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Supreme Court Clarifies Standard of Proof for Mixed-Motive Discrimination Cases
At the conclusion of its most recent 2002-2003 term, the U.S. Supreme Court issued a decision clarifying plaintiffs' standard of proof in “mixed-motive” employment discrimination cases under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended by the Civil Rights Act of 1991. In Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, the Court held that a plaintiff is required to prove by direct evidence that an unlawful factor was a “motivating factor” in the challenged adverse employment action. Instead, a plaintiff can prove his or her discrimination claim in a mixed-motive case by circumstantial evidence. As a result of this decision, defendants will find it more difficult to obtain summary judgment dismissing mixed-motive discrimination cases prior to trial, the result of which will be that more such cases will be subjected to the uncertainties of jury trials.
Legal Background
This case finds its origins in the U.S. Supreme Court's 1989 decision in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins. In Price Waterhouse, the Court first wrestled with the standard of proof in a mixed-motive case brought under Title VII, ie, a case in which the defendant's adverse job action was motivated by both unlawful discriminatory reasons and lawful reasons. Noting that Title VII prohibits employers from discriminating “because of” gender, the Court held that an employer could avoid a finding of liability by proving that it would have made the same decision even if it had not allowed gender to play a role in its decision.
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