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Case Notes

By ALM Staff | Law Journal Newsletters |
June 01, 2004

Speculative Expert Testimony on Alternate Design Is Inadmissible

Expert testimony regarding an alternate design may not be admitted when it is speculative or unreliable; the expert did not test his proposed design; the design was not published for peer review; the design did not have a “known rate of error”; and the expert cannot show a general acceptance of his design or his methodology. Zaremba v. General Motors Corp, No. 03-7565, Second U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals, Feb. 13, 2004.

On March 18, 1996, the three plaintiffs (one driver and two passengers) were in a 1994 T-Top Pontiac Trans Am. The driver had a blood alcohol level of 0.172. None of the plaintiffs was wearing a seat belt. The evidence established that the driver was operating the Trans Am at a speed approaching 100 miles per hour. While driving at that speed, the driver approached a fork in the road, struck a curb, rolled and crashed into an overpass railing. The driver was killed, the back seat passenger suffered severe brain damage and the front seat passenger sustained soft tissue injuries. Prior to the accident, a previous owner had totaled the Trans Am, and one of the plaintiffs purchased it and arranged for it to be rebuilt.

The plaintiffs commenced an action against General Motors, claiming two theories of design defect: 1) that the T-Top contained a substandard roof design; and 2) that the absence of laminated glass in the side windows, roof and rear hatch were an improper design. The plaintiffs argued that during the accident the T-Top panels became detached and shattered, and as a result, the driver and back seat passenger were ejected through portals created by the detached panels, causing them to suffer severe and fatal injuries after they were ejected by hitting hard surfaces outside of the vehicle. The plaintiffs argued that an alternative safer design existed which would have protected them from their injuries. The plaintiffs sought to call two expert witnesses, an engineer and a medical doctor, to testify that their injuries would not have been so serious if the alternate design had been implemented. General Motors challenged the testimony of the plaintiffs' witnesses under the Federal Rules of Evidence (FRE), arguing that the potential testimony was not rooted in proper methodology.

The district court agreed, excluded the testimony of the plaintiffs' experts, and granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment. The appellate court affirmed, finding no abuse of discretion by the district court. It held that under FRE 702, a district court has the right to consider whether an expert proffering scientific evidence is speculative or unreliable. It considered: 1) that the expert in question did not test his proposed design; 2) the design was not published for peer review; 3) the design did not have a “known rate of error” because it had never been tested; and 4) that the expert could not show a general acceptance of his design or his methodology

Speculative Expert Testimony on Alternate Design Is Inadmissible

Expert testimony regarding an alternate design may not be admitted when it is speculative or unreliable; the expert did not test his proposed design; the design was not published for peer review; the design did not have a “known rate of error”; and the expert cannot show a general acceptance of his design or his methodology. Zaremba v. General Motors Corp, No. 03-7565, Second U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals, Feb. 13, 2004.

On March 18, 1996, the three plaintiffs (one driver and two passengers) were in a 1994 T-Top Pontiac Trans Am. The driver had a blood alcohol level of 0.172. None of the plaintiffs was wearing a seat belt. The evidence established that the driver was operating the Trans Am at a speed approaching 100 miles per hour. While driving at that speed, the driver approached a fork in the road, struck a curb, rolled and crashed into an overpass railing. The driver was killed, the back seat passenger suffered severe brain damage and the front seat passenger sustained soft tissue injuries. Prior to the accident, a previous owner had totaled the Trans Am, and one of the plaintiffs purchased it and arranged for it to be rebuilt.

The plaintiffs commenced an action against General Motors, claiming two theories of design defect: 1) that the T-Top contained a substandard roof design; and 2) that the absence of laminated glass in the side windows, roof and rear hatch were an improper design. The plaintiffs argued that during the accident the T-Top panels became detached and shattered, and as a result, the driver and back seat passenger were ejected through portals created by the detached panels, causing them to suffer severe and fatal injuries after they were ejected by hitting hard surfaces outside of the vehicle. The plaintiffs argued that an alternative safer design existed which would have protected them from their injuries. The plaintiffs sought to call two expert witnesses, an engineer and a medical doctor, to testify that their injuries would not have been so serious if the alternate design had been implemented. General Motors challenged the testimony of the plaintiffs' witnesses under the Federal Rules of Evidence (FRE), arguing that the potential testimony was not rooted in proper methodology.

The district court agreed, excluded the testimony of the plaintiffs' experts, and granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment. The appellate court affirmed, finding no abuse of discretion by the district court. It held that under FRE 702, a district court has the right to consider whether an expert proffering scientific evidence is speculative or unreliable. It considered: 1) that the expert in question did not test his proposed design; 2) the design was not published for peer review; 3) the design did not have a “known rate of error” because it had never been tested; and 4) that the expert could not show a general acceptance of his design or his methodology

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