Call 855-808-4530 or email [email protected] to receive your discount on a new subscription.
“We are not final because we are infallible, but we are infallible only because we are final,” according to a U.S. Supreme Court Justice. Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 540 (1953) (Jackson, J. concurring). Bankruptcy courts are not infallible, though, and their rulings should be reviewable. But too many district courts and bankruptcy appellate panels (BAPs) regularly refuse to review nonfinal (i.e., interlocutory) bankruptcy court orders for questionable reasons. See, In re Western Robidoux, Inc., 2024 W.L. 4531764, *5 (8th Cir. BAP Oct. 21, 2024) (BAP declined to review nonfinal bankruptcy court professional retention order because “review under [28 U.S.C.] §158 (a)(3) is not appropriate ….”). In Western Robidoux, the court claimed to lack discretion to review “certain interlocutory orders,” relying on a rigid standard for appellate review that effectively makes appellate review a matter of the reviewing court’s convenience.
Relevance
District courts and BAPs have a confused record over the ground rules for exercising their discretion in reviewing nonfinal bankruptcy court orders. The BAP in Western Robidoux, like many district courts, set a high standard based on 28 U.S.C. §1292(b) (“… controlling question of law as to which there is substantial ground for difference of opinion and … an immediate appeal from the order would materially advance the ultimate termination of litigation.”). This section of the Judicial Code is applicable, by its terms, to appeals from interlocutory district court orders to the courts of appeals, but not to bankruptcy court orders. Some district courts disagree. See, Rivera v. BLD Realty, Inc., 2024 WL 4754191 (D.P.R. Nov. 12, 2024) (district court dismissed appeal from bankruptcy court’s interlocutory monetary sanctions order for appellant’s noncompliance with discovery orders; “[a]pplication of §158(a)3) review of interlocutory orders mirrors application of [28 U.S.C.] §1292(b)”), quoting In re Watson, 309 B.R. 652 (1st Cir. BAP 2004), aff’d on other grounds 403 F.3d 1,4 (1st Cir. 2005) (“Although the BAP … had jurisdiction to review the … order [denying plan confirmation] even if interlocutory, this Court has jurisdiction only if the underlying bankruptcy court order is in fact final”; order held final by “later order” dismissing case). See also, In re Maison Royale LLC, 2024 WL 2699994 (E.D. La May 24, 2024) (denied leave to appeal from interlocutory order denying creditor’s motion to dismiss bankruptcy case on bad faith grounds, relying on a Fifth Circuit precedent); In re Genter, 2020 WL 3129637 (N.D. Tex. June 12, 2020) (denied leave to appeal from interlocutory order; such appeals disfavored; leave to appeal “sparingly granted”; appellants failed to show “substantial grounds for difference of opinion” on bankruptcy’s court’s order); In re Paragon Offshore PLC, 2020 W.L. 181550 (Del. Apr. 9, 2020) (leave denied because of “standards … in 28 U.S.C. §1292(b)”; no “exceptional circumstances”; no advancement of litigation; no “premature appellate review.”). Contra, In re AIG Financial Products Corp., 2024 WL 810051 (D. Del. Feb 27, 2024) (granting leave to appeal from order denying dismissal of Chapter 11 case, based on Third Circuit precedent and on practical grounds).
Some courts candidly admit that the relevant statutory language “provides no guidance as to how [the district court’s] discretion should be exercised,” In re Hebb, 53 B.R. 1003, 1006 (D. Md. 1985), but then apply the standard of §1292(b) when summarily denying leave to appeal. See, e.g., Rivera, 2024 WL 4754191 (because 28 U.S.C. §158 provides no criteria, “courts look to section 1292(b), which sets the standard over interlocutory appeals”), quoting In re Martinez, 541 B.R. 539, 541 (D.P.R. 2015). Other district courts consider different criteria. See, In re Landmark Capital Co., 20 B.R. 220, 223 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) (“… there is good reason to permit review of the venue order in this case ….”). Accord, In re Hadar Leasing International Co. Inc., 14 B.R. 819, 820 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (merely because venue order was interlocutory did not “preclude judicial review of the order, since an interlocutory order may be appealed with leave of the court to which the appeal is taken ….”). Still other courts never address the issue but simply dispose of the appeal on the merits. See, In re Johns-Manville Corp., 68 B.R. 155 (S.D.N.Y. 1986); In re AroChem Corp., 176 F. 3d. 610, 618 (2d Cir. 1999 (“the district court also noted its willingness to grant leave to appeal from a professional retention order under §158(a)(3), which allows a party to appeal from a nonfinal order of the bankruptcy court ‘with leave’ of the district court.”); In re Stable Mews Associates, 778 F.2d 121, 123 (2d Cir. 1985) (district court “granted leave to appeal before affirming the bankruptcy court’s interim award” of compensation, “viewing the issue as interlocutory.”). In short, no uniformity exists in the district courts and BAPs when disposing of motions for leave to appeal from interlocutory bankruptcy court orders.
ENJOY UNLIMITED ACCESS TO THE SINGLE SOURCE OF OBJECTIVE LEGAL ANALYSIS, PRACTICAL INSIGHTS, AND NEWS IN ENTERTAINMENT LAW.
Already a have an account? Sign In Now Log In Now
For enterprise-wide or corporate acess, please contact Customer Service at [email protected] or 877-256-2473
With each successive large-scale cyber attack, it is slowly becoming clear that ransomware attacks are targeting the critical infrastructure of the most powerful country on the planet. Understanding the strategy, and tactics of our opponents, as well as the strategy and the tactics we implement as a response are vital to victory.
In June 2024, the First Department decided Huguenot LLC v. Megalith Capital Group Fund I, L.P., which resolved a question of liability for a group of condominium apartment buyers and in so doing, touched on a wide range of issues about how contracts can obligate purchasers of real property.
The Article 8 opt-in election adds an additional layer of complexity to the already labyrinthine rules governing perfection of security interests under the UCC. A lender that is unaware of the nuances created by the opt in (may find its security interest vulnerable to being primed by another party that has taken steps to perfect in a superior manner under the circumstances.
This article highlights how copyright law in the United Kingdom differs from U.S. copyright law, and points out differences that may be crucial to entertainment and media businesses familiar with U.S law that are interested in operating in the United Kingdom or under UK law. The article also briefly addresses contrasts in UK and U.S. trademark law.