Judith Grubner
In order to sue for copyright infringement, it is necessary for the plaintiff to be either the legal or beneficial owner of the copyright in the infringed work. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has found that the creator of a work made for hire cannot be either a legal or beneficial owner of a copyright in such a work.
Compiled by Kathlyn Card-Beckles
Highlights of the latest intellectual property news and cases from around the country.
Brian Hoffman
Under U.S. patent law, an inventor is entitled to a patent if the invention is useful, novel, and nonobvious. The "novelty" prong of this tripartite test is controlled by 35 U.S.C. '102, which defines the "prior art" (<i>ie,</i> already existing technology) that can "anticipate," or render non-novel, the invention. In general, an invention sought to be patented is anticipated when it already exists in the prior art, having been placed there either by a third party or through the inventor's own actions. Under '102, prior use of the invention can anticipate a patent in certain circumstances. Specifically, the statute states that: "A person shall be entitled to a patent unless (a) the invention was ... used by others ... before the invention thereof by the applicant ...; or (b) the invention was ... in public use ... more than one year prior to the date of the application.
Patrick J. Birde
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Nicholas J. Nowak
With the passage of the Domestic Publication of Foreign Filed Patent Applications Act of 1999, the U.S. Congress instituted a pre-grant patent publication system. As a result, the USPTO must now publish domestic utility patent applications filed on or after November 29, 2000 within 18 months of their earliest priority date, unless conditions for preventing publication are met.
Kathlyn Card-Beckles
Highlights of the latest intellectual property news and cases from around the country.
Features
ALM Staff
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Law Journal Newsletters
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In <i>Medinol Ltd. v. Neuro Vasx, Inc.</i> (Cancellation No. 92040535), the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board (TTAB) agreed to enter summary judgment in favor of Medinol canceling Neuro Vasx's trademark registration for NEUROVASX based on fraud on the PTO. In August 2000, Neuro Vasx, was granted a registration for the mark NEUROVASX for 'medical devices, namely neurological stents and catheters.' As a result of this registration, Medinol's application for registration of the mark NIROVASCULAR for 'medical devices, namely stents' was refused.
Ivor R. Elrifi
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Nicholas P. Triano, III
The growth of the pharmaceutical industry over the past 20 years has been driven by the R&D investment in discovering new compounds, which can be protected by composition of matter patent claims. There are notable exceptions to this rule, <i>eg,</i> an unexpected and lucrative use for an old compound, like topically-applied minoxidil for hair growth (Rogaine'). But composition of matter patent protection on the active product itself is always a primary plank in protecting a drug franchise, and increases the value of the technology significantly.
Features
Rufus J. Pichler
The second labor of Hercules was to kill the monstrous nine-headed Hydra. When Hercules struck off one of the Hydra's heads, two new ones grew forth in its place. The entertainment industry's fight against its modern menace, peer-to-peer file sharing networks, presents no lesser task. The record companies successfully shut down Napster (<i>see A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc.</i>, 114 F. Supp. 2d 896 (N.D. Cal. 2000), <i>aff'd in part, rev'd in part</i>, 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001)) and Aimster (<i>see In re Aimster Copyright Litig.,</i> 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17054 (N.D. Ill. 2002)) only to witness the instant emergence of Gnutella, Grokster, Kazaa, Morpheus, and similar services (as well as the re-emergence of Aimster, now known as Madster). We know, of course, that Hercules completed his second labor after figuring out that he could prevent growth of the new heads by burning the wound. However, unlike the Hydra, peer-to-peer file sharing technologies evolve quickly and swiftly adapt to changed circumstances. Thus, Hollywood's plaintiffs are likened more to Sisyphus (who was condemned to an eternity of pushing the rock up the mountain only to have it fall down again) than to Hercules. The most recent example is the decision in <i>Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd.</i>, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6994 (C.D. Cal. April 25, 2003).
Justin S. Rerko
In the previous issue, we discussed the principle of the Reverse Doctrine of Equivalents and provided several illustrations of cases that have addressed the same. In this issue, we apply the principle to the <i>Amgen, Inc. v. Hoechst Marion, Inc.</i> case, wherein the defendants Hoecht Marion and Transkarayotic Therapies (collectively 'TKT') were found liable for infringing several of Amgen's patents. <i>Amgen, Inc. v. Hoechst Marion, Inc.</i>, 126 F. Supp. 2d 69 (D. Mass. 2001). Although the Reverse Doctrine of Equivalents defense was not raised, this article discusses how this doctrine might have relieved TKT of liability.
Features
Deborah A. Somerville, Jeffrey Ginsberg
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K. Patrick Herman
On June 6, 2003, the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit seemingly breathed new life into research tool patents when it held that the use of patented peptides for drug discovery was not exempt from infringement under the "safe harbor" provision of 35 U.S.C. '271(e)(1). <i>Integra Lifesciences, Ltd. v. Merck KGaA,</i> 331 F.3d 860 (Fed. Cir. 2003). In an earlier case, <i>Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc.,</i> No. 95 Civ. 8833, 2001 WL 1512597 (S.D.N.Y 2001), a district court had ruled that the use of patented intermediates for drug screening was non-infringing, thereby implicating that the use of other research tool patents for drug discovery was likewise sheltered from infringement liability under '271(e)(1).
