National Litigation Hotline

ADEA Does Not Bar Discrimination Against Younger Employees

The U.S. Supreme Court has held that the structure, purpose and history of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) does not prohibit an employer from favoring an older employee over a younger one. General Dynamics Land System v. Kline, No. 02-1080 (U.S. Feb. 24).

In 1997, General Dynamics and the United Auto Workers union entered into a collective bargaining agreement (CBA) that eliminated the company's prior obligation to provide health benefits to subsequently retired employees, except as to then-current workers at least 50 years old. As a result, General Dynamic's employees who were over 40 years old (and therefore protected by the ADEA) but younger than 50 were denied post-retirement health benefits. A group of under-40 employees filed charges of discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), alleging that the CBA violated the ADEA, which protects employees age 40 and over from employment discrimination. The EEOC agreed and suggested that the company informally settled the aggrieved employees' claims. The parties failed to settle, however, and the employees filed suit under the ADEA and state law. The federal district court dismissed the plaintiffs' claims, relying on Seventh Circuit Authority holding that the ADEA does not protect younger employees against older ones. On appeal, the Sixth Circuit reversed the District Court's decision, “reasoning that [the ADEA's] prohibition of discrimination is so clear on its face that if Congress had meant to limit its coverage to protect only the older worker against the younger, it would have said so.”

The U.S. Supreme Court reversed the Sixth Circuit and affirmed the district court's dismissal of the claim. The antidiscrimination provisions of the ADEA, the high court noted, covers “discriminat[ion] … because of [an] individual's age.” that helps the younger by hurting the older. In the abstract, that phrase is susceptible to more than one interpretation, and could be read to prohibits favoring older workers over younger workers. Such an expansive reading, the Court wrote, does not square with the natural reading of the whole provision in its proper context. In fact, Congress's interpretive clues speak almost unanimously to an understanding of discrimination as directed against workers who are older than the ones getting treated better.” The legislative history of the ADEA, as well as its prefatory finding and purpose provisions, make clear that Congress's only concern was a preference for younger employees over older ones, not the reverse. The legislative history of the ADEA was also “devoid of any evidence that younger workers were suffering at their elders' expense, let alone that a social problem required a federal statute to place a younger worker in parity with an older one … If Congress had been worrying about protecting the younger against the older, it would not likely have ignored everyone under 40.” Accordingly, the Supreme Court held that the ADEA did not operate to prohibit the form of discrimination about which the younger employees in the instant case complained.

Employee Suffering from Meniere's Disease Not 'Regarded' As Disabled

The Department of Veterans Affairs' did not violate the Rehabilitation Act by “regarding” an applicant as disabled when it rejected him out of a concern that his vertigo, hearing loss, and ear ringing, could pose safety problems on the job, the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit has held. McGeshick v. Principi, 2004 WL 206327 10th Cir. Feb. 4.

Fred McGeshick sought a position as a housekeeper at the Veterans Affairs (VA) Medical Center in Albuquerque, NM, in late 1998. VA doctors opined that he could present a hazard on the job because of his active Meniere's disease, which created hearing hearing loss, tinnitus (ringing in the ears), and vertigo, and they recommended that his application be declined. McGeshick was subsequently denied employment. Specifically, the doctors were concerned that McGeshick could harm himself or others if the symptoms of his Meniere's disease became active while he performed the heavy manual labor required in the performance of the housekeeping position. The VA did, however, invite him to apply for other positions where safety was not an issue. McGeshick sued under the Rehabilitation Act, which, like the Americans with Disabilities Act, prohibits the federal government from discriminating against job applicants or employees either because they are disabled, are “regarded as” having a disability, or have a record of having a disability. The district court dismissed McGeshick's claim on the VA's motion for summary judgment, holding that the VA did not regard McGeshick as disabled and that its safety concerns were a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for rejecting his application. McGeshick appealed.

The Tenth Circuit upheld the decision of the district court, finding that the VA's decision not to hire McGeshick was “solidly grounded” in the advice of the VA doctors. “We agree with the district court,” the court wrote, “that McGeshick failed to present evidence to suggest that the Secretary perceived him as disabled under the Rehabilitation Act.” It was true that McGeshick's evidence had shown that the VA perceived him as being a safety hazard in the performance of duties involving working in stairwells, on ladders, and out on ledges to clean windows. However, the court noted, such issues were “confined to concerns about specific tasks unique to the job of a housekeeping aide.” The court thus concluded that “[t]he fact that McGeshick has Meniere's disease is not enough for him to be perceived as disabled; he must prove that the Secretary perceived his symptoms to have actually been disabling as defined by the Rehabilitation Act and the ADA.”

ADEA Does Not Bar Discrimination Against Younger Employees

The U.S. Supreme Court has held that the structure, purpose and history of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) does not prohibit an employer from favoring an older employee over a younger one. General Dynamics Land System v. Kline, No. 02-1080 (U.S. Feb. 24).

In 1997, General Dynamics and the United Auto Workers union entered into a collective bargaining agreement (CBA) that eliminated the company's prior obligation to provide health benefits to subsequently retired employees, except as to then-current workers at least 50 years old. As a result, General Dynamic's employees who were over 40 years old (and therefore protected by the ADEA) but younger than 50 were denied post-retirement health benefits. A group of under-40 employees filed charges of discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), alleging that the CBA violated the ADEA, which protects employees age 40 and over from employment discrimination. The EEOC agreed and suggested that the company informally settled the aggrieved employees' claims. The parties failed to settle, however, and the employees filed suit under the ADEA and state law. The federal district court dismissed the plaintiffs' claims, relying on Seventh Circuit Authority holding that the ADEA does not protect younger employees against older ones. On appeal, the Sixth Circuit reversed the District Court's decision, “reasoning that [the ADEA's] prohibition of discrimination is so clear on its face that if Congress had meant to limit its coverage to protect only the older worker against the younger, it would have said so.”

The U.S. Supreme Court reversed the Sixth Circuit and affirmed the district court's dismissal of the claim. The antidiscrimination provisions of the ADEA, the high court noted, covers “discriminat[ion] … because of [an] individual's age.” that helps the younger by hurting the older. In the abstract, that phrase is susceptible to more than one interpretation, and could be read to prohibits favoring older workers over younger workers. Such an expansive reading, the Court wrote, does not square with the natural reading of the whole provision in its proper context. In fact, Congress's interpretive clues speak almost unanimously to an understanding of discrimination as directed against workers who are older than the ones getting treated better.” The legislative history of the ADEA, as well as its prefatory finding and purpose provisions, make clear that Congress's only concern was a preference for younger employees over older ones, not the reverse. The legislative history of the ADEA was also “devoid of any evidence that younger workers were suffering at their elders' expense, let alone that a social problem required a federal statute to place a younger worker in parity with an older one … If Congress had been worrying about protecting the younger against the older, it would not likely have ignored everyone under 40.” Accordingly, the Supreme Court held that the ADEA did not operate to prohibit the form of discrimination about which the younger employees in the instant case complained.

Employee Suffering from Meniere's Disease Not 'Regarded' As Disabled

The Department of Veterans Affairs' did not violate the Rehabilitation Act by “regarding” an applicant as disabled when it rejected him out of a concern that his vertigo, hearing loss, and ear ringing, could pose safety problems on the job, the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit has held. McGeshick v. Principi, 2004 WL 206327 10th Cir. Feb. 4.

Fred McGeshick sought a position as a housekeeper at the Veterans Affairs (VA) Medical Center in Albuquerque, NM, in late 1998. VA doctors opined that he could present a hazard on the job because of his active Meniere's disease, which created hearing hearing loss, tinnitus (ringing in the ears), and vertigo, and they recommended that his application be declined. McGeshick was subsequently denied employment. Specifically, the doctors were concerned that McGeshick could harm himself or others if the symptoms of his Meniere's disease became active while he performed the heavy manual labor required in the performance of the housekeeping position. The VA did, however, invite him to apply for other positions where safety was not an issue. McGeshick sued under the Rehabilitation Act, which, like the Americans with Disabilities Act, prohibits the federal government from discriminating against job applicants or employees either because they are disabled, are “regarded as” having a disability, or have a record of having a disability. The district court dismissed McGeshick's claim on the VA's motion for summary judgment, holding that the VA did not regard McGeshick as disabled and that its safety concerns were a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for rejecting his application. McGeshick appealed.

The Tenth Circuit upheld the decision of the district court, finding that the VA's decision not to hire McGeshick was “solidly grounded” in the advice of the VA doctors. “We agree with the district court,” the court wrote, “that McGeshick failed to present evidence to suggest that the Secretary perceived him as disabled under the Rehabilitation Act.” It was true that McGeshick's evidence had shown that the VA perceived him as being a safety hazard in the performance of duties involving working in stairwells, on ladders, and out on ledges to clean windows. However, the court noted, such issues were “confined to concerns about specific tasks unique to the job of a housekeeping aide.” The court thus concluded that “[t]he fact that McGeshick has Meniere's disease is not enough for him to be perceived as disabled; he must prove that the Secretary perceived his symptoms to have actually been disabling as defined by the Rehabilitation Act and the ADA.”