Spam At Work Gets Another Look

Spam At Work Gets Another Look

In our August 2003 issue, Jay Waks and Joshua Abraham reviewed the issue of workplace spam in their article entitled “A New York Perspective on Workplace Spam.” Messrs. Waks and Abraham addressed in detail the controversial California Supreme Court decision on the topic that held that an employer had failed to satisfy the harm element in a trespass to chattel action where its former employee “spammed” it with 175,000 emails. Intel Corp. v. Hamidi, 30 Cal.4th 1342 (2003).

The Waks-Abraham article opined that New York law requires significantly less evidence from an employer to establish a trespass to chattel claim — that evidence of mere possessory interference demonstrates the quantum of harm needed, even if imprecise, such as when the evidence shows that the employee's communications are an “unwelcome interference with, and a risk of interruption to, its computer system and servers … ” Register.com, Inc. v. Verio, Inc., 126 F.Supp.2d 238 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).

A New York trial court recently revisited the employee spam issue in the post-Intel landscape. School of Visual Arts v. Kuprewicz, Index No. 115172-03, (Sup. Ct. N.Y. Co. 12/22/03) (Richter, J.). The court's ruling affirms the validity of the Waks-Abraham view of the state on New York law on the troubling topic of workplace spam.

In Kuprewicz, the employer alleged that the former employee caused “large volumes” of unsolicited job applications and pornographic e-mails to be sent to it and its manager without their consent. The complaint alleged that the emails “depleted hard disk space, drained processing power, and adversely affected other system resources” on the employer's computer system. The employee moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground that the damages alleged were too insubstantial.

The court denied the motion and in so doing factually distinguished its case from Intel. It noted that in Intel, the defendant's emails caused neither physical damage nor functional disruption to the employer's computers. The Kuprewicz court rejected the notion that “the mere sending of unsolicited e-mail communications will automatically subject the sender to tort liability.” Rather, the court concluded that “at this early stage in the litigation, accepting SVA's factual allegations of damages to its computer systems, the complaint states a valid action for trespass to chattels.”

The court added that whether the spam emails were damaging enough to sustain the trespass for chattels claim “is an issue for a future motion after discovery has taken place.”

Spam At Work Gets Another Look

In our August 2003 issue, Jay Waks and Joshua Abraham reviewed the issue of workplace spam in their article entitled “A New York Perspective on Workplace Spam.” Messrs. Waks and Abraham addressed in detail the controversial California Supreme Court decision on the topic that held that an employer had failed to satisfy the harm element in a trespass to chattel action where its former employee “spammed” it with 175,000 emails. Intel Corp. v. Hamidi , 30 Cal.4th 1342 (2003).

The Waks-Abraham article opined that New York law requires significantly less evidence from an employer to establish a trespass to chattel claim — that evidence of mere possessory interference demonstrates the quantum of harm needed, even if imprecise, such as when the evidence shows that the employee's communications are an “unwelcome interference with, and a risk of interruption to, its computer system and servers … ” Register.com, Inc. v. Verio, Inc. , 126 F.Supp.2d 238 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).

A New York trial court recently revisited the employee spam issue in the post-Intel landscape. School of Visual Arts v. Kuprewicz, Index No. 115172-03, (Sup. Ct. N.Y. Co. 12/22/03) (Richter, J.). The court's ruling affirms the validity of the Waks-Abraham view of the state on New York law on the troubling topic of workplace spam.

In Kuprewicz, the employer alleged that the former employee caused “large volumes” of unsolicited job applications and pornographic e-mails to be sent to it and its manager without their consent. The complaint alleged that the emails “depleted hard disk space, drained processing power, and adversely affected other system resources” on the employer's computer system. The employee moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground that the damages alleged were too insubstantial.

The court denied the motion and in so doing factually distinguished its case from Intel. It noted that in Intel, the defendant's emails caused neither physical damage nor functional disruption to the employer's computers. The Kuprewicz court rejected the notion that “the mere sending of unsolicited e-mail communications will automatically subject the sender to tort liability.” Rather, the court concluded that “at this early stage in the litigation, accepting SVA's factual allegations of damages to its computer systems, the complaint states a valid action for trespass to chattels.”

The court added that whether the spam emails were damaging enough to sustain the trespass for chattels claim “is an issue for a future motion after discovery has taken place.”