Decisions of Interest

Court Errs in Awarding Custody to Absconding Father

The appellate court reversed a decision awarding sole custody to a respondent father who had refused to return the children to the petitioner wife in accordance with the custody agreement after they visited him in his home in Saudi Arabia, as his actions showed he had no interest in promoting the children's relationship with their mother. Ahmad v. Naviwala, No. 92611, 2003 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 6300 (Sup. Ct., App. Div. 3d Dept., Broome Cty. 6/5/03) (Peters, J.).

The parties were married in 1986 and had four children. In 1997, petitioner and the children went to Saudi Arabia to reside with respondent after he got a job there. Seven months later, petitioner and the children returned to the Binghamton, Broome County, due to marital strife. There, petitioner obtained a divorce and received an order of sole custody with a reservation of rights to respondent due to his default.

After consulting with Islamic law scholars, the parties, represented by counsel, agreed that petitioner would maintain sole custody of Osamah until June 13, 2001 and of Maareah, Safiyya and Asmaa until Jan. 1, 2002, at which point sole custody would be transferred to respondent; the non-custodial parent would be entitled to a continuous three-month visitation period. This agreement was later incorporated, but not merged, into their Oct. 29, 1999 judgment of divorce.

In June 2000, respondent took the children to Saudi Arabia for a 3-month visitation, but later refused to return them. He asserted that he had received sole custody from a Saudi court; it is undisputed that petitioner never received notice of such proceedings. In April 2002, petitioner learned that respondent was planning a trip to Texas with the children. Armed with an order from the Broome County Family Court, authorities seized and returned the children to New York.

At the hearings in Broome County, respondent testified that he failed to abide by the negotiated agreement because petitioner failed to properly school the children. Petitioner testified that she had been willing to abide by the negotiated terms of their agreement so long as the visitation provisions were met. While she did not question respondent's commitment to the children, she opposed an award of custody to him if the children would reside in Saudi Arabia. Family Court granted custody to respondent. Recognizing that Saudi Arabia was not a signatory to the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction List of Hague Convention Signatory Countries, and that there was no method by which petitioner could enforce her visitation rights while the children resided in that country, the court imposed various conditions upon respondent. Petitioner appealed and the appellate court granted her motion for a stay.

The court here reversed the Family Court's decision, finding that the lower court had not given enough consideration to that fact that respondent's actions in keeping the children from their mother showed a strong probability that he was unfit to act as custodial parent. The court held that the best interests of the children would be served by giving sole custody to petitioner, with respondent having visitation rights with all visitation taking place in the United States. Petitioner was also given sole control over the children's passports.

Sale of Marital Residence: Strict Compliance Enforced

The trial court committed error when it granted one party to a separation agreement extra time within which to exercise an option to buy the marital home. DaLoia v. Burt, No. 2002-10021, 2003 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 6202 (Sup. Ct., App. Div., 2d Dept., Dutchess Cty. 6/2/03) (Fuerstein, JP).

Plaintiff wife sought a divorce and ancillary relief. The Supreme Court, Dutchess County, denied branches of her summary judgment motion for an order directing the sale of the marital residence. The appellate court reversed as to this portion of the motion because the Supreme Court had no authority to modify the agreement and extend the defendant's time within which to exercise the option to purchase the plaintiff's interest in the marital residence. Citing Glucksman v. Glucksman, 264 A.D.2d 812, 695 N.Y.S.2d., the court held that such relief contravened the express terms of the agreement and violated the principle requiring strict compliance with the terms of an option.

Foreign Divorce Obtained Over Internet

A plaintiff husband who got Mexican divorce without serving his wife with notice was denied his motion to have the divorce declared binding because even though the defendant wife soon learned of the divorce and did not immediately contest it, it was against public policy to sanction such a divorce. Kushnick v. Kushnick, N.Y.L.J. 5/27/03,Vol. 229; Pg. p. 33, col. 3 (Sup. Ct., Nassau Cty.) (Falanga, J.).

Plaintiff remarried 3 months after obtaining a Mexican divorce decree by filling out forms downloaded over the Internet. Defendant wife sought summary dismissal of plaintiff's action that sought a declaration that the divorce decree and his subsequent remarriage were valid. Plaintiff conceded that he had never established residency in Mexico, that defendant had not been provided notice of the Mexican divorce action, and that defendant had not submitted to Mexico's jurisdiction. Plaintiff also contended, however, that defendant had notice of the decree prior to his October 1999 remarriage and that the court should find defendant equitably estopped on the ground of laches from contesting the validity of the Mexican divorce decree.

The court declared the divorce and remarriage invalid because it would be repugnant to fundamental notions of fairness and decency to afford comity to a divorce decree obtained over the Internet without notice. With regard to the issue of equitable estoppel, the court noted that the law is clear that neither inaction nor delay in contesting a foreign divorce constitutes laches unless an unreasonable delay in action induced the other party to change his position in reliance thereon. In the instant case, where the plaintiffs married less than three months after the defendant became aware of the Internet Mexican divorce decree, the court found as a matter of law that plaintiff's marriage and his attendant “change of position” did not result from laches on the part of the defendant.

Contempt Charge Stands for Offense of Mailing Check

The court denied a man's motion for dismissal of a misdemeanor complaint of contempt stemming from his violation of a protection order prohibiting him from contacting his ex-wife or their child; he violated the order when he sent his ex-wife a letter containing a check for his share of the child's unreimbursed child care and medical expenses, as per the terms of the couple's marital agreement. People v. Lilley, N.Y.L.J. 5/12/03, Vol. 229, Pg. P. 34., col. 1 (Nassau Cty.) (Smolkin, J.).

The two orders of protection prohibited defendant from communicating with his ex-wife or child by mail, telephone, e-mail, voice mail or other electronic means. Nevertheless, defendant sent his ex-wife a check for their child's expenses and a letter explaining the amount being paid in September 2002.

Defendant argued that the orders of protection were inconsistent with the marital agreement, which obligated him to pay part of the child's expenses. The court disagreed with defendant, finding that the Family Court had had the opportunity to allow for some minimal contact for payment of child support in compliance with the previous divorce judgment and matrimonial agreement, but did not choose to do so. Thus, to avoid violating the orders of protection, it was incumbent upon the defendant to arrange acceptable means of delivery ' such as through an attorney, relative or friend 'to satisfy any support obligations.

The appellate court reversed a decision awarding sole custody to a respondent father who had refused to return the children to the petitioner wife in accordance with the custody agreement after they visited him in his home in Saudi Arabia, as his actions showed he had no interest in promoting the children's relationship with their mother. Ahmad v. Naviwala, No. 92611, 2003 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 6300 (Sup. Ct., App. Div. 3d Dept., Broome Cty. 6/5/03) (Peters, J.).

The parties were married in 1986 and had four children. In 1997, petitioner and the children went to Saudi Arabia to reside with respondent after he got a job there. Seven months later, petitioner and the children returned to Binghamton, Broome County, due to marital strife. There, petitioner obtained a divorce and received an order of sole custody with a reservation of rights to respondent due to his default.

After consulting with Islamic law scholars, the parties, represented by counsel, agreed that petitioner would maintain sole custody of Osamah until June 13, 2001 and of Maareah, Safiyya and Asmaa until Jan. 1, 2002, at which point sole custody would be transferred to respondent; the non-custodial parent would be entitled to a continuous 3-month visitation period. This agreement was later incorporated, but not merged, into their Oct. 29, 1999 judgment of divorce.

In June 2000, respondent took the children to Saudi Arabia for a 3-month visitation, but later refused to return them. He asserted that he had received sole custody from a Saudi court; it is undisputed that petitioner never received notice of such proceedings. In April 2002, petitioner learned that respondent was planning a trip to Texas with the children. Armed with an order from the Broome County Family Court, authorities seized and returned the children to New York.

At the hearings in Broome County, respondent testified that he failed to abide by the negotiated agreement because petitioner failed to properly school the children. Petitioner testified that she had been willing to abide by the negotiated terms of their agreement so long as the visitation provisions were met. While she did not question respondent's commitment to the children, she opposed an award of custody to him if the children would reside in Saudi Arabia. Family Court granted custody to respondent. Recognizing that Saudi Arabia was not a signatory to the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction List of Hague Convention Signatory Countries, and that there was no method by which petitioner could enforce her visitation rights while the children resided in that country, the court imposed various conditions upon respondent. Petitioner appealed and the appellate court granted her motion for a stay.

The court here reversed the Family Court's decision, finding that the lower court had not given enough consideration to the fact that respondent's actions in keeping the children from their mother showed a strong probability that he was unfit to act as custodial parent. The court held that the best interests of the children would be served by giving sole custody to petitioner, with respondent having visitation rights and with all visitation taking place in the United States. Petitioner was also given sole control over the children's passports.

The trial court committed error when it granted one party to a separation agreement extra time within which to exercise an option to buy the marital home. DaLoia v. Burt, No. 2002-10021, 2003 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 6202 (Sup. Ct., App. Div., 2d Dept., Dutchess Cty. 6/2/03) (Fuerstein, JP).

Plaintiff wife sought a divorce and ancillary relief. The Supreme Court, Dutchess County, denied branches of her summary judgment motion for an order directing the sale of the marital residence. The appellate court reversed as to this portion of the motion because the Supreme Court had no authority to modify the agreement and extend the defendant's time within which to exercise the option to purchase the plaintiff's interest in the marital residence. Citing Glucksman v. Glucksman, 264 A.D.2d 812, 695 N.Y.S.2d., the court held that such relief contravened the express terms of the agreement and violated the principle requiring strict compliance with the terms of an option.

A plaintiff husband who got a Mexican divorce without serving his wife with notice was denied his motion to have the divorce declared binding because even though the defendant wife soon learned of the divorce and did not immediately contest it, it was against public policy to sanction such a divorce. Kushnick v. Kushnick, N.Y.L.J. 5/27/03, Vol. 229; Pg. p. 33, col. 3 (Sup. Ct., Nassau Cty.) (Falanga, J.).

Plaintiff remarried 3 months after obtaining a Mexican divorce decree he got by filling out forms downloaded over the Internet. Defendant wife sought summary dismissal of plaintiff's action that sought a declaration that the divorce decree and subsequent remarriage were valid. Plaintiff conceded that he had never established residency in Mexico, that defendant had not been provided notice of the Mexican divorce action, and that defendant had not submitted to Mexico's jurisdiction. Plaintiff also contended, however, that defendant had notice of the decree prior to his October 1999 remarriage and that the court should find defendant equitably estopped on the ground of laches from contesting the validity of the Mexican divorce decree.

The court declared the divorce and remarriage invalid because it would be repugnant to fundamental notions of fairness and decency to afford comity to a divorce decree obtained over the Internet without notice. With regard to the issue of equitable estoppel, the court noted that the law is clear that neither inaction nor delay in contesting a foreign divorce constitutes laches unless an unreasonable delay in action induced the other party to change his position in reliance thereon. In the instant case, where the plaintiff married less than 3 months after the defendant became aware of the Internet Mexican divorce decree, the court found as a matter of law that plaintiff's marriage and his attendant 'change of position' did not result from laches on the part of the defendant.

The court denied a man's motion for dismissal of a misdemeanor complaint of contempt stemming from his violation of a protection order prohibiting him from contacting his ex-wife or their child; he violated the order when he sent his ex-wife a letter containing a check for his share of the child's unreimbursed child care and medical expenses, as per the terms of the couple's marital agreement. People v. Lilley, N.Y.L.J. 5/12/03, Vol. 229, Pg. P. 34., col. 1 (Nassau Cty.) (Smolkin, J.).

The two orders of protection prohibited defendant from communicating with his ex-wife or child by mail, telephone, e-mail, voice mail or other electronic means. Nevertheless, defendant sent his ex-wife a check for their child's expenses and a letter explaining the amount being paid, in September 2002.

Defendant argued that the orders of protection were inconsistent with the marital agreement, which obligated him to pay part of the child's expenses. The court disagreed with defendant, finding that the Family Court had had the opportunity to allow for some minimal contact for payment of child support in compliance with the previous divorce judgment and matrimonial agreement, but did not choose to do so. Thus, to avoid violating the orders of protection, it was incumbent upon the defendant to arrange acceptable means of delivery ' such as through an attorney, relative or friend ' to satisfy any support obligations.

Appellant May Not Appeal From Default Judgment

The court dismissed this appeal by defendant wife because the only proper means for her to seek a remedy on a judgment of divorce entered in default was by motion to vacate. Fibert v. Fibert, No. 92956, 2003 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 6360 (Sup. Ct., App. Div. St. Lawrence Cty. 6/5/03) (Carpinello, J.).

The wife deliberately absented herself from the divorce proceedings when it became apparent that she would not succeed in her efforts to obtain physical custody of the couple's two children. As a consequence, she did not contest any issue before Supreme Court, including equitable distribution of the parties' assets. Thereafter, the court granted plaintiff a judgment of divorce on the grounds outlined in his complaint and also, inter alia, equitably distributed the parties' property. This being the case, defendant's appeal from the judgment of divorce was dismissed since no appeal lies from a judgment entered upon default. Rather, her remedy is a motion to vacate the default on a showing of a reasonable excuse for the default and a meritorious defense.

Court Errs in Awarding Custody to Absconding Father

The appellate court reversed a decision awarding sole custody to a respondent father who had refused to return the children to the petitioner wife in accordance with the custody agreement after they visited him in his home in Saudi Arabia, as his actions showed he had no interest in promoting the children's relationship with their mother. Ahmad v. Naviwala, No. 92611, 2003 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 6300 (Sup. Ct., App. Div. 3d Dept., Broome Cty. 6/5/03) (Peters, J.).

The parties were married in 1986 and had four children. In 1997, petitioner and the children went to Saudi Arabia to reside with respondent after he got a job there. Seven months later, petitioner and the children returned to the Binghamton, Broome County, due to marital strife. There, petitioner obtained a divorce and received an order of sole custody with a reservation of rights to respondent due to his default.

After consulting with Islamic law scholars, the parties, represented by counsel, agreed that petitioner would maintain sole custody of Osamah until June 13, 2001 and of Maareah, Safiyya and Asmaa until Jan. 1, 2002, at which point sole custody would be transferred to respondent; the non-custodial parent would be entitled to a continuous three-month visitation period. This agreement was later incorporated, but not merged, into their Oct. 29, 1999 judgment of divorce.

In June 2000, respondent took the children to Saudi Arabia for a 3-month visitation, but later refused to return them. He asserted that he had received sole custody from a Saudi court; it is undisputed that petitioner never received notice of such proceedings. In April 2002, petitioner learned that respondent was planning a trip to Texas with the children. Armed with an order from the Broome County Family Court, authorities seized and returned the children to New York.

At the hearings in Broome County, respondent testified that he failed to abide by the negotiated agreement because petitioner failed to properly school the children. Petitioner testified that she had been willing to abide by the negotiated terms of their agreement so long as the visitation provisions were met. While she did not question respondent's commitment to the children, she opposed an award of custody to him if the children would reside in Saudi Arabia. Family Court granted custody to respondent. Recognizing that Saudi Arabia was not a signatory to the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction List of Hague Convention Signatory Countries, and that there was no method by which petitioner could enforce her visitation rights while the children resided in that country, the court imposed various conditions upon respondent. Petitioner appealed and the appellate court granted her motion for a stay.

The court here reversed the Family Court's decision, finding that the lower court had not given enough consideration to that fact that respondent's actions in keeping the children from their mother showed a strong probability that he was unfit to act as custodial parent. The court held that the best interests of the children would be served by giving sole custody to petitioner, with respondent having visitation rights with all visitation taking place in the United States. Petitioner was also given sole control over the children's passports.

Sale of Marital Residence: Strict Compliance Enforced

The trial court committed error when it granted one party to a separation agreement extra time within which to exercise an option to buy the marital home. DaLoia v. Burt, No. 2002-10021, 2003 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 6202 (Sup. Ct., App. Div., 2d Dept., Dutchess Cty. 6/2/03) (Fuerstein, JP).

Plaintiff wife sought a divorce and ancillary relief. The Supreme Court, Dutchess County, denied branches of her summary judgment motion for an order directing the sale of the marital residence. The appellate court reversed as to this portion of the motion because the Supreme Court had no authority to modify the agreement and extend the defendant's time within which to exercise the option to purchase the plaintiff's interest in the marital residence. Citing Glucksman v. Glucksman, 264 A.D.2d 812, 695 N.Y.S.2d., the court held that such relief contravened the express terms of the agreement and violated the principle requiring strict compliance with the terms of an option.

Foreign Divorce Obtained Over Internet

A plaintiff husband who got Mexican divorce without serving his wife with notice was denied his motion to have the divorce declared binding because even though the defendant wife soon learned of the divorce and did not immediately contest it, it was against public policy to sanction such a divorce. Kushnick v. Kushnick, N.Y.L.J. 5/27/03,Vol. 229; Pg. p. 33, col. 3 (Sup. Ct., Nassau Cty.) (Falanga, J.).

Plaintiff remarried 3 months after obtaining a Mexican divorce decree by filling out forms downloaded over the Internet. Defendant wife sought summary dismissal of plaintiff's action that sought a declaration that the divorce decree and his subsequent remarriage were valid. Plaintiff conceded that he had never established residency in Mexico, that defendant had not been provided notice of the Mexican divorce action, and that defendant had not submitted to Mexico's jurisdiction. Plaintiff also contended, however, that defendant had notice of the decree prior to his October 1999 remarriage and that the court should find defendant equitably estopped on the ground of laches from contesting the validity of the Mexican divorce decree.

The court declared the divorce and remarriage invalid because it would be repugnant to fundamental notions of fairness and decency to afford comity to a divorce decree obtained over the Internet without notice. With regard to the issue of equitable estoppel, the court noted that the law is clear that neither inaction nor delay in contesting a foreign divorce constitutes laches unless an unreasonable delay in action induced the other party to change his position in reliance thereon. In the instant case, where the plaintiffs married less than three months after the defendant became aware of the Internet Mexican divorce decree, the court found as a matter of law that plaintiff's marriage and his attendant “change of position” did not result from laches on the part of the defendant.

Contempt Charge Stands for Offense of Mailing Check

The court denied a man's motion for dismissal of a misdemeanor complaint of contempt stemming from his violation of a protection order prohibiting him from contacting his ex-wife or their child; he violated the order when he sent his ex-wife a letter containing a check for his share of the child's unreimbursed child care and medical expenses, as per the terms of the couple's marital agreement. People v. Lilley, N.Y.L.J. 5/12/03, Vol. 229, Pg. P. 34., col. 1 (Nassau Cty.) (Smolkin, J.).

The two orders of protection prohibited defendant from communicating with his ex-wife or child by mail, telephone, e-mail, voice mail or other electronic means. Nevertheless, defendant sent his ex-wife a check for their child's expenses and a letter explaining the amount being paid in September 2002.

Defendant argued that the orders of protection were inconsistent with the marital agreement, which obligated him to pay part of the child's expenses. The court disagreed with defendant, finding that the Family Court had had the opportunity to allow for some minimal contact for payment of child support in compliance with the previous divorce judgment and matrimonial agreement, but did not choose to do so. Thus, to avoid violating the orders of protection, it was incumbent upon the defendant to arrange acceptable means of delivery ' such as through an attorney, relative or friend 'to satisfy any support obligations.

The appellate court reversed a decision awarding sole custody to a respondent father who had refused to return the children to the petitioner wife in accordance with the custody agreement after they visited him in his home in Saudi Arabia, as his actions showed he had no interest in promoting the children's relationship with their mother. Ahmad v. Naviwala , No. 92611, 2003 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 6300 (Sup. Ct., App. Div. 3d Dept., Broome Cty. 6/5/03) (Peters, J.).

The parties were married in 1986 and had four children. In 1997, petitioner and the children went to Saudi Arabia to reside with respondent after he got a job there. Seven months later, petitioner and the children returned to Binghamton, Broome County, due to marital strife. There, petitioner obtained a divorce and received an order of sole custody with a reservation of rights to respondent due to his default.

After consulting with Islamic law scholars, the parties, represented by counsel, agreed that petitioner would maintain sole custody of Osamah until June 13, 2001 and of Maareah, Safiyya and Asmaa until Jan. 1, 2002, at which point sole custody would be transferred to respondent; the non-custodial parent would be entitled to a continuous 3-month visitation period. This agreement was later incorporated, but not merged, into their Oct. 29, 1999 judgment of divorce.

In June 2000, respondent took the children to Saudi Arabia for a 3-month visitation, but later refused to return them. He asserted that he had received sole custody from a Saudi court; it is undisputed that petitioner never received notice of such proceedings. In April 2002, petitioner learned that respondent was planning a trip to Texas with the children. Armed with an order from the Broome County Family Court, authorities seized and returned the children to New York.

At the hearings in Broome County, respondent testified that he failed to abide by the negotiated agreement because petitioner failed to properly school the children. Petitioner testified that she had been willing to abide by the negotiated terms of their agreement so long as the visitation provisions were met. While she did not question respondent's commitment to the children, she opposed an award of custody to him if the children would reside in Saudi Arabia. Family Court granted custody to respondent. Recognizing that Saudi Arabia was not a signatory to the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction List of Hague Convention Signatory Countries, and that there was no method by which petitioner could enforce her visitation rights while the children resided in that country, the court imposed various conditions upon respondent. Petitioner appealed and the appellate court granted her motion for a stay.

The court here reversed the Family Court's decision, finding that the lower court had not given enough consideration to the fact that respondent's actions in keeping the children from their mother showed a strong probability that he was unfit to act as custodial parent. The court held that the best interests of the children would be served by giving sole custody to petitioner, with respondent having visitation rights and with all visitation taking place in the United States. Petitioner was also given sole control over the children's passports.

The trial court committed error when it granted one party to a separation agreement extra time within which to exercise an option to buy the marital home. DaLoia v. Burt , No. 2002-10021, 2003 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 6202 (Sup. Ct., App. Div., 2d Dept., Dutchess Cty. 6/2/03) (Fuerstein, JP).

Plaintiff wife sought a divorce and ancillary relief. The Supreme Court, Dutchess County, denied branches of her summary judgment motion for an order directing the sale of the marital residence. The appellate court reversed as to this portion of the motion because the Supreme Court had no authority to modify the agreement and extend the defendant's time within which to exercise the option to purchase the plaintiff's interest in the marital residence. Citing Glucksman v. Glucksman , 264 A.D.2d 812, 695 N.Y.S.2d., the court held that such relief contravened the express terms of the agreement and violated the principle requiring strict compliance with the terms of an option.

A plaintiff husband who got a Mexican divorce without serving his wife with notice was denied his motion to have the divorce declared binding because even though the defendant wife soon learned of the divorce and did not immediately contest it, it was against public policy to sanction such a divorce. Kushnick v. Kushnick, N.Y.L.J. 5/27/03, Vol. 229; Pg. p. 33, col. 3 (Sup. Ct., Nassau Cty.) (Falanga, J.).

Plaintiff remarried 3 months after obtaining a Mexican divorce decree he got by filling out forms downloaded over the Internet. Defendant wife sought summary dismissal of plaintiff's action that sought a declaration that the divorce decree and subsequent remarriage were valid. Plaintiff conceded that he had never established residency in Mexico, that defendant had not been provided notice of the Mexican divorce action, and that defendant had not submitted to Mexico's jurisdiction. Plaintiff also contended, however, that defendant had notice of the decree prior to his October 1999 remarriage and that the court should find defendant equitably estopped on the ground of laches from contesting the validity of the Mexican divorce decree.

The court declared the divorce and remarriage invalid because it would be repugnant to fundamental notions of fairness and decency to afford comity to a divorce decree obtained over the Internet without notice. With regard to the issue of equitable estoppel, the court noted that the law is clear that neither inaction nor delay in contesting a foreign divorce constitutes laches unless an unreasonable delay in action induced the other party to change his position in reliance thereon. In the instant case, where the plaintiff married less than 3 months after the defendant became aware of the Internet Mexican divorce decree, the court found as a matter of law that plaintiff's marriage and his attendant 'change of position' did not result from laches on the part of the defendant.

The court denied a man's motion for dismissal of a misdemeanor complaint of contempt stemming from his violation of a protection order prohibiting him from contacting his ex-wife or their child; he violated the order when he sent his ex-wife a letter containing a check for his share of the child's unreimbursed child care and medical expenses, as per the terms of the couple's marital agreement. People v. Lilley, N.Y.L.J. 5/12/03, Vol. 229, Pg. P. 34., col. 1 (Nassau Cty.) (Smolkin, J.).

The two orders of protection prohibited defendant from communicating with his ex-wife or child by mail, telephone, e-mail, voice mail or other electronic means. Nevertheless, defendant sent his ex-wife a check for their child's expenses and a letter explaining the amount being paid, in September 2002.

Defendant argued that the orders of protection were inconsistent with the marital agreement, which obligated him to pay part of the child's expenses. The court disagreed with defendant, finding that the Family Court had had the opportunity to allow for some minimal contact for payment of child support in compliance with the previous divorce judgment and matrimonial agreement, but did not choose to do so. Thus, to avoid violating the orders of protection, it was incumbent upon the defendant to arrange acceptable means of delivery ' such as through an attorney, relative or friend ' to satisfy any support obligations.