Liability Rulings In Lawsuits Over Injuries on Sets

Liability for personal injuries has long been a major concern for film and TV studios, given the history of injuries to crew members on production sets. Two courts recently issued rulings based on this concern.

In one case, the Court of Appeal of California, Second Appellate Division, District Seven, decided that Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp. was a special employer immune from tort liability in an injury suit by a crew member of the “Roswell” TV series. Robert Clancey, who had hung drapes to conceal off-camera areas and helped with camera equipment lights and sets, filed an injury set alleging he developed lung disease due to exposure to fiberglass dust from damaged soundproofing materials on the “Roswell” set.

Fox had hired the TV show's crew through Entertainment Partners, a firm that the studio used for hiring and paying production personnel. Clancey claimed that he was an employee of Entertainment Partners, rather than Fox. But the court of appeal concluded, in an unpublished opinion, that Clancey was a special employee of Fox, which thus wasn't liable under the doctrine that workers' compensation is the sole remedy for general and special employees injured on the job. Clancey v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., B167685. Among the factors the court of appeal pointed to were that:

• Fox had the right to control and direct Clancey's activities on the set;
• Fox was ultimately responsible for the production and had the right to fire “Roswell” crew members;
• Clancey had signed an agreement that described him as a “daily employee” of Fox;
• Clancey had worked on the days Fox requested under conditions imposed by Fox; and
• Fox had given Clancey the equipment and tools for his work on the set.

In the second case, the U.S. District Court for the District of Kansas denied a motion by production-company defendants to allow them to compare the fault of an injured worker's employer. Cuiksa v. Hallmark Hall of Fame Productions Inc., 00-1389. Jason Cuiksa, a service technician employed by D&D Rental, was electrocuted on a production set while repairing a boom cart that struck a high voltage wire. Cuiksa filed suit alleging the production-company defendants had been negligent in parking the cart under the power line.

Under Kansas comparative-fault law, a defendant can be absolved of liability or damages can be decreased if a plaintiff's injuries are caused by a non-party to a suit. A magistrate had denied the Hallmark defendants' request to compare the fault of non-parties D&D Rental and Cuiksa's supervisor on the ground that the defendants had failed to mention those parties until after extensive discovery in Cuiksa's suit had been conducted. The defendants argued, however, that they had decided to move for a comparative-fault analysis only after Cuiksa amended his complaint to add new claims.

Affirming the magistrate, the district court emphasized: “Like the magistrate judge, the Court is troubled by the fact that defendants asserted the 'comparative fault of others' in their answer [to the original complaint] and then withheld factual discovery concerning that defense. Like the magistrate judge, the Court is unwilling to allow a party, under the guise of 'trial strategy,' to withhold discovery concerning an affirmative defense raised in its answer.”

Liability for personal injuries has long been a major concern for film and TV studios, given the history of injuries to crew members on production sets. Two courts recently issued rulings based on this concern.

In one case, the Court of Appeal of California, Second Appellate Division, District Seven, decided that Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp. was a special employer immune from tort liability in an injury suit by a crew member of the “Roswell” TV series. Robert Clancey, who had hung drapes to conceal off-camera areas and helped with camera equipment lights and sets, filed an injury set alleging he developed lung disease due to exposure to fiberglass dust from damaged soundproofing materials on the “Roswell” set.

Fox had hired the TV show's crew through Entertainment Partners, a firm that the studio used for hiring and paying production personnel. Clancey claimed that he was an employee of Entertainment Partners, rather than Fox. But the court of appeal concluded, in an unpublished opinion, that Clancey was a special employee of Fox, which thus wasn't liable under the doctrine that workers' compensation is the sole remedy for general and special employees injured on the job. Clancey v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., B167685. Among the factors the court of appeal pointed to were that:

• Fox had the right to control and direct Clancey's activities on the set;
• Fox was ultimately responsible for the production and had the right to fire “Roswell” crew members;
• Clancey had signed an agreement that described him as a “daily employee” of Fox;
• Clancey had worked on the days Fox requested under conditions imposed by Fox; and
• Fox had given Clancey the equipment and tools for his work on the set.

In the second case, the U.S. District Court for the District of Kansas denied a motion by production-company defendants to allow them to compare the fault of an injured worker's employer. Cuiksa v. Hallmark Hall of Fame Productions Inc., 00-1389. Jason Cuiksa, a service technician employed by D&D Rental, was electrocuted on a production set while repairing a boom cart that struck a high voltage wire. Cuiksa filed suit alleging the production-company defendants had been negligent in parking the cart under the power line.

Under Kansas comparative-fault law, a defendant can be absolved of liability or damages can be decreased if a plaintiff's injuries are caused by a non-party to a suit. A magistrate had denied the Hallmark defendants' request to compare the fault of non-parties D&D Rental and Cuiksa's supervisor on the ground that the defendants had failed to mention those parties until after extensive discovery in Cuiksa's suit had been conducted. The defendants argued, however, that they had decided to move for a comparative-fault analysis only after Cuiksa amended his complaint to add new claims.

Affirming the magistrate, the district court emphasized: “Like the magistrate judge, the Court is troubled by the fact that defendants asserted the 'comparative fault of others' in their answer [to the original complaint] and then withheld factual discovery concerning that defense. Like the magistrate judge, the Court is unwilling to allow a party, under the guise of 'trial strategy,' to withhold discovery concerning an affirmative defense raised in its answer.”