Case Notes

The court first observed that to establish standing under Article III of the United States Constitution, a plaintiff must demonstrate, among other things, that he has suffered “injury in fact.” Here, the plaintiffs offered two arguments. First, they alleged that the lead in the defendants' products placed the plaintiffs and their children at risk of future physical injury from lead poisoning. Second, the plaintiffs alleged they suffered economic injury by purchasing products that the defendants advertised as safe, but in fact contained dangerous lead amounts, rendering the products unsuitable for their intended purpose.

The court first found that there were no allegations that the plaintiffs or anyone else ever had suffered any type of injury from defendants' products, nor had the products been recalled or failed to comply with any federal standards. Consequently, any claimed risk of future harm was too speculative to constitute injury in fact. On the plaintiffs' second argument, the court determined that any allegation of economic injury also lacked substance. The plaintiffs had purchased and consumed the products without suffering harm. They failed to allege the products had any diminished value because of the presence of lead or that they would have purchased different or cheaper products had they known about the lead. Because the plaintiffs thus received the benefit of their bargain in purchasing the products, their claim that the lead levels in the products were unsatisfactory to them was insufficient to demonstrate injury in fact. ' David R. Geiger, Foley Hoag LLP, Boston

MA Court Holds Plaintiffs in Class Actions Arising Out of Lead in Fruit Products Lacked Standing

In In re Fruit Juice Products Marketing and Sales Practices Litigation, C.A. No. 11-MD-02231-MAP (D. Mass. Dec. 21, 2011), the Environmental Law Foundation (ELF), a non-profit organization, sent notices to numerous manufacturers of juice and packaged fruit products, including the defendants, alleging their products contained amounts of lead greater than the permissible daily intake level set by the California Safe Drinking Water and Toxic Enforcement Act of 1986. The notice prompted the FDA to check the lead levels of some of the products and conclude that “[a]lmost all of the products ' contained a small amount of lead, but in each case the level found would not pose an unacceptable health risk.” Notwithstanding the FDA's conclusion, various individual plaintiffs brought suits in multiple federal district courts against various defendants.

The suits were consolidated for pre-trial purposes in an MDL in the U.S. District Court for the District of Massachusetts, and amended complaints by two groups of individual plaintiffs asserting class actions against two groups of defendants were filed. Based on the ELF notice, the plaintiffs alleged that the lead in the defendants' products could lead to health risks and claimed, among other things, violations of state consumer protection laws and breach of the implied warranties of merchantability and fitness for a particular purpose. The defendants moved to dismiss the complaints, arguing, among other things, that the plaintiffs lacked standing because none of them had been physically injured by the defendants' products. The court agreed and allowed the defendants' motion.

The court first observed that to establish standing under Article III of the United States Constitution, a plaintiff must demonstrate, among other things, that he has suffered “injury in fact.” Here, the plaintiffs offered two arguments. First, they alleged that the lead in the defendants' products placed the plaintiffs and their children at risk of future physical injury from lead poisoning. Second, the plaintiffs alleged they suffered economic injury by purchasing products that the defendants advertised as safe, but in fact contained dangerous lead amounts, rendering the products unsuitable for their intended purpose.

The court first found that there were no allegations that the plaintiffs or anyone else ever had suffered any type of injury from defendants' products, nor had the products been recalled or failed to comply with any federal standards. Consequently, any claimed risk of future harm was too speculative to constitute injury in fact. On the plaintiffs' second argument, the court determined that any allegation of economic injury also lacked substance. The plaintiffs had purchased and consumed the products without suffering harm. They failed to allege the products had any diminished value because of the presence of lead or that they would have purchased different or cheaper products had they known about the lead. Because the plaintiffs thus received the benefit of their bargain in purchasing the products, their claim that the lead levels in the products were unsatisfactory to them was insufficient to demonstrate injury in fact. ' David R. Geiger, Foley Hoag LLP, Boston