Doing Business After Sarbanes-Oxley

In a recent article in this newsletter, we described a hypothetical situation about a publicly traded health care entity that was under attack by government regulators, disgruntled shareholders, and likely a qui tam relator. See, Michael E. Clark, Proffer Agreements May Be a Viable Strategy for Negotiating with Government, (Health Care Fraud & Abuse Newsletter, October 2002). This hypothetical situation continues in this article, as we illustrate some of the heightened compliance risks facing officers, directors, and attorneys who represent publicly traded entities as a result of The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 ('Sarbanes-Oxley'), Pub. L. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (2002), which ushered in major reform measures when signed into law on July 30, 2002 (and also in light of other proposals for strengthening corporate accountability from the major self regulatory organizations and exchanges: the National Association of Securities Dealers (NASD) (see NASDAQ Corporate Governance Proposals, September 13, 2002) and The New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) (see Corporate Governance Rules Proposals Reflecting Recommendations from the NYSE Corporate Accountability and Listings Standards Committee As Approved by the NYSE Board of Directors, August 1, 2002).