying in his own defense that he did not know about the conspiracy. First, the Ninth Circuit determined that despite some statements by the district court during sentencing recognizing that the jury had clearly not found the defendant's testimony to be credible, the district court had not articulated its own belief that the defendant had committed perjury, which would have mandated application of the guideline. Second, the Ninth Circuit rejected the government's argument that the case should be remanded on the ground that the district court had an obligation to articulate specific facts to support rejection of the obstruction of justice enhancement. The panel acknowledged that under Supreme Court precedent, a district court applying the obstruction of justice guideline to false testimony must articulate specific findings of fact that the elements of perjury have been satisfied. However, the Court reasoned that the purpose of the specific-finding requirement is “to safeguard the constitutional and statutory right to testify on one's own behalf in a criminal proceeding”; because a rejection of the sentence enhancement does not threaten that right, specific findings that there was no perjury need not be made.