NJ & CT News

Parent Coordinator Compensated for Time Spent Responding to Grievances

New Jersey's Supreme Court ruled Aug. 2 that attorneys appointed as parenting coordinators may in some cases bill their unhappy clients for time spent answering their grievances. An attorney in that situation may not, however, bill for hours spent in court representing herself, because other litigants in similar circumstances who choose to appear on their own behalfs are not entitled to such compensation. Segal v. Lynch, A-127-10. The underlying case saw the separated common-law couple Moses Segal and Cynthia Lynch fighting a protracted battle over custody of their children. They each signed an agreement with parenting coordinator and licensed attorney Linda Schofel in which they agreed to pay her for writing reports, among other things. The contract set the fee for these services at $325 per hour and called for each of the parents to pay an equal share. The agreement also stated that if Schofel found that one parent was abusing the process she would be authorized to bill only the guilty party. She so found after Moses Segal called for Schofel's recusal and then lodged 20 grievances against her. She answered these complaints by composing an 89-page response, spending a total of 100 hours writing it and preparing exhibits. Segal was thus billed $33,304, and he protested. While a lower court awarded Schofel not only the $33,304, it also gave here $5,728 for the time she spent as an attorney representing herself and her firm pro se in opposition to Segal's motions. When the case got to the State Supreme Court, it reversed the award of attorney fees, stating, “Just as others who appear in our courts seeking justice are not compensated for the value of the time they expend in that effort, so too is Schofel prohibited from being paid for the time she spent appearing on her behalf.” Schofel's position as a parenting coordinator did not change this fact. However, the court was persuaded by the parenting coordinator agreement that Schofel was entitled to compensation for the time she spent preparing her written response to Segal's 20 grievances. It observed that Rule of Professional Conduct (RPC) 1.5 prohibits attorneys representing themselves from charging clients for time spent defending ethics grievances, but found that “[a]lthough Schofel is an attorney whose conduct is generally governed by the RPCs, we do not extend that prohibition found in RPC 1.5 to an attorney, acting as a parenting coordinator, in the circumstances presented in this appeal.” Specifically, the court found that the nature of grievances against a parenting coordinator, and the mechanism for resolution of those grievances found in the Parent Coordinator Pilot Program Implementation Guidelines, is different from RPC 1.5's methods for handling ethics grievances. Since the retainer agreement between Schofel and the parents said that the parent coordinator would be compensated for writing reports, and Segal had agreed to that provision, he must pay Schofel for the time she spent writing a report responding to his grievances.

CONNECTICUT

Restraining Orders Under This Statute Are for Family Offenses Only

In Connecticut v. Clark, 2012 Conn. App. LEXIS 361 (7/31/12), Connecticut's Appellate Division has reversed a trial court's prohibition against a man having contact with the victim of his assault. The reason is that conviction under General Statutes (Rev. to 2007) ' 53a-40e, as amended by Public Acts 2007, No. 07-123, ' 5, permits a court to issue a criminal restraining order following conviction only when a victim is a family or household member, as defined in General Statutes ' 46b-38a. The victim in Clark, however, had only just met the defendant at the time the assault occurred, in the bar in which their altercation took place. “Suffice to say,” stated the appeals court, “the brief and violent moment in time that the victim and the defendant shared clearly reveals that the relationship between them fits none of the statutory definitions that underlie the court's authority to issue a standing criminal restraining order. In short, the victim and the defendant were not family or household members with one another. The [trial] court was therefore without authority to issue a standing criminal restraining order pursuant to ' 53a-40e in the case at hand.”

NEW JERSEY

It Is Error to Use Child Support Guidelines When Children in College

New Jersey's Appellate Division says it is error to apply the child-support guidelines of New Jersey Court Rule (R.) 5:6A to support calculations when a child goes away to college. The decision in Jacoby v. Jacoby, A-4278-10T2, 2012 N.J. Super. LEXIS 118 (7/11/12), remands the case for judicial determination of the proper amount of support needed for a child attending college. Although the motion for reduction in child support was made in 2009, its history goes back to 2007, when a divorced couple's older child entered college. The court at that time reduced the father's child support payments using a formula based on the child support guidelines. After that success, the father two years later moved for similar relief in the Chancery Division, Family Part, Monmouth County, when his younger child also entered college. He asked the court to employ the formula used to reduce his support payment to the older child, but the motion judge declined. She did, however, find that the child's entering college constituted a change in circumstances and recalculated the father's obligation using the child-support guidelines of R 5:6A. On appeal, the father argued that the motion court should have used the same formula used in the 2007 case, as it amounted to “the law of the case.” The Appellate Division disagreed, noting that the law-of-the-case rule applies only where a new matter substantially duplicates a previously decided matter in facts, proofs and interested parties. Here, however, the issues to resolve involved a different child, and the possibility of different parental financial circumstances. Finding that a move to college amounts to a changed circumstance, but not necessarily a reduction in support needs, the appeals court faulted the Family Part's use of R. 5.6A's child support guidelines. Instead, the factors in New Jersey Statutes Annotated (N.J.S.A.) 2A:34-23a (i.e., the needs of the child, parents' standard of living and earning capacity, etc.) should have been employed to arrive at the proper amount of child support.

Parent Coordinator Compensated for Time Spent Responding to Grievances

New Jersey's Supreme Court ruled Aug. 2 that attorneys appointed as parenting coordinators may in some cases bill their unhappy clients for time spent answering their grievances. An attorney in that situation may not, however, bill for hours spent in court representing herself, because other litigants in similar circumstances who choose to appear on their own behalfs are not entitled to such compensation. Segal v. Lynch, A-127-10. The underlying case saw the separated common-law couple Moses Segal and Cynthia Lynch fighting a protracted battle over custody of their children. They each signed an agreement with parenting coordinator and licensed attorney Linda Schofel in which they agreed to pay her for writing reports, among other things. The contract set the fee for these services at $325 per hour and called for each of the parents to pay an equal share. The agreement also stated that if Schofel found that one parent was abusing the process she would be authorized to bill only the guilty party. She so found after Moses Segal called for Schofel's recusal and then lodged 20 grievances against her. She answered these complaints by composing an 89-page response, spending a total of 100 hours writing it and preparing exhibits. Segal was thus billed $33,304, and he protested. While a lower court awarded Schofel not only the $33,304, it also gave here $5,728 for the time she spent as an attorney representing herself and her firm pro se in opposition to Segal's motions. When the case got to the State Supreme Court, it reversed the award of attorney fees, stating, “Just as others who appear in our courts seeking justice are not compensated for the value of the time they expend in that effort, so too is Schofel prohibited from being paid for the time she spent appearing on her behalf.” Schofel's position as a parenting coordinator did not change this fact. However, the court was persuaded by the parenting coordinator agreement that Schofel was entitled to compensation for the time she spent preparing her written response to Segal's 20 grievances. It observed that Rule of Professional Conduct (RPC) 1.5 prohibits attorneys representing themselves from charging clients for time spent defending ethics grievances, but found that “[a]lthough Schofel is an attorney whose conduct is generally governed by the RPCs, we do not extend that prohibition found in RPC 1.5 to an attorney, acting as a parenting coordinator, in the circumstances presented in this appeal.” Specifically, the court found that the nature of grievances against a parenting coordinator, and the mechanism for resolution of those grievances found in the Parent Coordinator Pilot Program Implementation Guidelines, is different from RPC 1.5's methods for handling ethics grievances. Since the retainer agreement between Schofel and the parents said that the parent coordinator would be compensated for writing reports, and Segal had agreed to that provision, he must pay Schofel for the time she spent writing a report responding to his grievances.

CONNECTICUT

Restraining Orders Under This Statute Are for Family Offenses Only

In Connecticut v. Clark, 2012 Conn. App. LEXIS 361 (7/31/12), Connecticut's Appellate Division has reversed a trial court's prohibition against a man having contact with the victim of his assault. The reason is that conviction under General Statutes (Rev. to 2007) ' 53a-40e, as amended by Public Acts 2007, No. 07-123, ' 5, permits a court to issue a criminal restraining order following conviction only when a victim is a family or household member, as defined in General Statutes ' 46b-38a. The victim in Clark, however, had only just met the defendant at the time the assault occurred, in the bar in which their altercation took place. “Suffice to say,” stated the appeals court, “the brief and violent moment in time that the victim and the defendant shared clearly reveals that the relationship between them fits none of the statutory definitions that underlie the court's authority to issue a standing criminal restraining order. In short, the victim and the defendant were not family or household members with one another. The [trial] court was therefore without authority to issue a standing criminal restraining order pursuant to ' 53a-40e in the case at hand.”