Cameo Clips

A copyright owner can assign an accrued cause of action for infringement by itself to a third party, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has ruled. Silvers v. Sony Pictures Entertainment Inc., 01-56069. Nancey Silvers, who wrote the script for the CBS movie 'The Other Woman' as a work for hire, received an assignment from the TV movie's producers of 'all right, title and interest in and to any claims and causes of action against Sony Pictures Entertainment Inc., Columbia Tri-Star and any other appropriate persons or entities with respect to the screenplay 'The Other Woman' ' and the motion picture 'Stepmom.” Silvers then sued Sony alleging that the 'Stepmom' was similar to 'The Other Woman.' Sony moved to dismiss, arguing that Silvers lacked standing to file suit. The district court denied the motion. Affirming, the appeals court noted, 'Simply stated, the accrued causes of action may be assigned without transferring any other copyright right to the assignee. ' The all-inclusive language of the assignment precisely and clearly specified what rights Silvers obtained. ' Nothing in the language of [17 U.S.C.] Sec. 501 specifies or suggests that the legal or the beneficial owners are the exclusive plaintiffs in copyright infringement cases.' The appeals court also concluded that there was no risk of Sony being subjected to multiple lawsuits if Silvers were allowed to proceed with her action.

Copyright Infringement/Personal Jurisduction

The issuance of mechanical licenses and a synchronization license by a Texas music publisher for the use of songs in sound recordings and a movie didn't constitute purposeful availment that would give the district court specific personal jurisdiction over the publisher in a copyright infringement suit in Tennessee, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit has held. 02-5165 through 02-5175 Bridgeport Music Inc. v. Still N The Water Publishing, 327 F.3d 472. The music publisher's knowledge that the records and movie would be distributed nationally was insufficient to show purposeful availment, the appeals court determined. In addition, neither did the mechanical licenses nor the publisher's affiliations with the performing rights societies ASCAP and BMI specify an affirmative obligation to distribute or license the songs nationally or in Tennessee. Also, that the music publisher expected its compositions to be sold on the Internet wasn't enough for jurisdiction, considering there was no assertion that the publisher maintained a Web site of its own (or one sufficiently interactive for use by Tennessee residents). But Florida-based co-defendant DM Records did purposefully avail itself of doing or causing business to be done in Tennessee by entering into a distribution agreement with Ryco Distribution Partners for the national distribution of its records, the appeals court stated. Plus, the volume of business that DM generated through its website for at least two of the albums at issue established a prima facie case of purposeful availment, the appeals court concluded.