Update: Danger to Unsuccessful Employment Discrimination Plaintiffs

The September 2003 issue of New York Employment Law & Practice published my article entitled “Be Wary of Rule 54(d)'s Costs Provision,” in which I discussed the award of costs to prevailing defendant employers in employment law cases. I observed that courts have often assessed substantial costs awards against even low-income plaintiffs whose employment law cases are dismissed or lost at trial, although there are arguments available to plaintiffs' counsel in some situations that can be used to minimize or eliminate such awards.

Yadav v. Brookhaven National Laboratory

A January 2004 decision on a costs motion by Eastern District of New York Judge Arthur D. Spatt reinforces several of the points made in the September article, and further dramatizes the dangers of potential costs awards to plaintiffs with marginal cases. The decision in Yadav v. Brookhaven National Laboratory, 2004 WL 46615, 99 CV 5602 (E.D.N.Y. 2004) approved an unusually large costs award of $26,280.20 against a pro se plaintiff after the court granted the defendant's motion for judgment as a matter of law following trial.

This seemingly draconian decision, however, needs to be viewed in the context of the unusual facts of the Yadav case. First, the pro se plaintiff may have acted in a fashion that caused the court to be less sympathetic to the equitable considerations that sometime limit costs awards. The Yadav plaintiff filed three amended complaints in the action, and later made what the court viewed as a completely frivolous motion for reconsideration of its JMOL decision. In his decision on the costs issue, Judge Spatt cited several cases which held that costs should automatically be granted unless there is a compelling reason for not doing so, and stated that “a party's indigence does not preclude an award of costs.” Id. at 2.

The court, exercising the broad discretion permitted it when reviewing costs applications, then tempered its findings. Judge Spatt noted that, despite the fact that the Yadav plaintiff did not claim indigence, the costs award of more than $26,000 “may be excessive.” Id. In recognition of this fact, the court then ordered the Clerk of Court to make his own determination of the appropriate amount of taxable costs and further permitted the parties to file motions contesting the Clerk's determination.

It would seem likely that the plaintiff in Yadav will not, in the end, be required to pay in excess of $26,000 in costs. Nonetheless, although the court properly took into account the economic impact upon the plaintiff of a large costs award, Yadav underscores the risk to employment discrimination plaintiffs with limited means of pursuing an action against a potentially vindictive employer in federal court.

The September 2003 issue of New York Employment Law & Practice published my article entitled “Be Wary of Rule 54(d)'s Costs Provision,” in which I discussed the award of costs to prevailing defendant employers in employment law cases. I observed that courts have often assessed substantial costs awards against even low-income plaintiffs whose employment law cases are dismissed or lost at trial, although there are arguments available to plaintiffs' counsel in some situations that can be used to minimize or eliminate such awards.

Yadav v. Brookhaven National Laboratory

A January 2004 decision on a costs motion by Eastern District of New York Judge Arthur D. Spatt reinforces several of the points made in the September article, and further dramatizes the dangers of potential costs awards to plaintiffs with marginal cases. The decision in Yadav v. Brookhaven National Laboratory, 2004 WL 46615, 99 CV 5602 (E.D.N.Y. 2004) approved an unusually large costs award of $26,280.20 against a pro se plaintiff after the court granted the defendant's motion for judgment as a matter of law following trial.

This seemingly draconian decision, however, needs to be viewed in the context of the unusual facts of the Yadav case. First, the pro se plaintiff may have acted in a fashion that caused the court to be less sympathetic to the equitable considerations that sometime limit costs awards. The Yadav plaintiff filed three amended complaints in the action, and later made what the court viewed as a completely frivolous motion for reconsideration of its JMOL decision. In his decision on the costs issue, Judge Spatt cited several cases which held that costs should automatically be granted unless there is a compelling reason for not doing so, and stated that “a party's indigence does not preclude an award of costs.” Id. at 2.

The court, exercising the broad discretion permitted it when reviewing costs applications, then tempered its findings. Judge Spatt noted that, despite the fact that the Yadav plaintiff did not claim indigence, the costs award of more than $26,000 “may be excessive.” Id. In recognition of this fact, the court then ordered the Clerk of Court to make his own determination of the appropriate amount of taxable costs and further permitted the parties to file motions contesting the Clerk's determination.

It would seem likely that the plaintiff in Yadav will not, in the end, be required to pay in excess of $26,000 in costs. Nonetheless, although the court properly took into account the economic impact upon the plaintiff of a large costs award, Yadav underscores the risk to employment discrimination plaintiffs with limited means of pursuing an action against a potentially vindictive employer in federal court.