NJ & CT News

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Get It in Writing

The Superior Court of New Jersey, Appellate Division, has sided with one child of a deceased man over his other two children (with a different mother) regarding disposition of life insurance funds. The court did so because that boy's mother entered into a written agreement requiring the father to obtain a life insurance policy to guarantee his child support payments. Both mothers entered into support agreements with the man, and each of these agreements was sanctioned by the courts. However, although in Prudential Insurance Company of America v. Reiter, 2013 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 240 (2/4/13), the support agreement with the mother of two was the first to be entered into; the second agreement laid out the life insurance requirement while the first did not. Before his death, the father' reconciled with the mother of two, naming her and her children as beneficiaries of his life insurance policy. When he died, both mothers sought distribution of the life insurance proceeds. The lower and appeals courts agreed that, as stated by the Appellate Division, “it is not the date of the parties' relationship that establishes the priority of interest to the proceeds of the policy, rather it is the existence of a court order establishing the life insurance obligation that gives it priority over a subsequent contractual arrangement made by a decedent with an insurance carrier. ' A parent obligated to maintain life insurance for the support of a child cannot effectively terminate the obligation by disregarding or taking action inconsistent with the obligation.”

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CONNECTICUT

Extra Hearing Changes Date of Trial's Closure

In Bonito v. Bonito, 2013 Conn. App. LEXIS 70 (4/12/13), the Appellate Court of Connecticut interpreted Conn. Gen. Stat. ' 51-183b in a way that upheld a judgment of divorce, even though the final judgment was rendered relatively long after original arguments were completed. The divorce trial had ended on Aug. 23, 2010, but soon thereafter the mother asked for an emergency hearing to bring further information to the court concerning custody of the couple's child. The final hearing on that issue took place on Sept. 29, 2010, with the court siding with the mother and terminating the father's visitation rights. The final divorce rulings were issued on Jan. 18, 2011, 111 days following the evidentiary hearing.

The husband moved to vacate the judgment, claiming its tardy filing stripped the trial court of jurisdiciton. He pointed to section 51-183b, which states: “Any judge of the Superior Court and any judge trial referee who has the power to render judgment, who has commenced the trial of any civil cause, shall have power to continue such trial and shall render judgment not later than one hundred and twenty days from the completion date of the trial of such civil cause. The parties may waive the provisions of this section.” The husband argued that the trial ended on Aug. 23, 2010; that the court did not render a decision within 120 days of that date; that he was not waiving his rights to demand a speedy decision under ' 51-183b; and that, therefore, a new trial must be ordered.

The question for the appellate court, therefore, was just when had the “trial” ended? Was it on Aug. 23 or on Sept. 29, 2010? The court stated, “It is undisputed that, in reaching a final judgment in the dissolution action, the court had' to resolve issues related to the parties' children, such as custody and visitation rights.” Thus, the emergency hearing was clearly a continuation of the divorce action, and the clock did not start running until Sept. 29. As the final decision was rendered within a 120-day period subsequent to that date, it was not untimely, and no new trial was in order.

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NEW JERSEY

Appeals Court: Palimony Suits Filed After January 2010 Not Actionable

New Jersey's Appellate Division has declared that even if an oral promise to support a paramour was made prior to the 2010 law that now requires palimony agreements to be in writing, it will not be enforced if the claim for support was made subsequent to that law's effective date. The decision in Maeker v. Ross, A-3034-11, is the first precedential appellate ruling on the issue of the applicability of the amendment to New Jersey's statute of frauds, which brought palimony contracts under the statute's umbrella as of Jan. 18, 2010. The ruling leaves Beverly Maeker ' who filed her complaint against William Ross in July 2011 after he ended their 13-year relationship ' without recourse, although she claims Ross promised to support her for life. While the trial court had sided with Maeker after finding that a party to a contract should not be entitled to void it simply by manipulating the timing of his breach, the appeals court concluded that the cause of action arose only when the breach occurred. Maeker's lawyer, Angelo Sarno of Snyder & Sarno in Roseland, said after the ruling, “This statute takes away people's rights. One day you have it, one day you don't.” He plans to seek further appellate review on behalf of his client.

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Get It in Writing

The Superior Court of New Jersey, Appellate Division, has sided with one child of a deceased man over his other two children (with a different mother) regarding disposition of life insurance funds. The court did so because that boy's mother entered into a written agreement requiring the father to obtain a life insurance policy to guarantee his child support payments. Both mothers entered into support agreements with the man, and each of these agreements was sanctioned by the courts. However, although in Prudential Insurance Company of America v. Reiter, 2013 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 240 (2/4/13), the support agreement with the mother of two was the first to be entered into; the second agreement laid out the life insurance requirement while the first did not. Before his death, the father' reconciled with the mother of two, naming her and her children as beneficiaries of his life insurance policy. When he died, both mothers sought distribution of the life insurance proceeds. The lower and appeals courts agreed that, as stated by the Appellate Division, “it is not the date of the parties' relationship that establishes the priority of interest to the proceeds of the policy, rather it is the existence of a court order establishing the life insurance obligation that gives it priority over a subsequent contractual arrangement made by a decedent with an insurance carrier. ' A parent obligated to maintain life insurance for the support of a child cannot effectively terminate the obligation by disregarding or taking action inconsistent with the obligation.”

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CONNECTICUT

Extra Hearing Changes Date of Trial's Closure

In Bonito v. Bonito, 2013 Conn. App. LEXIS 70 (4/12/13), the Appellate Court of Connecticut interpreted Conn. Gen. Stat. ' 51-183b in a way that upheld a judgment of divorce, even though the final judgment was rendered relatively long after original arguments were completed. The divorce trial had ended on Aug. 23, 2010, but soon thereafter the mother asked for an emergency hearing to bring further information to the court concerning custody of the couple's child. The final hearing on that issue took place on Sept. 29, 2010, with the court siding with the mother and terminating the father's visitation rights. The final divorce rulings were issued on Jan. 18, 2011, 111 days following the evidentiary hearing.

The husband moved to vacate the judgment, claiming its tardy filing stripped the trial court of jurisdiciton. He pointed to section 51-183b, which states: “Any judge of the Superior Court and any judge trial referee who has the power to render judgment, who has commenced the trial of any civil cause, shall have power to continue such trial and shall render judgment not later than one hundred and twenty days from the completion date of the trial of such civil cause. The parties may waive the provisions of this section.” The husband argued that the trial ended on Aug. 23, 2010; that the court did not render a decision within 120 days of that date; that he was not waiving his rights to demand a speedy decision under ' 51-183b; and that, therefore, a new trial must be ordered.

The question for the appellate court, therefore, was just when had the “trial” ended? Was it on Aug. 23 or on Sept. 29, 2010? The court stated, “It is undisputed that, in reaching a final judgment in the dissolution action, the court had' to resolve issues related to the parties' children, such as custody and visitation rights.” Thus, the emergency hearing was clearly a continuation of the divorce action, and the clock did not start running until Sept. 29. As the final decision was rendered within a 120-day period subsequent to that date, it was not untimely, and no new trial was in order.

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