Bit Parts

Jazz Artist's Daughter Can't Pursue Conspiracy Claim over Music Royalties

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit decided that a daughter of late jazz artist Bill Tennyson Jr. lacked standing to pursue a royalty suit against ASCAP, The Harry Fox Agency and The Royalty Network, among other defendants. Tennyson v. ASCAP, 10-13711. The U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Florida had dismissed Tanya Tennyson's complaint seeking $350,000 in damages. Affirming, the Eleventh Circuit noted that Tennyson “alleges that the defendants conspired to divert her father's royalty earnings from 'his successors' and that they breached 'songwriters contracts' to avoid paying the royalties to the successors. She claims that the defendants engaged in copyright infringement and that they 'conspired against her so that she would not be able to recover her inheritance. ' [But i]n her brief to this Court Tennyson contends that her family members, who are not parties to this appeal, have mishandled her father's estate.” The appeals court continued: “The allegations that Tennyson makes on her own behalf are based on her dispute with her family members over how the estate should be administered and divided, but none of her family members are defendants. Her claims against the defendants are based on the allegation that the defendants caused the estate of her father to suffer damages.” The appeals court then observed: “Only a real party in interest has the capacity to bring a lawsuit. ' Under Florida law the only party who has the capacity to sue on behalf of an estate is the duly appointed legal representative of the estate. See, Brake v. Murphy, 687 So. 2d 842, 843 (Fla. 3d DCA 1996); see also, Fla. Stat. Ann. ” 733.607(1). Tennyson concedes in her brief to this Court that she is not the personal representative of her father's estate.”

Here are some key quotes from the decision by Chief District Judge Barry Ted Moskowitz of the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of California who decided that Victor Willis could terminate copyright assignments he made in English song lyrics he wrote for the Village People, of which Willis was a member: “When referring to a grant [made post-1977 and] executed by two or more authors of a joint work, [17 U.S.C. ']203(a)(1) refers to a 'grant' in the singular, not 'grants.' Thus, under the plain meaning of the statute, if two or more joint authors join in a grant of their copyright interests, a majority of the authors is necessary to terminate the grant. If, however, a single joint author enters into a grant of his copyright interest, that author alone can terminate his grant. ' Section 203(a)(1) certainly does not require that a joint author enter into a joint grant with one or more of his co-authors. Nor does the statute provide that where two or more joint authors enter into separate grants, a majority of those authors is needed to terminate any one of those grants. ' Furthermore, it makes sense to interpret the term 'grant' to refer to a single transaction whereby the rights of one or more joint authors was transferred, because the time for terminating a grant is calculated from [35 years following] the date of execution of the grant. Under Plaintiffs' interpretation, in the case of separate transfers by joint authors, there would be uncertainty regarding the date of execution, which could become a moving target.” Scorpio Music S.A. v. Willis, 11cv1557.

Jazz Artist's Daughter Can't Pursue Conspiracy Claim over Music Royalties

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit decided that a daughter of late jazz artist Bill Tennyson Jr. lacked standing to pursue a royalty suit against ASCAP, The Harry Fox Agency and The Royalty Network, among other defendants. Tennyson v. ASCAP, 10-13711. The U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Florida had dismissed Tanya Tennyson's complaint seeking $350,000 in damages. Affirming, the Eleventh Circuit noted that Tennyson “alleges that the defendants conspired to divert her father's royalty earnings from 'his successors' and that they breached 'songwriters contracts' to avoid paying the royalties to the successors. She claims that the defendants engaged in copyright infringement and that they 'conspired against her so that she would not be able to recover her inheritance. ' [But i]n her brief to this Court Tennyson contends that her family members, who are not parties to this appeal, have mishandled her father's estate.” The appeals court continued: “The allegations that Tennyson makes on her own behalf are based on her dispute with her family members over how the estate should be administered and divided, but none of her family members are defendants. Her claims against the defendants are based on the allegation that the defendants caused the estate of her father to suffer damages.” The appeals court then observed: “Only a real party in interest has the capacity to bring a lawsuit. ' Under Florida law the only party who has the capacity to sue on behalf of an estate is the duly appointed legal representative of the estate. See , Brake v. Murphy , 687 So. 2d 842, 843 (Fla. 3d DCA 1996); see also , Fla. Stat. Ann. ” 733.607(1). Tennyson concedes in her brief to this Court that she is not the personal representative of her father's estate.”

Here are some key quotes from the decision by Chief District Judge Barry Ted Moskowitz of the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of California who decided that Victor Willis could terminate copyright assignments he made in English song lyrics he wrote for the Village People, of which Willis was a member: “When referring to a grant [made post-1977 and] executed by two or more authors of a joint work, [17 U.S.C. ']203(a)(1) refers to a 'grant' in the singular, not 'grants.' Thus, under the plain meaning of the statute, if two or more joint authors join in a grant of their copyright interests, a majority of the authors is necessary to terminate the grant. If, however, a single joint author enters into a grant of his copyright interest, that author alone can terminate his grant. ' Section 203(a)(1) certainly does not require that a joint author enter into a joint grant with one or more of his co-authors. Nor does the statute provide that where two or more joint authors enter into separate grants, a majority of those authors is needed to terminate any one of those grants. ' Furthermore, it makes sense to interpret the term 'grant' to refer to a single transaction whereby the rights of one or more joint authors was transferred, because the time for terminating a grant is calculated from [35 years following] the date of execution of the grant. Under Plaintiffs' interpretation, in the case of separate transfers by joint authors, there would be uncertainty regarding the date of execution, which could become a moving target.” Scorpio Music S.A. v. Willis, 11cv1557.