Decisions of Interest

On Oct. 31, 2003, Capato applied to the SSA for survivor's insurance benefits for the twins. Her request was denied because the children were not deemed to be children of the deceased under Florida law. That state's law was used because 42 U.S.C. ' 416(h)(2)(A), titled “Determination of Family Status” (for the purpose of eligibility for survivor benefits), states: “In determining whether an applicant is the child ' of a fully or currently insured individual for purposes of this title, the Commissioner of Social Security shall apply such law as would be applied in determining the devolution of intestate personal property ' by the Courts of the State in which [such insured individual] was domiciled at the time of his death ' . Applicants who according to such law would have the same status relative to taking intestate personal property as a child or parent shall be deemed such.” Under Florida's intestate succession laws, which specifically refer to “afterborn heirs,” lawful heirs are defined as children “conceived before [the decedent's] death, but born thereafter.” Fla. Stat. Ann. S 732.106. In addition, Fla. Stat. Ann. S 742.17(4) provides that a child conceived after the death of a biological parent will not be eligible to make a claim against the deceased parent's estate unless that child was provided for in the decedent's will.

Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg wrote the opinion for the unanimous Court. She stated, “We find the Social Security Administration's ruling better attuned to the statute's text and its design to benefit primarily those the deceased wage earner actually supported in his or her lifetime.” The Court concluded that “even if the agency's longstanding interpretation is not the only reasonable one, it is at least a permissible construction entitled to deference.”

In Oleg Cassini Probate Fight, Old Settlement Agreement Still Good

The Second Department has confirmed several previous court determinations holding that the property settlement accompanying the 1953 divorce of designer Oleg Cassini and actress Gene Tierney, requiring Cassini to bequeath at least 50% of his estate to his two daughters, is enforceable. In the Matter of Oleg Cassini, 2012 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 4127; 2012 NY Slip Op 4162 (2d Dept. 5/30/12) (Skelos, J.P., Dickerson, Eng and Austin, JJ.).

Cassini was a resident of Nassau County at the time of his death in 2006, at the age of 92. Cassini's last will and testament, executed in the 1990s, was admitted to probate in the Surrogate's Court, Nassau County. By its terms, Cassini left the sum of $1 million to his daughter Christina, as well as similar relatively small sums for his other daughter and brother. The remainder of his approximately $52 million estate he left to his wife, who is also the executor of the estate.

Christina sought at least a quarter share in the value of her father's estate, relying on paragraph 17 of her parents' settlement agreement, in which the decedent agreed that he would, “by testamentary disposition[,] leave not less than one-half of his net estate ' to” Christina and her sister “in equal proportions.” The settlement agreement was incorporated, in its entirety, into a California “interlocutory judgment of divorce.” The interlocutory judgment of divorce was incorporated by reference into the final judgment of divorce.

The Surrogate's Court determined that Christina had made a prima facie showing that the decedent's obligation under paragraph 17 of the settlement agreement was enforceable as part of her parents' final divorce judgment and that the final judgment was never modified, vacated, or reversed. That court also found that the executor failed to raise any triable issue of fact to counter the petitioner's showing.

On appeal, the Second Department agreed, affirming the Surrogate Court's determination that Christina Cassini is entitled to not less than 25% of her father's estate.

After-Conceived Children Not Entitled to Social Security Survivor Benefits

Deferring to the administrative decision-makers in the Social Security Administration (SSA), the U.S. Supreme Court has declared that dependent eligibility for Social Security survivor benefits shall be determined by the laws of intestate succession in the deceased's state of residence at the time of death. Astrue v. Capato, 2012 U.S. Lexis 3782 (5/21/12).

The plaintiff in the original New Jersey federal court proceeding, Karen Capato, is the mother of twins conceived through artificial insemination 18 months after their father's death. The father, Robert Capato, had had his sperm stored in 2000 after discovering he had cancer and would have to undergo chemotherapy. The couple had a child through natural means in 2001. Robert Capato executed a will in Florida in that year, naming the couple's child and his two children from a previous marriage as his beneficiaries, but making no mention of children not yet conceived. He died in Florida in March 2002. Karen Capato was artificially inseminated in New Jersey in January 2003 and the twins were born later that year.

On Oct. 31, 2003, Capato applied to the SSA for survivor's insurance benefits for the twins. Her request was denied because the children were not deemed to be children of the deceased under Florida law. That state's law was used because 42 U.S.C. ' 416(h)(2)(A), titled “Determination of Family Status” (for the purpose of eligibility for survivor benefits), states: “In determining whether an applicant is the child ' of a fully or currently insured individual for purposes of this title, the Commissioner of Social Security shall apply such law as would be applied in determining the devolution of intestate personal property ' by the Courts of the State in which [such insured individual] was domiciled at the time of his death ' . Applicants who according to such law would have the same status relative to taking intestate personal property as a child or parent shall be deemed such.” Under Florida's intestate succession laws, which specifically refer to “afterborn heirs,” lawful heirs are defined as children “conceived before [the decedent's] death, but born thereafter.” Fla. Stat. Ann. S 732.106. In addition, Fla. Stat. Ann. S 742.17(4) provides that a child conceived after the death of a biological parent will not be eligible to make a claim against the deceased parent's estate unless that child was provided for in the decedent's will.

Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg wrote the opinion for the unanimous Court. She stated, “We find the Social Security Administration's ruling better attuned to the statute's text and its design to benefit primarily those the deceased wage earner actually supported in his or her lifetime.” The Court concluded that “even if the agency's longstanding interpretation is not the only reasonable one, it is at least a permissible construction entitled to deference.”

In Oleg Cassini Probate Fight, Old Settlement Agreement Still Good

The Second Department has confirmed several previous court determinations holding that the property settlement accompanying the 1953 divorce of designer Oleg Cassini and actress Gene Tierney, requiring Cassini to bequeath at least 50% of his estate to his two daughters, is enforceable. In the Matter of Oleg Cassini, 2012 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 4127; 2012 NY Slip Op 4162 (2d Dept. 5/30/12) (Skelos, J.P., Dickerson, Eng and Austin, JJ.).

Cassini was a resident of Nassau County at the time of his death in 2006, at the age of 92. Cassini's last will and testament, executed in the 1990s, was admitted to probate in the Surrogate's Court, Nassau County. By its terms, Cassini left the sum of $1 million to his daughter Christina, as well as similar relatively small sums for his other daughter and brother. The remainder of his approximately $52 million estate he left to his wife, who is also the executor of the estate.

Christina sought at least a quarter share in the value of her father's estate, relying on paragraph 17 of her parents' settlement agreement, in which the decedent agreed that he would, “by testamentary disposition[,] leave not less than one-half of his net estate ' to” Christina and her sister “in equal proportions.” The settlement agreement was incorporated, in its entirety, into a California “interlocutory judgment of divorce.” The interlocutory judgment of divorce was incorporated by reference into the final judgment of divorce.

The Surrogate's Court determined that Christina had made a prima facie showing that the decedent's obligation under paragraph 17 of the settlement agreement was enforceable as part of her parents' final divorce judgment and that the final judgment was never modified, vacated, or reversed. That court also found that the executor failed to raise any triable issue of fact to counter the petitioner's showing.

On appeal, the Second Department agreed, affirming the Surrogate Court's determination that Christina Cassini is entitled to not less than 25% of her father's estate.