Call 855-808-4530 or email [email protected] to receive your discount on a new subscription.
Can fear of cancer be litigated? And if so, what is the potential impact on the med mal community? On March 10 the U.S. Supreme Court announced a decision in Norfolk and Western Railway Co. v. Ayers, 123 S.Ct. 1210 (2003), in which it ruled by a five to four vote that railway workers who suffer from asbestosis would be allowed to recover damages for fear of asbestos-related cancer. Rail-worker plaintiffs would still bear the burden of proof that their fear was 'genuine and serious,' but the Supreme Court did not specify how such evidence would be demonstrated or refuted. This article considers whether the Ayers decision could extend to medical malpractice litigation.
The Norfolk Decision
Alleging that the Norfolk and Western Railway Company had negligently exposed them to asbestos and thereby caused them to contract asbestosis, the plaintiffs, six former Norfolk employees, filed suit in a West Virginia state court under the Federal Employers Liability Act (FELA). As an element of damages, the plaintiffs sought recovery for mental anguish based on their fear of developing cancer. The trial court instructed the jury that a plaintiff who demonstrated a reasonable fear of cancer, related to proven physical injury from asbestos, was entitled to compensation for that fear as part of the damages recoverable for pain and suffering. The trial court also instructed the jury not to reduce recoveries because of non-railroad exposure to asbestos, as long as the jury found that Norfolk was negligent and that 'dust exposures at Norfolk contributed, however slightly, to the plaintiff's injuries.' Id. at 1216. The trial court rejected proposed jury instructions submitted by Norfolk that would have 1) ruled out damages for fear of cancer unless the plaintiff proved both an actual likelihood of developing cancer and physical manifestations of the alleged fear; and 2) required the jury to apportion damages between Norfolk and other employers alleged to have contributed to an asbestosis claimant's disease. The jury returned damages awards for each plaintiff, and the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia denied discretionary review.
ENJOY UNLIMITED ACCESS TO THE SINGLE SOURCE OF OBJECTIVE LEGAL ANALYSIS, PRACTICAL INSIGHTS, AND NEWS IN ENTERTAINMENT LAW.
Already a have an account? Sign In Now Log In Now
For enterprise-wide or corporate acess, please contact Customer Service at [email protected] or 877-256-2473
This article highlights how copyright law in the United Kingdom differs from U.S. copyright law, and points out differences that may be crucial to entertainment and media businesses familiar with U.S law that are interested in operating in the United Kingdom or under UK law. The article also briefly addresses contrasts in UK and U.S. trademark law.
With each successive large-scale cyber attack, it is slowly becoming clear that ransomware attacks are targeting the critical infrastructure of the most powerful country on the planet. Understanding the strategy, and tactics of our opponents, as well as the strategy and the tactics we implement as a response are vital to victory.
The Article 8 opt-in election adds an additional layer of complexity to the already labyrinthine rules governing perfection of security interests under the UCC. A lender that is unaware of the nuances created by the opt in (may find its security interest vulnerable to being primed by another party that has taken steps to perfect in a superior manner under the circumstances.
In Rockwell v. Despart, the New York Supreme Court, Third Department, recently revisited a recurring question: When may a landowner seek judicial removal of a covenant restricting use of her land?