Decisions of Interest

Verdict of $140,000 in Compensatory Damages Shocks Conscience

A jury award of $140,000 in compensatory damages shocked the judicial conscience where the employee introduced minimal evidence of emotional injuries or mental distress. Reiter v. Met. Transp. Auth. of New York, 2003 WL 22271223 (S.D.N.Y. 9/30/03) (Koeltl, D.J.).

The employee testified to feelings of distress, such as feeling nervous and on edge; and to the circumstances creating the distress. However, he failed to describe the severity, duration or consequences of his mental suffering. The court found the evidence of the employee's mental injury to be “largely vague and conclusory testimony, without any evidence of medical treatment.”

After reviewing comparable cases, the court concluded that an award in excess of $10,000 would shock the judicial conscience. Therefore, the court ordered a new trial on the issue of compensatory damages unless the employee agreed to a remittitur reducing the award to $10,000.

No attorneys listed.

Employer Not Required to Create Light Duty Position for Injured Employee

An African-American employee failed to establish that his former employer discriminated against him by allowing two Caucasian employees to return from injuries for “light duty” while refusing to permit him to do the same. Hudson v. Western New York Bics Div., 2003 WL 22092080 (2d Cir. 9/9/03) (Sotomayor, Wesley, Circuit Judges, and Pollack, Senior District Judge, by designation).

The employer did not violate either Title VII or the Americans With Disabilities Act by adopting a policy allowing injured employees to return for light duty work as a transition to regular full time work, the Second Circuit ruled, in affirming the lower court. The employee admitted that the light duty policy did not exist at the time he allegedly sought light duty work, precluding his claim that the policy was applied in a discriminatory manner.

The employer also had no obligation to create a light duty position for the employee. Therefore, the Second Circuit reasoned, even if the employee requested light duty work as a reasonable accommodation, his failure to offer any evidence that light duty work was available mandated summary judgment in favor of the employer.

Note: Unpublished decision.

For Plaintiff-Appellant, Raicle Banning Weiss PLLC, by Arnold Weiss, Buffalo.

For Defendant-Appellee, Harris Beach LLP, by Daniel J. Moore, Pittsford.

No Individual Liability under ADA

Individuals cannot be liable for violations of the Americans With Disabilities Act. Lyman v. City of New York, 2003 WL 22171518 (S.D.N.Y. 9/19/03) (Sweet, D.J.)

The employee named her supervisor as a defendant in her complaint alleging violations of the ADA. The court noted that while the Second Circuit has yet to address whether individual liability exists under the ADA, it followed persuasive precedent in the Southern District that holds that no such individual liability exists because the ADA provides redress only for discrimination by a “public entity,” and the statute's definition of that term excludes individuals.

For Plaintiff, Jeffrey S. Karp, P.C., by Jeffrey S. Karp, New York.

For Defendants, Hon. Michael A. Cardozo, Corporation Counsel of the City of New York, by Bruce Rosenbaum, Barbara G. Lifton, New York.

Sufficient Notice of Leave under the FMLA

An employee need not expressly assert rights under the FMLA when requesting FMLA leave from an employer. Jennings v. Parade Publications, 2003 WL 22241511 (S.D.N.Y. 9/30/03) (Griesa, J.)

Employee requested FMLA leave from her employer so that she could take care of her son who suffered from the medical condition of ADHD. The employer denied the employee's request by taking the position that ADHD was not a medical condition covered under the FMLA. A few weeks later and without specifically mentioning the FMLA, employee requested a modification of her work schedule so that she could be home to take care of her son. Employee was terminated soon after her request for a change in her work schedule was denied. When employee sued under the FMLA, employer sought summary judgment on the grounds that it had no notice of employee's intent to take FMLA leave. The court denied the motion and held that sufficient notice was provided to the employer. The court ruled that when an employer has some prior knowledge of an employee's medical situation, it may not later avoid the duty to inquire into whether a subsequent request is FMLA related. Here, the employer had sufficient notice that employee was seeking a potentially FMLA qualifying absence.

(No attorneys listed)

Award of Attorneys' Fees to Prevailing Party under ADA Reversed

In a case involving an award of attorneys' fees under the standards set forth by the Supreme Court in Christiansburg Garment Co. v EEOC (434 U.S. 412 (1978)), the Second Circuit reversed a district court finding that defendants, as the prevailing party, were entitled to fees under the ADA. EEOC v. J.B. Hunt Transport, Inc., 2003 WL 22229425 (2d Cir. 9/29/03) (McLaughlin, Jacobs, and Pooler, Circuit Judges).

The EEOC commenced an enforcement action that was dismissed on summary judgment by the district court. The district court then awarded attorneys' fees to the employer on the grounds that the case was frivolous or unreasonable since the EEOC had not even identified the precise nature of each claimant's disability. Although a divided panel of the Second Circuit had earlier affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment, the court here ruled that the EEOC's case did not rise to the level of frivolous or unreasonable to warrant an award of attorneys' fees. The court held that the EEOC's failure to identify the claimants' disability alone was not determinative. The mere fact that a circuit panel member had earlier dissented on the award of summary judgment alone precluded a finding that the EEOC's claim was frivolous or unreasonable.

For Appellant EEOC, Julie L. Gantz and Scopelitis, Garvin, Light & Hanson, by James H. Hanson.

For Appellee, no attorney listed.

Verdict of $140,000 in Compensatory Damages Shocks Conscience

A jury award of $140,000 in compensatory damages shocked the judicial conscience where the employee introduced minimal evidence of emotional injuries or mental distress. Reiter v. Met. Transp. Auth. of New York, 2003 WL 22271223 (S.D.N.Y. 9/30/03) (Koeltl, D.J.).

The employee testified to feelings of distress, such as feeling nervous and on edge; and to the circumstances creating the distress. However, he failed to describe the severity, duration or consequences of his mental suffering. The court found the evidence of the employee's mental injury to be “largely vague and conclusory testimony, without any evidence of medical treatment.”

After reviewing comparable cases, the court concluded that an award in excess of $10,000 would shock the judicial conscience. Therefore, the court ordered a new trial on the issue of compensatory damages unless the employee agreed to a remittitur reducing the award to $10,000.

No attorneys listed.

Employer Not Required to Create Light Duty Position for Injured Employee

An African-American employee failed to establish that his former employer discriminated against him by allowing two Caucasian employees to return from injuries for “light duty” while refusing to permit him to do the same. Hudson v. Western New York Bics Div., 2003 WL 22092080 (2d Cir. 9/9/03) (Sotomayor, Wesley, Circuit Judges, and Pollack, Senior District Judge, by designation).

The employer did not violate either Title VII or the Americans With Disabilities Act by adopting a policy allowing injured employees to return for light duty work as a transition to regular full time work, the Second Circuit ruled, in affirming the lower court. The employee admitted that the light duty policy did not exist at the time he allegedly sought light duty work, precluding his claim that the policy was applied in a discriminatory manner.

The employer also had no obligation to create a light duty position for the employee. Therefore, the Second Circuit reasoned, even if the employee requested light duty work as a reasonable accommodation, his failure to offer any evidence that light duty work was available mandated summary judgment in favor of the employer.

Note: Unpublished decision.

For Plaintiff-Appellant, Raicle Banning Weiss PLLC, by Arnold Weiss, Buffalo.

For Defendant-Appellee, Harris Beach LLP, by Daniel J. Moore, Pittsford.

No Individual Liability under ADA

Individuals cannot be liable for violations of the Americans With Disabilities Act. Lyman v. City of New York, 2003 WL 22171518 (S.D.N.Y. 9/19/03) (Sweet, D.J.)

The employee named her supervisor as a defendant in her complaint alleging violations of the ADA. The court noted that while the Second Circuit has yet to address whether individual liability exists under the ADA, it followed persuasive precedent in the Southern District that holds that no such individual liability exists because the ADA provides redress only for discrimination by a “public entity,” and the statute's definition of that term excludes individuals.

For Plaintiff, Jeffrey S. Karp, P.C., by Jeffrey S. Karp, New York.

For Defendants, Hon. Michael A. Cardozo, Corporation Counsel of the City of New York, by Bruce Rosenbaum, Barbara G. Lifton, New York.

Sufficient Notice of Leave under the FMLA

An employee need not expressly assert rights under the FMLA when requesting FMLA leave from an employer. Jennings v. Parade Publications, 2003 WL 22241511 (S.D.N.Y. 9/30/03) (Griesa, J.)

Employee requested FMLA leave from her employer so that she could take care of her son who suffered from the medical condition of ADHD. The employer denied the employee's request by taking the position that ADHD was not a medical condition covered under the FMLA. A few weeks later and without specifically mentioning the FMLA, employee requested a modification of her work schedule so that she could be home to take care of her son. Employee was terminated soon after her request for a change in her work schedule was denied. When employee sued under the FMLA, employer sought summary judgment on the grounds that it had no notice of employee's intent to take FMLA leave. The court denied the motion and held that sufficient notice was provided to the employer. The court ruled that when an employer has some prior knowledge of an employee's medical situation, it may not later avoid the duty to inquire into whether a subsequent request is FMLA related. Here, the employer had sufficient notice that employee was seeking a potentially FMLA qualifying absence.

(No attorneys listed)

Award of Attorneys' Fees to Prevailing Party under ADA Reversed

In a case involving an award of attorneys' fees under the standards set forth by the Supreme Court in Christiansburg Garment Co. v EEOC (434 U.S. 412 (1978)), the Second Circuit reversed a district court finding that defendants, as the prevailing party, were entitled to fees under the ADA. EEOC v. J.B. Hunt Transport, Inc., 2003 WL 22229425 (2d Cir. 9/29/03) (McLaughlin, Jacobs, and Pooler, Circuit Judges).

The EEOC commenced an enforcement action that was dismissed on summary judgment by the district court. The district court then awarded attorneys' fees to the employer on the grounds that the case was frivolous or unreasonable since the EEOC had not even identified the precise nature of each claimant's disability. Although a divided panel of the Second Circuit had earlier affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment, the court here ruled that the EEOC's case did not rise to the level of frivolous or unreasonable to warrant an award of attorneys' fees. The court held that the EEOC's failure to identify the claimants' disability alone was not determinative. The mere fact that a circuit panel member had earlier dissented on the award of summary judgment alone precluded a finding that the EEOC's claim was frivolous or unreasonable.

For Appellant EEOC, Julie L. Gantz and Scopelitis, Garvin, Light & Hanson, by James H. Hanson.

For Appellee, no attorney listed.