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One year ago, newspaper headlines in publications such as The Wall Street Journal and The New York Times sounded the alarm that litigation involving injury or disease attributed to silica could be the “Next Asbestos.” (Jonathan D. Glater, Suits on Silica Being Compared to Asbestos Cases, N.Y. Times, Sept. 6, 2003 at C1; Susan Warren, Silicosis Suits Rise Like Dust, Wall St. J., Sept. 4, 2003.) Since then, many legal and insurance industry commentators have tracked the growing number of silica claims. At the same time, the business and investment communities have taken a closer look to determine whether silica liabilities will present financial risk profiles similar to that experienced in the asbestos mass tort arena.
If the impact of silica litigation ultimately follows the same path as asbestos litigation in this country, it will exacerbate what the U.S. Supreme Court has called an “elephantine mass” of asbestos litigation that “defies customary judicial administration.” The crushing volume and weight of asbestos liability is not, however, limited to strictures in the administration of the U.S. civil justice system; it also imposes staggering, and sometimes unanticipated, financial burdens on a broad array of industries and companies. Indeed, asbestos litigation to date has already prompted the outlay of many billions of dollars in verdicts, settlements, and litigation fees and costs.
Companies caught in the web of asbestos litigation have certainly had to contend with a flood of plaintiffs' asbestos claims, but the “plaintiff versus defendant” component is only a part of the overall problem. Asbestos defendants meet significant challenges on many other fronts. For example, asbestos defendants often contend with: 1) worker discontent over past or present workplace safety considerations, 2) an increased incidence of workers' compensation claims and costs; 3) disputes with insurers refusing to meet defense and indemnification obligations; 4) battles over indemnification rights or legal responsibilities with past sellers or purchasers of product lines or facilities now implicated in asbestos litigation; and 5) heightened concerns by shareholders and investment interests over the extent of required financial disclosure and the potential impact of asbestos litigation on stock prices or company value.
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