Cameo Clips

A California lawyer could represent a California-based film client in an arbitration proceeding in Illinois, the Appellate Court of Illinois, First District, Fourth Division, decided in a case of first impression. Colmar Ltd. v. Fremantlemedia North America Inc. (FMNA), 1-02-3533. Colmar, producer of the film “Captive,” entered into a distribution agreement with the California-based FMNA. The distribution contract contained an arbitration clause under which Colmar subsequently filed a demand alleging that FMNA breached the agreement by failing to “actively and aggressively” market “Captive.” The arbitrator ruled in favor of FMNA. When Colmar filed a second arbitration complaint, that arbitrator ruled that the first arbitrator had decided all the relevant issues. In both arbitrations, which took place in Chicago, FMNA was represented by its California counsel, Peter J. Anderson. Colmar later filed suit in Cook County Circuit Court claiming that the arbitration awards were void because Anderson wasn't licensed to practice law in Illinois. The trial court upheld the second arbitration award. Affirming, the appellate court first noted that the rules of the American Arbitration Association permit a non-attorney to represent a party in an arbitration proceeding. The appellate court next noted that Anderson likely would have been granted pro hac vice admission to represent FMNA in a court proceeding in Illinois. But the court continued that, “there is no corresponding procedure allowing for pro hac vice admission of an out-of-state attorney to represent a client in arbitration proceedings in Illinois. This discrepancy can lead to problems for transactional and other attorneys who represent clients in matters out of court. … In this case, the relevant factors weigh in favor of our finding that Anderson's activities were authorized primarily because they related to his regular representation of FMNA in California and involved issues that were not specific to Illinois law.”

The term “royalties” as used in a settlement agreement involving the works of the late composer Igor Stravinsky included only the writer's share of copyrights that reverted to the composer's estate pursuant to the British Copyright Act of 1911, the Supreme Court of New York, Appellate Division, First Department, decided. In re Estate of Stravinsky v. Schott Musik International GmbH & Co., 380. In this complex case, a dispute had arisen between Stravinsky's widow, Vera, and the composer's children after Vera claimed that, in addition to her income entitlement from her late husband's estate, she was also entitled to an absolute 40% community-property interest of all Stravinsky's estate because the couple had lived in California when he composed some of his works. The parties settled, but after Vera died in 1982, a dispute arose between her executor and the children over whether the phrase “such royalties” in the settlement agreement referred to French royalties. The Surrogate's Court, New York County, which had jurisdiction under the settlement agreement to hear further disputes between the parties, ruled that it did. Chester Music, to which Stravinsky's children subsequently assigned their respective interests in their reversionary copyrights, brought the current proceeding in 1999 to again clarify “such royalties.” The surrogate's court then ruled that the phrase referred to the writer's portion of royalties, including from reversionary copyrights. Affirming, the appellate division noted: “We find no merit in, or support for, the composer's issues' argument, raised for the first time on appeal, that Vera's interest does not attach to the British reversionary interest as a matter of law. In any event, the Stipulation does not, in any manner, undercut the purpose of the British Copyright Act, which was to prohibit the author from alienating the reversionary copyrights.”

Arbitration/Distribution