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Litigation

By ALM Staff | Law Journal Newsletters |
December 01, 2003

Transfer of Stock Assets: Ruling on Valuation

Where stock assets suffer a financial loss, the dollar amount transferred under the court's order should be the amount as of the date contained in the order; if a later date is improperly chosen by the transferor party, that party will be required to pay the difference if there is a financial loss. Bruno v. Loeffler, FA990170403S, Conn. Super. Ct., Stamford, Sept. 10, 2003.

The parties were divorced by judgment on Feb. 21, 2001. The husband was required to transfer certain stock property to the wife as part of the equitable dissolution of the assets. The court order clearly stated that the parties were to divide the assets based upon values on the date of entry of judgment, even though the husband had 30 days after entry to transfer the stock. On the date of the entry of the divorce judgment, the value of the combined stocks was approximately $136,000. Because of certain economic conditions, by the time the husband actually transferred the stock to the wife 20 months later, the value of the combined stocks was only $92,000. The husband was unable to offer credible evidence that the delay was excusable. The court ordered the husband to pay the wife the difference in value, plus statutory interest at the rate of 10% for the 20 months.

Husband Has No Entitlement to New Trial

The husband is not entitled to a new trial where, inter alia, there is no indication of judicial bias; the fraud on community property committed by the wife was overall inconsequential. The husband is not entitled to retain certain contractual provisions from the parties' first judgment of divorce that was voided by the court. Markowitz v. Markowitz, No.14-00-01505-CV, Tx.. Ct. App.,14th Cir., Houston, September 11, 2003.

The parties were married in 1983 and the husband filed for divorce in 1997. The wife signed an agreed decree of divorce the day prior to a scheduled surgery for breast cancer, but initialed “AMW” next to her signature. She later testified that the initials represented that she signed the decree of divorce “Against My Will.” After recovery from her surgery, the wife filed a motion for a new divorce trial. The court granted the wife's motion and a new final judgment of divorce was signed on September 20, 2000. The husband appealed, seeking a third new trial. He argued, inter alia: 1) that the trial court was biased against him; 2) that he was entitled to retain certain contractual agreements from the 1997 “agreed” decree of divorce despite the second final judgment of divorce; and 3) that the wife's fraud on the parties' community property warranted a new trial. The appellate court disagreed and upheld the second final judgment of divorce. First, it held that nothing in the record indicated that there was any judicial bias against the husband. It considered that although the court made certain negative comments regarding the husband, the husband failed to object to the court's comments during the proceedings, and, therefore, did not preserve the issue for appeal. The appellate court also refused to consider extrajudicial comments made by the court to a local newspaper after the husband was sent to jail because it was not made part of a transcript preserved for appeal. The appellate court noted that a significant number of rulings during the trial were in the husband's favor, which was evidence of the trial court's ability to be impartial. Second, the husband was not entitled to retain certain contractual agreements from the 1997 divorce decree. The fact that the trial court granted a new trial essentially wiped the slate clean because it considered the contractual provisions under the 1997 decree to be unfair. Finally, even though the jury found the wife to have committed fraud against the community property in the sum of $67,000, the division of assets as a whole was proper in consideration of each party's income, assets, education and the benefits that the wife would have received had the marriage remained intact.

Transfer of Stock Assets: Ruling on Valuation

Where stock assets suffer a financial loss, the dollar amount transferred under the court's order should be the amount as of the date contained in the order; if a later date is improperly chosen by the transferor party, that party will be required to pay the difference if there is a financial loss. Bruno v. Loeffler, FA990170403S, Conn. Super. Ct., Stamford, Sept. 10, 2003.

The parties were divorced by judgment on Feb. 21, 2001. The husband was required to transfer certain stock property to the wife as part of the equitable dissolution of the assets. The court order clearly stated that the parties were to divide the assets based upon values on the date of entry of judgment, even though the husband had 30 days after entry to transfer the stock. On the date of the entry of the divorce judgment, the value of the combined stocks was approximately $136,000. Because of certain economic conditions, by the time the husband actually transferred the stock to the wife 20 months later, the value of the combined stocks was only $92,000. The husband was unable to offer credible evidence that the delay was excusable. The court ordered the husband to pay the wife the difference in value, plus statutory interest at the rate of 10% for the 20 months.

Husband Has No Entitlement to New Trial

The husband is not entitled to a new trial where, inter alia, there is no indication of judicial bias; the fraud on community property committed by the wife was overall inconsequential. The husband is not entitled to retain certain contractual provisions from the parties' first judgment of divorce that was voided by the court. Markowitz v. Markowitz, No.14-00-01505-CV, Tx.. Ct. App.,14th Cir., Houston, September 11, 2003.

The parties were married in 1983 and the husband filed for divorce in 1997. The wife signed an agreed decree of divorce the day prior to a scheduled surgery for breast cancer, but initialed “AMW” next to her signature. She later testified that the initials represented that she signed the decree of divorce “Against My Will.” After recovery from her surgery, the wife filed a motion for a new divorce trial. The court granted the wife's motion and a new final judgment of divorce was signed on September 20, 2000. The husband appealed, seeking a third new trial. He argued, inter alia: 1) that the trial court was biased against him; 2) that he was entitled to retain certain contractual agreements from the 1997 “agreed” decree of divorce despite the second final judgment of divorce; and 3) that the wife's fraud on the parties' community property warranted a new trial. The appellate court disagreed and upheld the second final judgment of divorce. First, it held that nothing in the record indicated that there was any judicial bias against the husband. It considered that although the court made certain negative comments regarding the husband, the husband failed to object to the court's comments during the proceedings, and, therefore, did not preserve the issue for appeal. The appellate court also refused to consider extrajudicial comments made by the court to a local newspaper after the husband was sent to jail because it was not made part of a transcript preserved for appeal. The appellate court noted that a significant number of rulings during the trial were in the husband's favor, which was evidence of the trial court's ability to be impartial. Second, the husband was not entitled to retain certain contractual agreements from the 1997 divorce decree. The fact that the trial court granted a new trial essentially wiped the slate clean because it considered the contractual provisions under the 1997 decree to be unfair. Finally, even though the jury found the wife to have committed fraud against the community property in the sum of $67,000, the division of assets as a whole was proper in consideration of each party's income, assets, education and the benefits that the wife would have received had the marriage remained intact.

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