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The Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction (Oct. 25, 1980, T.I.A.S. No. 11670) is not a vehicle for deciding child access questions. Instead, its main purpose is to ensure that abducted children are returned to their country of habitual residence. It presumes that custody and visitation disputes are properly resolved in the country where the child habitually resides. The Convention applies in cases where: 1) both the country of the child's habitual residence and the country to which the child was taken have acceded to the Convention; 2) the child in question is younger than 16 years of age; and 3) the child has been “wrongfully removed or retained” in breach of rights of custody under the law of the state of the child's habitually residence.
The Convention provides both an administrative and a judicial avenue for parties seeking relief. These two remedies are not mutually exclusive; the aggrieved party may pursue one or both of them. Administrative assistance in securing a child's return can be obtained by making an application to the designated Central Authority in the nation where the child habitually resides, or in any other nation that is a party to the Convention. The United States has designated the State Department's Office of Children's Issues in the Bureau of Consular Affairs as its Central Authority.
A party may also initiate judicial proceedings in the nation where the child is located. In the United States, federal and state courts have concurrent jurisdiction over Hague Convention cases. A U.S. state or federal court must give full faith and credit to the judgment of any other U.S. state or federal court entered in an action brought under the Convention. In contrast, one federal appeals court has held that decisions of the courts of foreign nations under the Convention are not entitled to full faith and credit; they are, however, entitled to deference under principles of international comity. Diorinou v Mezitis, 237 F2d 133, 142-143 (CA 2, 2001).
This article highlights how copyright law in the United Kingdom differs from U.S. copyright law, and points out differences that may be crucial to entertainment and media businesses familiar with U.S law that are interested in operating in the United Kingdom or under UK law. The article also briefly addresses contrasts in UK and U.S. trademark law.
The Article 8 opt-in election adds an additional layer of complexity to the already labyrinthine rules governing perfection of security interests under the UCC. A lender that is unaware of the nuances created by the opt in (may find its security interest vulnerable to being primed by another party that has taken steps to perfect in a superior manner under the circumstances.
With each successive large-scale cyber attack, it is slowly becoming clear that ransomware attacks are targeting the critical infrastructure of the most powerful country on the planet. Understanding the strategy, and tactics of our opponents, as well as the strategy and the tactics we implement as a response are vital to victory.
Possession of real property is a matter of physical fact. Having the right or legal entitlement to possession is not "possession," possession is "the fact of having or holding property in one's power." That power means having physical dominion and control over the property.
UCC Sections 9406(d) and 9408(a) are one of the most powerful, yet least understood, sections of the Uniform Commercial Code. On their face, they appear to override anti-assignment provisions in agreements that would limit the grant of a security interest. But do these sections really work?