Case Notes

Pervasive Business Contacts Create Personal Jurisdiction

A state retains general personal jurisdiction over a foreign corporation whose business contacts are so pervasive within the state that it will not offend notions of fair play and substantial justice to retain general personal jurisdiction, even if none of the actions of the litigation occurred within the state. Willard v. Ingersoll-Rand Company, No. 03 C 4665, U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division, Sept. 19, 2003.

On June 19, 2000, in Zimbabwe, Roy Willard's left hand was sucked into an air compressor's cooling fan. The air compressor was manufactured by Ingersoll-Rand, a New Jersey corporation, in North Carolina. Roy Willard's left hand was partially amputated as a result of the injury. The air compressor was shipped to Ingersoll-Rand Overseas Company in France, and then to Zimbabwe, where the injury occurred. After attempts to pursue compensation on his own, Roy Willard sought counsel in the United States and filed an action in Cook County, Illinois, on June 5, 2003, almost 3 years after the incident. Ingersoll-Rand filed a motion to dismiss, claiming lack of personal jurisdiction and arguing that the action was barred by the statute of limitations.

The court denied Ingersoll-Rand's motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction but dismissed Willard's claim on the grounds that it was barred by the statute of limitations. The court held that it did have personal jurisdiction over Ingersoll-Rand in this matter under a general jurisdiction theory. It concluded that because Ingersoll-Rand's business contacts with the state of Illinois were so pervasive and systematic '  one of five central business offices nationwide was located in Illinois '  it was only fair and just to require Ingersoll-Rand to answer to any Illinois court regarding any litigation arising out of its business transactions, even if the transaction involved in the particular litigation did not arise in Illinois. Nevertheless, because Willard had commenced his action more than 2 years after the injury occurred, the Illinois court dismissed the claim because the Illinois 2-year statute of limitations had run. The court rejected Willard's argument that he was entitled to a tolling of the statute because he did not “discover” the injury until May 21, 2003, when Roy Willard retained Illinois counsel and realized that his injury was caused by a defect in the air compressor.

No Duty to Warn When Potential Danger is Evident

A manufacturer does not have a duty to warn a user or handler of a product if the user is reasonably expected to know of the potential danger of the product. Jones v. Flowserve FCD Corp., 02-30582, United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, Aug. 21, 2003.

Keith Jones was employed by PPG Industries. He was injured while working on a valve in a tank containing hot brine. The valve was made of stainless steel, but some years after it was made, the chemical process industry recognized the risk for stainless steel bolting in high-chloride environments, such as that at PPG and recommended that carbon steel be used instead. After the industry standard changed, the manufacturer of the valve used by PPG, Duriron, began using carbon steel bolting: It did not, however, notify PPG of this change. The bolting securing the valve on the tank Jones was working on failed, and he was sprayed with the hot brine. Jones sued Duriron on theories of defective manufacture, defective design and failure to warn. The defendants moved to strike an affidavit in opposition to summary judgment by Dr. Morse, one of the plaintiff's experts, and then moved for summary judgment. Dr. Morse's affidavit contained testimony regarding, inter alia, four different alternative designs for the defective valve. The affidavit was stricken, and the defendants were granted summary judgment on the defective design and failure to warn theories. The plaintiffs appealed the striking of the expert's affidavit and also the granting of the summary judgment motion. The appellate court affirmed the court below on both issues. It held that it was not an abuse of discretion by the court below to strike Dr. Morse's affidavit because the alternative design valve testimony was not disclosed to the defendants during discovery. The appellate court considered that during discovery, Dr. Morse had provided no opinion on three of the four suggested alternative designs. With regard to the fourth valve design on which Dr. Morse did provide an opinion, the appellate court held that it was only harmless error by the court below to strike that portion of the affidavit because it did not establish whether the fourth alternative design outweighed the attendant burden on the defendant. With regard to the failure to warn claim, the appellate court held that the defendant did not have a duty to warn the plaintiff because the plaintiff knew or should have known of the dangerous characteristics of the valve.

Failure to Use Seat Belt is Proper 'Misuse' Consideration for Jury

It may be misuse of an automobile if a passenger in the rear of the vehicle fails to wear a seat belt. Morgen v. Ford Motor Company, No. 71S03-0211-CV-00593, Supreme Court of Indiana, Oct. 29, 2003.

On Nov. 14, 1993, Monterey Morgen sat in the passenger-side rear seat of a 1984 Ford Escort without wearing the seat belt provided. The Escort was stopped at an intersection when a 1991 Honda Accord hit the Escort in the rear. The impact caused the Escort to collide with an Oldsmobile Cierra, causing a spinal cord injury to Morgen that resulted in his becoming a quadriplegic. Morgen sued defendant Ford Motor Company, claiming the Escort was defective and unreasonably dangerous. Morgen's experts testified that the injury was caused when the rear seat moved upward during the crash, causing Morgen's head to strike the roof of the car. Morgen's experts testified that there was a flaw in the manufacturing process causing a structural defect. Ford's experts testified that Morgen's neck was broken when the crash causing the Escort to move forward launched him into the roof of the car. Ford also considered Morgen's failure to wear a seat belt a misuse of the Escort under Indiana's product liability act. The trial judge instructed the jury on Morgen's misuse of the Escort because of his failure to wear a seat belt. The jury concluded that Morgen misused the Escort because of his failure to wear a seat belt. Morgen appealed, and the Indiana Court of Appeals reversed, finding that the trial court committed reversible error by instructing the jury that: “With respect to any product liability action based on strict liability in tort … [i]t is a defense that a cause of the physical harm is a misuse of the product by the claimant.” The Indiana Supreme Court disagreed and held that the instruction was proper. It held that although Morgen's failure to use the seat belt was not a misuse as a matter of law, it was a proper issue for the jury to decide. The Supreme Court considered that making misuse an issue for the jury to decide encourages manufacturers to include safety devices in their products regardless of whether the consumer is required by law or custom to use it. The Supreme Court did not believe that it was “clearly foreseeable” that a passenger would not wear a seat belt.

Pervasive Business Contacts Create Personal Jurisdiction

A state retains general personal jurisdiction over a foreign corporation whose business contacts are so pervasive within the state that it will not offend notions of fair play and substantial justice to retain general personal jurisdiction, even if none of the actions of the litigation occurred within the state. Willard v. Ingersoll-Rand Company, No. 03 C 4665, U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division, Sept. 19, 2003.

On June 19, 2000, in Zimbabwe, Roy Willard's left hand was sucked into an air compressor's cooling fan. The air compressor was manufactured by Ingersoll-Rand, a New Jersey corporation, in North Carolina. Roy Willard's left hand was partially amputated as a result of the injury. The air compressor was shipped to Ingersoll-Rand Overseas Company in France, and then to Zimbabwe, where the injury occurred. After attempts to pursue compensation on his own, Roy Willard sought counsel in the United States and filed an action in Cook County, Illinois, on June 5, 2003, almost 3 years after the incident. Ingersoll-Rand filed a motion to dismiss, claiming lack of personal jurisdiction and arguing that the action was barred by the statute of limitations.

The court denied Ingersoll-Rand's motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction but dismissed Willard's claim on the grounds that it was barred by the statute of limitations. The court held that it did have personal jurisdiction over Ingersoll-Rand in this matter under a general jurisdiction theory. It concluded that because Ingersoll-Rand's business contacts with the state of Illinois were so pervasive and systematic '  one of five central business offices nationwide was located in Illinois '  it was only fair and just to require Ingersoll-Rand to answer to any Illinois court regarding any litigation arising out of its business transactions, even if the transaction involved in the particular litigation did not arise in Illinois. Nevertheless, because Willard had commenced his action more than 2 years after the injury occurred, the Illinois court dismissed the claim because the Illinois 2-year statute of limitations had run. The court rejected Willard's argument that he was entitled to a tolling of the statute because he did not “discover” the injury until May 21, 2003, when Roy Willard retained Illinois counsel and realized that his injury was caused by a defect in the air compressor.

No Duty to Warn When Potential Danger is Evident

A manufacturer does not have a duty to warn a user or handler of a product if the user is reasonably expected to know of the potential danger of the product. Jones v. Flowserve FCD Corp., 02-30582, United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, Aug. 21, 2003.

Keith Jones was employed by PPG Industries. He was injured while working on a valve in a tank containing hot brine. The valve was made of stainless steel, but some years after it was made, the chemical process industry recognized the risk for stainless steel bolting in high-chloride environments, such as that at PPG and recommended that carbon steel be used instead. After the industry standard changed, the manufacturer of the valve used by PPG, Duriron, began using carbon steel bolting: It did not, however, notify PPG of this change. The bolting securing the valve on the tank Jones was working on failed, and he was sprayed with the hot brine. Jones sued Duriron on theories of defective manufacture, defective design and failure to warn. The defendants moved to strike an affidavit in opposition to summary judgment by Dr. Morse, one of the plaintiff's experts, and then moved for summary judgment. Dr. Morse's affidavit contained testimony regarding, inter alia, four different alternative designs for the defective valve. The affidavit was stricken, and the defendants were granted summary judgment on the defective design and failure to warn theories. The plaintiffs appealed the striking of the expert's affidavit and also the granting of the summary judgment motion. The appellate court affirmed the court below on both issues. It held that it was not an abuse of discretion by the court below to strike Dr. Morse's affidavit because the alternative design valve testimony was not disclosed to the defendants during discovery. The appellate court considered that during discovery, Dr. Morse had provided no opinion on three of the four suggested alternative designs. With regard to the fourth valve design on which Dr. Morse did provide an opinion, the appellate court held that it was only harmless error by the court below to strike that portion of the affidavit because it did not establish whether the fourth alternative design outweighed the attendant burden on the defendant. With regard to the failure to warn claim, the appellate court held that the defendant did not have a duty to warn the plaintiff because the plaintiff knew or should have known of the dangerous characteristics of the valve.

Failure to Use Seat Belt is Proper 'Misuse' Consideration for Jury

It may be misuse of an automobile if a passenger in the rear of the vehicle fails to wear a seat belt. Morgen v. Ford Motor Company, No. 71S03-0211-CV-00593, Supreme Court of Indiana, Oct. 29, 2003.

On Nov. 14, 1993, Monterey Morgen sat in the passenger-side rear seat of a 1984 Ford Escort without wearing the seat belt provided. The Escort was stopped at an intersection when a 1991 Honda Accord hit the Escort in the rear. The impact caused the Escort to collide with an Oldsmobile Cierra, causing a spinal cord injury to Morgen that resulted in his becoming a quadriplegic. Morgen sued defendant Ford Motor Company, claiming the Escort was defective and unreasonably dangerous. Morgen's experts testified that the injury was caused when the rear seat moved upward during the crash, causing Morgen's head to strike the roof of the car. Morgen's experts testified that there was a flaw in the manufacturing process causing a structural defect. Ford's experts testified that Morgen's neck was broken when the crash causing the Escort to move forward launched him into the roof of the car. Ford also considered Morgen's failure to wear a seat belt a misuse of the Escort under Indiana's product liability act. The trial judge instructed the jury on Morgen's misuse of the Escort because of his failure to wear a seat belt. The jury concluded that Morgen misused the Escort because of his failure to wear a seat belt. Morgen appealed, and the Indiana Court of Appeals reversed, finding that the trial court committed reversible error by instructing the jury that: “With respect to any product liability action based on strict liability in tort … [i]t is a defense that a cause of the physical harm is a misuse of the product by the claimant.” The Indiana Supreme Court disagreed and held that the instruction was proper. It held that although Morgen's failure to use the seat belt was not a misuse as a matter of law, it was a proper issue for the jury to decide. The Supreme Court considered that making misuse an issue for the jury to decide encourages manufacturers to include safety devices in their products regardless of whether the consumer is required by law or custom to use it. The Supreme Court did not believe that it was “clearly foreseeable” that a passenger would not wear a seat belt.