Cameo Clips

An individual who used the character history of DC Comics' copyrighted Superman character for a story idea he submitted to DC created an unauthorized derivative work not entitled to copyright protection, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit held in an unpublished opinion. Walker v. DC Comics Inc., 02-3058. Marcel Walker created a one-page “springboard” for DC Comic's “Elseworlds” series, which puts established DC heroes in unfamiliar settings or plots. In Walker's “Superman: The Last Son of Earth,” Superman's history is reversed by having him born on Earth and sent to Krypton. Walker sued after DC Comics published a two-part series with the same title and general plot idea. The district court granted summary judgment for the defendants. Walker agreed that his springboard was a derivative work but argued on appeal that DC Comics had granted him permission to use its copyright or that his springboard was a fair use, and that he deserved copyright protection for the original elements he contributed. Affirming the district court, the Third Circuit first noted that nothing in DC Comics' submission guidelines gave Walker a license to use the Superman copyright. The court next noted that Walker's springboard fell within none of the recognized fair-use activities. Finally, the appeals court concluded that Walker stood in the shoes of an infringer, rather than a protectible copyright owner, regarding the elements he had created for his springboard submission.

Use of a close variation of the first three lines of the song standard “What a Wonderful World” in the introduction to the rap song “The Forest” was a permissible fair-use parody, a Manhattan federal court ruled. Abilene Music Inc. v. Sony Music Entertainment Inc., 02-2462. In contrast to the upbeat message of “Wonderful World, “The Forest,” written and recorded by former Wu-Tang Clan member Ghostface Killah, portrays famous cartoon characters engaged in violence, sex and theft. The introduction to “The Forest” places “Wonderful World” in a drug-use context. The district court noted, “While the world of Wonderful World is all flowers and light, the world of The Forest is a 'wonderland' that is hardly wonderful. Thus, just as The Forest's use of cartoon characters pointedly comments on lost innocence and what its author sees as the naivetZ of mainstream culture, its rendition of Wonderful World just before the beginning of the rap is easily understood as commenting on the innocence reflected in the lyrics of the original, in order to drive home its own message more effectively.” The plaintiffs argued, however, that “The Forest” couldn't be a parody because it used “Wonderful World” only at the beginning of the rap recording. But the district court emphasized, “Plaintiffs' analysis would create a perverse incentive for parodists to use more of an existing work, in effect making their parody less transformative, thereby undermining the very rationale for according permissive fair use treatment to parodies.” In its fair-use finding, the district court concluded that “only after finishing the quotation [of 'Wonderful World'] does ['The Forest's] hip-hop beat and rap-style lyrics begin. … Because The Forest does not transpose Wonderful World into the hip-hop genre, it could not possibly supplant the market for non-parody hip-hop versions of Wonderful World.”

Universal-MCA Publishing may proceed with a breach of fiduciary duty claim against rap mogul Sean “P. Diddy” Combs, a Manhattan Supreme Court decided. Universal-MCA Publishing v. Bad Boy Entertainment Inc., 601935/02. The plaintiffs' songwriters had created six songs with Combs for inclusion on the 1997 album “No Way Out.” Universal-MCA claimed that it wasn't until 2001 that Bad Boy informed Universal that no mechanical royalties were owed for exploitation of those compositions due to a controlled composition clause in a recording agreement between Combs and Bad Boy that placed a cap on the number of “No Way Out” controlled compositions to receive payment. Co-authors generally do not owe a fiduciary duty to each other. But the district court found “special circumstances” in this case, noting, “The limitations stemming from [Combs'] Recording Agreement were allegedly self dealing in that Combs put his personal financial interests and that of his record company, Bad Boy, above the best interests of the Universal Songwriters, actions he was able to execute despite his shared status as a co-author, because of his role as head of Bad Boy.”

Recording artists weren't entitled to share a settlement purportedly worth up to $26 million that their recording companies received in a suit the labels filed against MP3.com over the unauthorized Internet downloading of sound recordings, a Manhattan Supreme Court held. Silvester v. Time Warner Inc., 602830/02. The class action suit by the artists against the labels alleged that the original artist contracts didn't give the labels the right to digitize recording masters. The state court ruled that the “by any method now known, or hereafter to become known” provision in artist contracts gave the record companies new technology rights. The court also ruled that the collective bargaining agreements of the American Federation of Television and Radio Artists covering sound recordings didn't apply in this case. In addition, the court dismissed the artists' claims for negligence, breach of fiduciary duty, and breach of covenant of good faith and fair dealing. Finally, the court noted that the Copyright Act didn't give beneficial copyright owners (ie, the recording artists) a right to equitable apportionment of damages recovered from infringement.

A program license agreement limited a satellite TV service to providing its existing – but not new ' customers with the licensor's shows during the post-termination, wind-down period of the license, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held in an unpublished opinion. Telewizja Polska USA v. Echostar Satellite Corp., 02-4332. The plaintiff, which produced Polish language programming, had sued for, among other things, breach of contract and violation of the federal Lanham Act. The district court dismissed the complaint. The disputed provision stated that the post-termination period would last for “the shorter of twelve months or that number of months necessary for EchoStar to provide the Programming Service to Service Subscribers who bought a multi-month subscription to the Programming Service prior to the receipt by EchoStar of notice of termination.” Reversing and remanding, the appeals court concluded, “[i]n the context of the entire agreement, the most natural reading of this clause is that it was intended to ensure that existing subscribers continued to receive programming for up to one year, while permitting the parties to terminate their relationship.”

Copyright/Derivative Works