Decisions of Interest

Dispute Over Lottery Winnings' Status As Joint Property

A woman was unsuccessful in obtaining a protective order prohibiting her husband from giving the media transcripts of her deposition despite the fact that her deposition pertained to divorce proceedings. Parker v. Parker, N.Y.L.J. 12/15/03, DOI; Pg. 19 (Sup. Ct., Nassau Cty.) (Falanga, J.).

A woman who won a $25 million lottery prize moved for a protective order enjoining her husband from distributing transcripts of her divorce-related deposition to the media. In their divorce, the husband argued that the lottery prize was excluded from their prenuptial agreement and subject to an oral agreement to share the winnings. Conceding that the party seeking a protective order normally bears the burden of proving entitlement, the woman, citing Lisa C.-R. v. William R., 166 Misc2d 817, argued that in a divorce, the party seeking to disseminate a deposition transcript must establish a special need for dissemination. Departing from the Lisa C.-R. exception, the court denied the woman's motion, ruling that she failed to meet her burden of proof under Civil Practice Law and Rules 3103. The court noted that while the Lisa C.-R. court found a presumption against dissemination of matrimonial papers, it did not define the parameters or duration of the presumption.

Former Wife Gets No Share of Preretirement Death Benefits

Supreme Court, Onondaga County, properly determined that plaintiff was not entitled to share in the preretirement death benefits of her ex-husband, as there was no evidence that such an award had been contemplated by the court granting the divorce. Kazel v. Kazel, CA 02-02617, 2003 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 14223, (App. Div., 4th Dept. 12/31/03) (Pigott, Jr., P.J., Pine, Wisner, Scudder and Kehoe, JJ.).

The plaintiff and decedent were married for 28 years before their divorce in March 1991. At the time of the divorce, the decedent was employed by Niagara Mohawk Power Corporation, for which he was still working at the time of his death at age 58 in March 2001. Following the death of decedent, who had remarried, plaintiff sought to share with his widow in the preretirement death benefits payable pursuant to the decedent's pension plan. Plaintiff was denied any share of those benefits on the ground that the qualified domestic relations order (QDRO) issued in conjunction with the judgment of divorce granted plaintiff an interest only in the decedent's retirement annuity, and not in the death benefits. Plaintiff thereafter commenced this proceeding seeking to modify or supplement the QDRO by awarding plaintiff a share of the death benefits. Supreme Court, Onondage County, declined to modify the QDRO.

The Fourth Department here held that because the judgment of divorce referred only to the division of the pension itself, and there was no evidence that the court granting the judgment of divorce was aware that the decedent's beneficiaries might be entitled to preretirement death benefits, such benefits were properly denied to plaintiff.

The dissent, written by Justice Kehoe, noted however that the amended divorce decision recites that decedent's “pension plan” is, without exception or limitation, a “marital asset” to be distributed by the court, and it further recites that the court had “heard proof as to the value of the pension interests of decedent and would determine the percentage to be awarded to the plaintiff” pursuant to the formula promulgated by the Court of Appeals in Majauskas v. Majauskas, 61 N.Y.2d 481, 463 N.E.2d 15. “Clearly,” Justice Kehoe wrote, “the death benefit was a component of [decedent's] 'pension plan' or 'pension interests,' concerning which the court had heard proof and which it manifestly intended to distribute at the time of the divorce … The original QDRO was thus in error insofar as it failed to award plaintiff a share of [decedent's] preretirement death benefits under [Majauskas].”

Courts Must Decide Validity of Agreement Allegedly Obtained By Coercion

The question whether the parties' matrimonial agreement was obtained by coercion must be determined by the courts, rather than through arbitration, despite the fact that the couples' stipulation and a religious “Heskem” agreement called for arbitration of all marital disputes. Iacob v. Iacob, N.Y.L.J. 12/8/03, DOI; Pg. 20 (Sup. Ct., Kings Cty.) (Sunshine, J.).

The parties' divorce judgment incorporated, but did not merge, a stipulation setting out their financial obligations as well as issues regarding their child. Plaintiff wife sought, among other things, to set aside the divorce judgment and settlement on the grounds that she was under great stress and duress because defendant husband threatened not to give her a “Get” (a Jewish divorce) unless she signed the stipulation. Defendant sought plaintiff's appearance before a Beth Din (a religious court) for arbitration of issues raised in her motion. He asserted that both the stipulation and a religious “Heskem” agreement that the parties had entered into called for arbitration of their marital disputes by a Beth Din. In an apparent case of first impression, the court ruled, as a matter of public policy, that the issue of whether a matrimonial agreement, allegedly obtained through coercion and overreaching, should be set aside could not be submitted to arbitration, but must be decided by the courts.

Dispute Over Lottery Winnings' Status As Joint Property

A woman was unsuccessful in obtaining a protective order prohibiting her husband from giving the media transcripts of her deposition despite the fact that her deposition pertained to divorce proceedings. Parker v. Parker, N.Y.L.J. 12/15/03, DOI; Pg. 19 (Sup. Ct., Nassau Cty.) (Falanga, J.).

A woman who won a $25 million lottery prize moved for a protective order enjoining her husband from distributing transcripts of her divorce-related deposition to the media. In their divorce, the husband argued that the lottery prize was excluded from their prenuptial agreement and subject to an oral agreement to share the winnings. Conceding that the party seeking a protective order normally bears the burden of proving entitlement, the woman, citing Lisa C.-R. v. William R. , 166 Misc2d 817, argued that in a divorce, the party seeking to disseminate a deposition transcript must establish a special need for dissemination. Departing from the Lisa C.-R. exception, the court denied the woman's motion, ruling that she failed to meet her burden of proof under Civil Practice Law and Rules 3103. The court noted that while the Lisa C.-R. court found a presumption against dissemination of matrimonial papers, it did not define the parameters or duration of the presumption.

Former Wife Gets No Share of Preretirement Death Benefits

Supreme Court, Onondaga County, properly determined that plaintiff was not entitled to share in the preretirement death benefits of her ex-husband, as there was no evidence that such an award had been contemplated by the court granting the divorce. Kazel v. Kazel, CA 02-02617, 2003 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 14223, (App. Div., 4th Dept. 12/31/03) (Pigott, Jr., P.J., Pine, Wisner, Scudder and Kehoe, JJ.).

The plaintiff and decedent were married for 28 years before their divorce in March 1991. At the time of the divorce, the decedent was employed by Niagara Mohawk Power Corporation, for which he was still working at the time of his death at age 58 in March 2001. Following the death of decedent, who had remarried, plaintiff sought to share with his widow in the preretirement death benefits payable pursuant to the decedent's pension plan. Plaintiff was denied any share of those benefits on the ground that the qualified domestic relations order (QDRO) issued in conjunction with the judgment of divorce granted plaintiff an interest only in the decedent's retirement annuity, and not in the death benefits. Plaintiff thereafter commenced this proceeding seeking to modify or supplement the QDRO by awarding plaintiff a share of the death benefits. Supreme Court, Onondage County, declined to modify the QDRO.

The Fourth Department here held that because the judgment of divorce referred only to the division of the pension itself, and there was no evidence that the court granting the judgment of divorce was aware that the decedent's beneficiaries might be entitled to preretirement death benefits, such benefits were properly denied to plaintiff.

The dissent, written by Justice Kehoe, noted however that the amended divorce decision recites that decedent's “pension plan” is, without exception or limitation, a “marital asset” to be distributed by the court, and it further recites that the court had “heard proof as to the value of the pension interests of decedent and would determine the percentage to be awarded to the plaintiff” pursuant to the formula promulgated by the Court of Appeals in Majauskas v. Majauskas , 61 N.Y.2d 481, 463 N.E.2d 15. “Clearly,” Justice Kehoe wrote, “the death benefit was a component of [decedent's] 'pension plan' or 'pension interests,' concerning which the court had heard proof and which it manifestly intended to distribute at the time of the divorce … The original QDRO was thus in error insofar as it failed to award plaintiff a share of [decedent's] preretirement death benefits under [ Majauskas ].”

Courts Must Decide Validity of Agreement Allegedly Obtained By Coercion

The question whether the parties' matrimonial agreement was obtained by coercion must be determined by the courts, rather than through arbitration, despite the fact that the couples' stipulation and a religious “Heskem” agreement called for arbitration of all marital disputes. Iacob v. Iacob, N.Y.L.J. 12/8/03, DOI; Pg. 20 (Sup. Ct., Kings Cty.) (Sunshine, J.).

The parties' divorce judgment incorporated, but did not merge, a stipulation setting out their financial obligations as well as issues regarding their child. Plaintiff wife sought, among other things, to set aside the divorce judgment and settlement on the grounds that she was under great stress and duress because defendant husband threatened not to give her a “Get” (a Jewish divorce) unless she signed the stipulation. Defendant sought plaintiff's appearance before a Beth Din (a religious court) for arbitration of issues raised in her motion. He asserted that both the stipulation and a religious “Heskem” agreement that the parties had entered into called for arbitration of their marital disputes by a Beth Din. In an apparent case of first impression, the court ruled, as a matter of public policy, that the issue of whether a matrimonial agreement, allegedly obtained through coercion and overreaching, should be set aside could not be submitted to arbitration, but must be decided by the courts.