Decisions of Interest

The U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of New York dismissed the actions against the judges and referee after concluding that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction. The court determined that the case presented no cognizable federal questions, because federal courts are not authorized to hear matters pertaining to domestic relations; those matters are handled almost exclusively by state courts. And although the plaintiff claimed that her constitutional rights had been infringed by the state court decisions with which she disagreed, she was in fact simply unhappy with the outcome of her domestic relations case.

Further, the court cited to two cases ' Awan v. Kramer, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 160039 (E.D.N.Y. 2012) and Mitchell-Angel v. Cronin, 1996 U.S. App. LEXIS 4416 (2d Cir. 1996) ' in which courts in its circuit held that the federal jurisdictional exception for family law cases also extends to civil rights actions directed at challenging domestic relations proceedings. In addition, the doctrine of judicial immunity, explained in the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9 (1988), precluded an action seeking damages against any jurist or referee for actions taken in performance of his or her judicial duties, even if those actions were erroneous or based on malice. Accordingly, the complaints against the judges and referee must be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

The claims against the State of New York and Unified Court System were also not cognizable on sovereign immunity grounds. The 11th Amendment to the Constitution precludes suit by a private individual against a sovereign state in federal court unless the state consents to be sued, and the plaintiff here did not allege that New York had waived its sovereign immunity.'

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No Maintenance Where Wife Self-Supporting and Husband Did Not Waste Assets

Supreme Court erred by granting a wife maintenance because she was fully self-supporting and failed to prove that her husband had dissipated marital assets prior to commencement of the action. McCaffrey v. McCaffrey, 2013 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 3991 (3d Dept. 6/6/13) (Rose, J.P., Lahtinen, Spain and Garry, JJ.).

When the parties, who had been married for 12 years, divorced, the court ordered the husband to pay the wife maintenance. He appealed. The Appellate Division, Third Department, found the trial court abused its discretion because the Court of Appeals has said that the primary purpose of maintenance is to encourage self sufficiency (Quinn v. Quinn, 61 AD3d 1067 (2009). New York's high court has also stated that “[m]aintenance is appropriate where ' the marriage is of long duration, the recipient spouse has been out of the work force for a number of years, has sacrificed her or his own career development or has made substantial noneconomic contributions to the household or to the career of the payor.” Ndulo v. Ndulo, 66 AD3d 1263, 1265 (2009).

The wife in this action was employed at the end of the 12-year marriage (which the Third Department did not consider a marriage of long duration) and was earning $65,000 per year, while the husband was earning $113,000. And although the trial court had apparently considered the couple's high pre-divorce standard of living in making its decision, the appeals court observed that this had actually been financed in large part by their high rate of borrowing. “In our view, Supreme Court gave inadequate consideration to the balancing of the wife's needs ' for which her own salary should provide adequate support ' with the husband's ability to pay,” stated the court.

In addition, the Third Department disagreed with the wife's contention that she was entitled to maintenance because of the husband's wasteful dissipation of their marital assets. The husband showed that his gambling losses had been minimal (no more than $2,000) and that he had actually broken even when considering his marital gambling career overall. His support of his paramour and their child (who was conceived before the divorce proceedings were commenced and born while the action was pending) did not begin until after the commencement date. And although the wife asserted that the husband had incurred significant debt without her knowledge, he claimed that this debt was used for the marital household and work expenses. Because the wife failed to rebut his claims, the court must treat the disputed debts as marital rather than as wasteful dissipation.

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Federal Court to Divorce Litigant: We Cannot Punish State Judges

Finding that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction, the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of New York has dismissed a divorce and child custody litigant's complaints against the State of New York and the judges who oversaw her case there. Renner v. Stanton, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 65015 (E.D.N.Y. 5/7/13).

A woman, unhappy with the decisions made in her divorce and child custody proceedings, filed suit against the judges and a referee who had presided over those proceedings. She claimed they were all biased against her, that they should have recused themselves upon her request, and that they failed to timely consider motions, along with a host of other alleged missteps. The plaintiff also accused the Unified Court System and the State of New York of failing to choose qualified judges, failing to properly train them, and failing to remove the “bad judges” from the bench. She sought both monetary and injunctive relief in federal court.

The U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of New York dismissed the actions against the judges and referee after concluding that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction. The court determined that the case presented no cognizable federal questions, because federal courts are not authorized to hear matters pertaining to domestic relations; those matters are handled almost exclusively by state courts. And although the plaintiff claimed that her constitutional rights had been infringed by the state court decisions with which she disagreed, she was in fact simply unhappy with the outcome of her domestic relations case.

Further, the court cited to two cases ' Awan v. Kramer, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 160039 (E.D.N.Y. 2012) and Mitchell-Angel v. Cronin, 1996 U.S. App. LEXIS 4416 (2d Cir. 1996) ' in which courts in its circuit held that the federal jurisdictional exception for family law cases also extends to civil rights actions directed at challenging domestic relations proceedings. In addition, the doctrine of judicial immunity, explained in the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Mireles v. Waco , 502 U.S. 9 (1988), precluded an action seeking damages against any jurist or referee for actions taken in performance of his or her judicial duties, even if those actions were erroneous or based on malice. Accordingly, the complaints against the judges and referee must be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

The claims against the State of New York and Unified Court System were also not cognizable on sovereign immunity grounds. The 11th Amendment to the Constitution precludes suit by a private individual against a sovereign state in federal court unless the state consents to be sued, and the plaintiff here did not allege that New York had waived its sovereign immunity.'

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No Maintenance Where Wife Self-Supporting and Husband Did Not Waste Assets

Supreme Court erred by granting a wife maintenance because she was fully self-supporting and failed to prove that her husband had dissipated marital assets prior to commencement of the action. McCaffrey v. McCaffrey , 2013 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 3991 (3d Dept. 6/6/13) (Rose, J.P., Lahtinen, Spain and Garry, JJ.).

When the parties, who had been married for 12 years, divorced, the court ordered the husband to pay the wife maintenance. He appealed. The Appellate Division, Third Department, found the trial court abused its discretion because the Court of Appeals has said that the primary purpose of maintenance is to encourage self sufficiency ( Quinn v. Quinn , 61 AD3d 1067 (2009). New York's high court has also stated that “[m]aintenance is appropriate where ' the marriage is of long duration, the recipient spouse has been out of the work force for a number of years, has sacrificed her or his own career development or has made substantial noneconomic contributions to the household or to the career of the payor.” Ndulo v. Ndulo , 66 AD3d 1263, 1265 (2009).

The wife in this action was employed at the end of the 12-year marriage (which the Third Department did not consider a marriage of long duration) and was earning $65,000 per year, while the husband was earning $113,000. And although the trial court had apparently considered the couple's high pre-divorce standard of living in making its decision, the appeals court observed that this had actually been financed in large part by their high rate of borrowing. “In our view, Supreme Court gave inadequate consideration to the balancing of the wife's needs ' for which her own salary should provide adequate support ' with the husband's ability to pay,” stated the court.

In addition, the Third Department disagreed with the wife's contention that she was entitled to maintenance because of the husband's wasteful dissipation of their marital assets. The husband showed that his gambling losses had been minimal (no more than $2,000) and that he had actually broken even when considering his marital gambling career overall. His support of his paramour and their child (who was conceived before the divorce proceedings were commenced and born while the action was pending) did not begin until after the commencement date. And although the wife asserted that the husband had incurred significant debt without her knowledge, he claimed that this debt was used for the marital household and work expenses. Because the wife failed to rebut his claims, the court must treat the disputed debts as marital rather than as wasteful dissipation.

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