Decisions of Interest

The Surrogate's Court found there was enough evidence that the religious marriage ceremony took place, but denied Geaney's request for summary determination that she was the decedent's wife. Questions remained as to whether the marriage ceremony was legally sufficient. To be legally sufficient, a religious mariage ceremony must comply with New York's Domestic Relations Law (DRL): The parties must participate in the religious ceremony; it must be officiated over by a member of the clergy authorized to perform such ceremonies; another witness must also be present; and the couple must solemnly declare that they take each other as husband and wife. DRL ” 11, 12. Here, Geaney had not produced valid evidence that the Iman who performed the ceremony was authorized to perform marriages, and she did not produce evidence that the couple had solemnly declared that they took each other as husband and wife.

The court specifically declined to determine ' as the decedent's sister asked it to do ' that the ceremony was insufficient under Islamic law because, stated the court, “Matters of religious doctrine and practice are outside the bounds of civil judicial review.”

The court also did not feel obliged to defer to Family Court's determination that Gearney and the deceased were married because Family Court only said that the two were married as a means for determining which tribunal should decide their petitions for orders of protection. Such could have been issued whether they were married or not, so the question of whether they were married was not a necessary element of the relief they sought. The court here stated, “The decision in Family Court was thus neither a final determination on the merits nor a determination of an issue material to the family offense proceeding after a full and fair opportunity to be heard; as a merely incidental ruling it has no preclusive effect ( Loomis v. Loomis, 288 NY 222 [1942]; Tcholakian v. Tcholakian, 29 AD2d 848 (1st Dept. 1968)).”

For the above reasons, the court denied the request for summary determination that the decedent was married at the time of his death and ordered a conference to set discovery and trial dates.

Charges Stand Against Mother

A woman who locked her children in a room with her for 80 minutes may properly be charged with unlawful imprisonment, attempted unlawful imprisonment and endangering the welfare of a child, even though she is their custodial parent. People v. Jordan, 2013 NY 076424.

The defendant mother was resident at a women's shelter, where she locked herself, her five children and two adults into the room, shoving a chair underneath the doorknob to prevent their exiting. She was charged with unlawful imprisonment and endangering the welfare of a child, among other charges. Her attorney moved for dismissal of the charges, arguing that parents are entitled to restrict the movements of their own children.

While the judge agreed that this was generally true, he also said this right was not unfettered. Criminal Court Judge Steven Statsinger cited to the Court of Appeals' statement in People v. Leonard, 19 NY3d 323 (2012), that a custodial parent's kidnapping of his or her own child was not a “legal impossibility.” The court found that, “[a] parent who restricts the movement of an angry or unruly child, under the reasonable belief that such is necessary to prevent the child from harming another person or damaging property, would ' likely be acting on the lawful end of the Leonard spectrum.” “Similarly,” Judge Statsinger wrote, “a parent who restricts the movement of a sick child so that the child will not infect others is also likely behaving lawfully. But 'the court can here discern no such goal in defendant's behavior.” Therefore, the court denied the motion to dismiss many of the causes of action pertaining to the mother's behavior toward her children.

BIO HERE

Elements of Valid Marriage Not Proven

A woman petitioning to administer her alleged husband's estate over the objection of the deceased's sister was not entitled to summary determination that she was married and thus the sole distributee of the estate because although Family Court determined that the couple were married when they each sought orders of protection from that court, the matter of the validity of the marriage was never argued or decided on the merits, and the elements of a valid New York marriage were not proven. Estate of Weisberg, 2012-3470, NYLJ 1202651628436, at *1 (Surr., NY, Decided April 8, 2014).

The decedent died intestate. His sister, on behalf of her mother, asked to be appointed administrator of the estate, claiming that the decedent's mother was the sole distributee of the estate. Ms. Jannah Geaney cross-petitioned, claiming that she was the sole distributee of the deceased because she and the deceased had been married in an Islamic ceremony on June 21, 2008, and that such a marriage was recognized under New York law. Geaney also asserted that the Surrogate's Court was bound by a Family Court finding that the couple were married. That finding was made in conjunction with the couple's 2012 petitions for orders of protection from one another.

The Surrogate's Court found there was enough evidence that the religious marriage ceremony took place, but denied Geaney's request for summary determination that she was the decedent's wife. Questions remained as to whether the marriage ceremony was legally sufficient. To be legally sufficient, a religious mariage ceremony must comply with New York's Domestic Relations Law (DRL): The parties must participate in the religious ceremony; it must be officiated over by a member of the clergy authorized to perform such ceremonies; another witness must also be present; and the couple must solemnly declare that they take each other as husband and wife. DRL ” 11, 12. Here, Geaney had not produced valid evidence that the Iman who performed the ceremony was authorized to perform marriages, and she did not produce evidence that the couple had solemnly declared that they took each other as husband and wife.

The court specifically declined to determine ' as the decedent's sister asked it to do ' that the ceremony was insufficient under Islamic law because, stated the court, “Matters of religious doctrine and practice are outside the bounds of civil judicial review.”

The court also did not feel obliged to defer to Family Court's determination that Gearney and the deceased were married because Family Court only said that the two were married as a means for determining which tribunal should decide their petitions for orders of protection. Such could have been issued whether they were married or not, so the question of whether they were married was not a necessary element of the relief they sought. The court here stated, “The decision in Family Court was thus neither a final determination on the merits nor a determination of an issue material to the family offense proceeding after a full and fair opportunity to be heard; as a merely incidental ruling it has no preclusive effect ( Loomis v. Loomis , 288 NY 222 [1942]; Tcholakian v. Tcholakian , 29 AD2d 848 (1st Dept. 1968)).”

For the above reasons, the court denied the request for summary determination that the decedent was married at the time of his death and ordered a conference to set discovery and trial dates.

Charges Stand Against Mother

A woman who locked her children in a room with her for 80 minutes may properly be charged with unlawful imprisonment, attempted unlawful imprisonment and endangering the welfare of a child, even though she is their custodial parent. People v. Jordan , 2013 NY 076424.

The defendant mother was resident at a women's shelter, where she locked herself, her five children and two adults into the room, shoving a chair underneath the doorknob to prevent their exiting. She was charged with unlawful imprisonment and endangering the welfare of a child, among other charges. Her attorney moved for dismissal of the charges, arguing that parents are entitled to restrict the movements of their own children.

While the judge agreed that this was generally true, he also said this right was not unfettered. Criminal Court Judge Steven Statsinger cited to the Court of Appeals' statement in People v. Leonard , 19 NY3d 323 (2012), that a custodial parent's kidnapping of his or her own child was not a “legal impossibility.” The court found that, “[a] parent who restricts the movement of an angry or unruly child, under the reasonable belief that such is necessary to prevent the child from harming another person or damaging property, would ' likely be acting on the lawful end of the Leonard spectrum.” “Similarly,” Judge Statsinger wrote, “a parent who restricts the movement of a sick child so that the child will not infect others is also likely behaving lawfully. But 'the court can here discern no such goal in defendant's behavior.” Therefore, the court denied the motion to dismiss many of the causes of action pertaining to the mother's behavior toward her children.

BIO HERE