NJ & CT News

Record Supporting Emancipation Finding Is Lacking

The Superior Court of New Jersey's Appellate Division recently reversed a lower court's finding that a college student was “emancipated” such that his father should no longer be required to contribute to the young man's educational expenses. The parties had agreed in their Property Settlement Agreement (PSA) that their son would not be deemed emancipated until he completed undergraduate college, provided that he attend such college full time (taking at least 12 credits per semester). The son attended community college for two years, then transferred to Rutgers University, where he hoped to be accepted into the music program. After a year at Rutgers, having not been admitted to the music program there, he transferred to another four-year college, West Chester University. There, according to the mother, he would have to start anew, attending for a full four-year program. The mother claimed her son informed the father of this last change, but the father denied it. The father paid his share for three semesters at West Chester, but then sought a declaration that the son was emancipated.

The lower court granted that request, finding that although it might have been reasonable for the son to take some time to “find his way,” a seven-plus-year period of undergraduate college attendance was too much to ask the father to support, particularly since father and son were not close. This decision was reversed on appeal because of a lack of support in the record for the emancipation determination, which should be based on a finding that the child has “moved beyond the sphere of influence and responsibility exercised by a a parent and obtains an independent status of his or her own.” Bishop v. Bishop, 287 N.J. Super. 593 (Ch. Div. 1995).

The appellate court noted that the parties here had disputes on several issues pertaining to the son's attainment of independent status, such as whether the son's disabilities had contributed to his failure to complete college within four years, or if they prevented him from supporting himself. They did not agree on whether their son must spend a full four years at West Chester University in order to attain a degree, nor about whether they had actually contemplated when signing their PSA that there would be no limit on the time in which the son could complete his undergraduate studies. Because these and other key questions had not been addressed below, the Appellate Division reversed and remanded for a plenary hearing.

CONNECTICUT

No 'Change in Circumstances' When Agreement Says Wife Will Cohabit with Friend

The Superior Court of Connecticut, Judicial District of Middlesex at Middletown, recently declined to terminate an ex-wife's alimony based on her habitation with a family friend, because that living arrangement was contemplated by the parties at the time of separation. In Beauchamp v. Beauchamp, 2013 Conn. Super. LEXIS 2251 (10/8/13), the parties' divorce decree incorporated the terms of their separation agreement, which provided, inter alia, that “[t]he Husband shall pay periodic alimony to the Wife in the amount of $200 per week for a period of five years from the date of dissolution. … The order of alimony shall terminate sooner upon the death of either party, the wife's remarriage, or the wife's cohabitation pursuant to Connecticut General Statutes 46b-86.”

The settlement agreement also stated that the husband would have exclusive use of the marital home and that “[t]he Wife shall have thirty (30) days from date of judgment to vacate the marital home with herself and the children to live in Glastonbury, Connecticut and represents that her address is 6 Gayfeather Lane, Glastonbury, CT 06033.” The owner/occupant of 6 Gayfether Lane is a friend of both of the parties. The husband never paid alimony, saying he found out that his ex-wife was living with this male friend. He testified that he thought the wife was going to pay rent to the friend, and that the friend would move out of the home when the wife and children moved in. The court found this
testimony not credible, since the wife had no income at the time of divorce and could not possibly be expected to pay rent with the little money she was to receive in alimony.

Connecticut General Statutes 46b-86 defines the alimony-altering nature of a cohabitation as one in which the new living arrangement results in a change in circumstances that alters the parties' financial needs. In Beauchamp, athough the wife did cohabit with the friend, this was contemplated by the settlement agreement, and thus her move did not alter the parties' financial interests. Therefore, the court denied the husband's motion to terminate alimony.

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NEW JERSEY

Same-Sex Marriage: Christie Gives Up the Fight

In October, New Jersey Governor Chris Christie officially put an end to the government's campaign to keep same-sex marriage out of the State, bowing to the courts that had held that gay civil union legislation was not enough. New Jersey's Supreme Court refused on Oct. 18 to impose a stay on the Oct. 21 start date for gay marriages. That Sept. 27 order came from Judge Mary Jacobson, who found that civil union partners were being denied equal access to federal benefits. In declining to impose the stay, the Supreme Court acknowledged its agreement with Judge Jacobson's concerns, stating, “The state has advanced a number of arguments, but none of them overcome this reality: Same-sex couples who cannot marry are not treated equally under the law today. The harm to them is real, not abstract or speculative.” It also found the government was not likely to prevail on the merits of its appeal. With the State's court challenges completed, the next step is likely legislative action to codify Judge Jacobson's order and to address questions that it left unanswered, such as whether clergymen can legally refuse to perform same-sex marriages on religious ground. Legislation addressing these issues passed last year but was vetoed by Gov. Christie.

Record Supporting Emancipation Finding Is Lacking

The Superior Court of New Jersey's Appellate Division recently reversed a lower court's finding that a college student was “emancipated” such that his father should no longer be required to contribute to the young man's educational expenses. The parties had agreed in their Property Settlement Agreement (PSA) that their son would not be deemed emancipated until he completed undergraduate college, provided that he attend such college full time (taking at least 12 credits per semester). The son attended community college for two years, then transferred to Rutgers University, where he hoped to be accepted into the music program. After a year at Rutgers, having not been admitted to the music program there, he transferred to another four-year college, West Chester University. There, according to the mother, he would have to start anew, attending for a full four-year program. The mother claimed her son informed the father of this last change, but the father denied it. The father paid his share for three semesters at West Chester, but then sought a declaration that the son was emancipated.

The lower court granted that request, finding that although it might have been reasonable for the son to take some time to “find his way,” a seven-plus-year period of undergraduate college attendance was too much to ask the father to support, particularly since father and son were not close. This decision was reversed on appeal because of a lack of support in the record for the emancipation determination, which should be based on a finding that the child has “moved beyond the sphere of influence and responsibility exercised by a a parent and obtains an independent status of his or her own.” Bishop v. Bishop , 287 N.J. Super. 593 (Ch. Div. 1995).

The appellate court noted that the parties here had disputes on several issues pertaining to the son's attainment of independent status, such as whether the son's disabilities had contributed to his failure to complete college within four years, or if they prevented him from supporting himself. They did not agree on whether their son must spend a full four years at West Chester University in order to attain a degree, nor about whether they had actually contemplated when signing their PSA that there would be no limit on the time in which the son could complete his undergraduate studies. Because these and other key questions had not been addressed below, the Appellate Division reversed and remanded for a plenary hearing.

CONNECTICUT

No 'Change in Circumstances' When Agreement Says Wife Will Cohabit with Friend

The Superior Court of Connecticut, Judicial District of Middlesex at Middletown, recently declined to terminate an ex-wife's alimony based on her habitation with a family friend, because that living arrangement was contemplated by the parties at the time of separation. In Beauchamp v. Beauchamp, 2013 Conn. Super. LEXIS 2251 (10/8/13), the parties' divorce decree incorporated the terms of their separation agreement, which provided, inter alia, that “[t]he Husband shall pay periodic alimony to the Wife in the amount of $200 per week for a period of five years from the date of dissolution. … The order of alimony shall terminate sooner upon the death of either party, the wife's remarriage, or the wife's cohabitation pursuant to Connecticut General Statutes 46b-86.”

The settlement agreement also stated that the husband would have exclusive use of the marital home and that “[t]he Wife shall have thirty (30) days from date of judgment to vacate the marital home with herself and the children to live in Glastonbury, Connecticut and represents that her address is 6 Gayfeather Lane, Glastonbury, CT 06033.” The owner/occupant of 6 Gayfether Lane is a friend of both of the parties. The husband never paid alimony, saying he found out that his ex-wife was living with this male friend. He testified that he thought the wife was going to pay rent to the friend, and that the friend would move out of the home when the wife and children moved in. The court found this
testimony not credible, since the wife had no income at the time of divorce and could not possibly be expected to pay rent with the little money she was to receive in alimony.

Connecticut General Statutes 46b-86 defines the alimony-altering nature of a cohabitation as one in which the new living arrangement results in a change in circumstances that alters the parties' financial needs. In Beauchamp, athough the wife did cohabit with the friend, this was contemplated by the settlement agreement, and thus her move did not alter the parties' financial interests. Therefore, the court denied the husband's motion to terminate alimony.

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