Divorcing a Jailed Spouse

“[T]he failure of the Legislature to exempt the imprisonment ground from the operation of the statute of limitations was not a matter of oversight since the statutory framework does provide such exemptions for abandonment and adultery grounds,” the majority wrote in Covington v. Walker, 2001-00425, NYLJ, 8/7/03, p. 25.

In a dissenting opinion, Justice Sandra J. Feuerstein said the majority's reasoning led to an “absurd result” that was most likely in conflict with the intent of the Legislature, which in 1966 broadened the grounds for divorce. “As a matter of statutory construction, it will be presumed that the Legislature did not intend a patently absurd result,” she wrote. The judge said Domestic Relations Law ' 170 – which says that an action for divorce can be based upon the “confinement of the defendant in prison for a period of 3 or more consecutive years” – implies that the imprisonment ground is a continuing cause that terminates when a defendant is released. “In my opinion, a more logical interpretation would be that the long parted spouses would have at least 5 years after the imprisoned spouse's release to determine whether the relationship is still viable,” Judge Feuerstein wrote. The majority, however, said it was fundamental that courts “not judicially legislate an exception to an otherwise unambiguous statute, even to mitigate a potentially harsh result.”

The ruling may not have a significant impact, since imprisonment is rarely used as grounds for divorce, according to one matrimonial attorney. However, there is little precedent on the issue, and the majority may be going against a long-standing trend to loosen restrictions on divorce actions.

There is no question that under New York law, having a jailed spouse is grounds for divorce, but one appeals court is divided on how much time a free spouse has to act on that option.

In a split opinion, the Appellate Division, Second Department, ruled that a 5-year statute of limitations applies to those seeking divorce from a spouse who is in prison. Under the ruling, the statute of limitations begins to run once the jailed spouse has served 3 consecutive years. After 8 years of consecutive incarceration, then, a free spouse would not be able to divorce a jailed spouse simply because he or she remained in jail.

The court's decision affirmed a ruling from a Westchester County judge who had denied Rhonda Covington's motion to divorce her husband in 2000. The husband has been incarcerated since 1984.

“[T]he failure of the Legislature to exempt the imprisonment ground from the operation of the statute of limitations was not a matter of oversight since the statutory framework does provide such exemptions for abandonment and adultery grounds,” the majority wrote in Covington v. Walker, 2001-00425, NYLJ, 8/7/03, p. 25.

In a dissenting opinion, Justice Sandra J. Feuerstein said the majority's reasoning led to an “absurd result” that was most likely in conflict with the intent of the Legislature, which in 1966 broadened the grounds for divorce. “As a matter of statutory construction, it will be presumed that the Legislature did not intend a patently absurd result,” she wrote. The judge said Domestic Relations Law ' 170 – which says that an action for divorce can be based upon the “confinement of the defendant in prison for a period of 3 or more consecutive years” – implies that the imprisonment ground is a continuing cause that terminates when a defendant is released. “In my opinion, a more logical interpretation would be that the long parted spouses would have at least 5 years after the imprisoned spouse's release to determine whether the relationship is still viable,” Judge Feuerstein wrote. The majority, however, said it was fundamental that courts “not judicially legislate an exception to an otherwise unambiguous statute, even to mitigate a potentially harsh result.”

The ruling may not have a significant impact, since imprisonment is rarely used as grounds for divorce, according to one matrimonial attorney. However, there is little precedent on the issue, and the majority may be going against a long-standing trend to loosen restrictions on divorce actions.