Development

Parkland Impact Fee Upheld

Twin Lakes Development Corp. v. Town of Monroe

NYLJ 12/30/02, p.27, col. 6

App. Div., Second Dept.

(memorandum opinion)

In landowner's action for a judgment declaring development fees imposed by a town unconstitutional, landowner appealed from the New York Supreme Court's grant of summary judgment to the town. The Appellate Division affirmed, holding that landowner had not established beyond a reasonable doubt the unconstitutionality of the fees.

Landowner applied to the town planning board for approval of a subdivision into 22 residential lots. Local Law 3, enacted by the town, provides that if a planning board requires an applicant to dedicate parkland as a condition for subdivision approval, and if the planning board determines that landowner should pay a fee in lieu of dedication, the fee should be set at $1500 per lot. Local Law 7, also enacted by the town, requires landowner to pay consultant fees incurred by the town in reviewing subdivision applications. Landowner challenged both of these local laws as unconstitutional. Supreme Court granted summary judgment to the town, and landowner appealed.

In affirming, the Appellate Division rejected landowner's claim that Local Law 3 effected taking its property without just compensation. The court indicated that the parkland fee requirement had a reasonable nexus with the municipality's interest in meeting anticipated recreation requirements of the town. The court also held that landowner had not set forth evidence to establish that the fee exceeds an amount roughly proportionate to the needs the requirement is supposed to serve. Moreover, the court rejected landowner's claim that before setting the fee, the town was obligatbed to conduct a fact-finding process in which an applicant could participate. The court labeled setting of fees as 'a mere administrative detail.' With respect to Local Law 7, the court started by noting that a town has implied authority to impose consultant fees so long as the expenses to be reimbursed are reasonable in amount an necessary to accomplish the municipality's reasonable objectives. The court went on to observe that landowner had failed to prove that the expenses at issue were not reasonable and necessary.

COMMENT

(See New York Impact Fees: Unconstitutional? page 1.)

Village's Breach of Contract Embedded in Urban Renewal Plan Dismissed

One Gateway Plaza LLC. v. Village of Port Chester

NYLJ 1/6/03, p. 28, col. 4

 
Supreme Ct., Westchester City

(LaCava, J.)

In an action by neighboring landowner to enjoin construction by developer, developer and the village moved to dismiss the complaint. The court dismissed the action, holding that two of neighboring landowner's claims were time-barred and that, in any event, landowner had failed to preserve its right to judicial review.

In 1978, the village board adopted an urban renewal plan that encompassed the subject area. As part of the plan, the board executed a declaration of restrictions that required the village to obtain consent of any redevelopers of land within the plan area before the village could modify the plan in any way that would affect the redevelopers. The declaration also gave purchasers of property within the area the right to injunctive relief to prevent violations of the plan's restrictions. Neighboring landowner's predecessor became a redeveloper in 1988 when it acquired One Gateway Plaza, an office building with an adjacent parking lot. In 1991, the village amended the urban renewal plan to establish a new redevelopment project. In response to solicitations, developer proposed modifications. After studies, reviews, and hearings pursuant to the State Environmental Quality Review Act (SEQRA), developer obtained site plan review and a special permit. During a June 1999 hearing, issues relating to the modified plan, including zoning map amendments, were raised at a public hearing. A principal of the current plaintiff, a neighboring landowner, voiced concerns about a number of issues, but did not initiate discussion about the need for neighboring landowner's consent to any changes. In July 1999, the village adopted a resolution approving the modifications. It is undisputed that the village never obtained consent from current plaintiff or its predecessor. In 2001, current plaintiff acquired title to One Gateway Plaza. Plaintiff then brought this action to enjoin construction. Supreme Court denied plaintiff a preliminary injunction on November 13, 2001. Subsequent settlement negotiations did not generate a resolution of the dispute, and construction continued. The village and developer now moved to dismiss the complaint.

In granting the motion to dismiss, the court offered alternative rationales. First, the court indicated that neighboring landowner's claim that it was improperly excluded from the village's decision-making process, and landowner's claim that the village had not complied with SEQRA, both should have been made in a timely-filed article 78 proceeding. Because such proceedings are subject to a 4-month statute of limitations, the court concluded that neighboring landowner's claims were time-barred. The court went on to hold that neighboring landowner had failed to preserve its right to judicial review because landowner had not sought preliminary injunctive relief from the Appellate Division after the Supreme Court had denied the preliminary injunction. Instead, neighboring landowner had filed an appeal, never perfected it, and ultimately withdrew the appeal. The court emphasized the prejudice to developer were the project sent back to the planning stage, and concluded that the action was moot in light of the continuous construction over the course of a year.

Parkland Impact Fee Upheld

Twin Lakes Development Corp. v. Town of Monroe

NYLJ 12/30/02, p.27, col. 6

App. Div., Second Dept.

(memorandum opinion)

In landowner's action for a judgment declaring development fees imposed by a town unconstitutional, landowner appealed from the New York Supreme Court's grant of summary judgment to the town. The Appellate Division affirmed, holding that landowner had not established beyond a reasonable doubt the unconstitutionality of the fees.

Landowner applied to the town planning board for approval of a subdivision into 22 residential lots. Local Law 3, enacted by the town, provides that if a planning board requires an applicant to dedicate parkland as a condition for subdivision approval, and if the planning board determines that landowner should pay a fee in lieu of dedication, the fee should be set at $1500 per lot. Local Law 7, also enacted by the town, requires landowner to pay consultant fees incurred by the town in reviewing subdivision applications. Landowner challenged both of these local laws as unconstitutional. Supreme Court granted summary judgment to the town, and landowner appealed.

In affirming, the Appellate Division rejected landowner's claim that Local Law 3 effected taking its property without just compensation. The court indicated that the parkland fee requirement had a reasonable nexus with the municipality's interest in meeting anticipated recreation requirements of the town. The court also held that landowner had not set forth evidence to establish that the fee exceeds an amount roughly proportionate to the needs the requirement is supposed to serve. Moreover, the court rejected landowner's claim that before setting the fee, the town was obligatbed to conduct a fact-finding process in which an applicant could participate. The court labeled setting of fees as 'a mere administrative detail.' With respect to Local Law 7, the court started by noting that a town has implied authority to impose consultant fees so long as the expenses to be reimbursed are reasonable in amount an necessary to accomplish the municipality's reasonable objectives. The court went on to observe that landowner had failed to prove that the expenses at issue were not reasonable and necessary.

COMMENT

(See New York Impact Fees: Unconstitutional? page 1.)

Village's Breach of Contract Embedded in Urban Renewal Plan Dismissed

One Gateway Plaza LLC. v. Village of Port Chester

NYLJ 1/6/03, p. 28, col. 4

 
Supreme Ct., Westchester City

(LaCava, J.)

In an action by neighboring landowner to enjoin construction by developer, developer and the village moved to dismiss the complaint. The court dismissed the action, holding that two of neighboring landowner's claims were time-barred and that, in any event, landowner had failed to preserve its right to judicial review.

In 1978, the village board adopted an urban renewal plan that encompassed the subject area. As part of the plan, the board executed a declaration of restrictions that required the village to obtain consent of any redevelopers of land within the plan area before the village could modify the plan in any way that would affect the redevelopers. The declaration also gave purchasers of property within the area the right to injunctive relief to prevent violations of the plan's restrictions. Neighboring landowner's predecessor became a redeveloper in 1988 when it acquired One Gateway Plaza, an office building with an adjacent parking lot. In 1991, the village amended the urban renewal plan to establish a new redevelopment project. In response to solicitations, developer proposed modifications. After studies, reviews, and hearings pursuant to the State Environmental Quality Review Act (SEQRA), developer obtained site plan review and a special permit. During a June 1999 hearing, issues relating to the modified plan, including zoning map amendments, were raised at a public hearing. A principal of the current plaintiff, a neighboring landowner, voiced concerns about a number of issues, but did not initiate discussion about the need for neighboring landowner's consent to any changes. In July 1999, the village adopted a resolution approving the modifications. It is undisputed that the village never obtained consent from current plaintiff or its predecessor. In 2001, current plaintiff acquired title to One Gateway Plaza. Plaintiff then brought this action to enjoin construction. Supreme Court denied plaintiff a preliminary injunction on November 13, 2001. Subsequent settlement negotiations did not generate a resolution of the dispute, and construction continued. The village and developer now moved to dismiss the complaint.

In granting the motion to dismiss, the court offered alternative rationales. First, the court indicated that neighboring landowner's claim that it was improperly excluded from the village's decision-making process, and landowner's claim that the village had not complied with SEQRA, both should have been made in a timely-filed article 78 proceeding. Because such proceedings are subject to a 4-month statute of limitations, the court concluded that neighboring landowner's claims were time-barred. The court went on to hold that neighboring landowner had failed to preserve its right to judicial review because landowner had not sought preliminary injunctive relief from the Appellate Division after the Supreme Court had denied the preliminary injunction. Instead, neighboring landowner had filed an appeal, never perfected it, and ultimately withdrew the appeal. The court emphasized the prejudice to developer were the project sent back to the planning stage, and concluded that the action was moot in light of the continuous construction over the course of a year.