Litigation

Personal vs. Status Jurisdiction in Louisiana

Under Louisiana law, there is a distinction between an exception to lack of personal jurisdiction and status jurisdiction. A court can have status jurisdiction over a divorce even if it does not have personal jurisdiction over one spouse. Watkins v. Watkins, No. 37,906-CA, Louisiana Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, Dec. 10, 2003.

The husband and wife were married in Mississippi in 1988 and resided in the state until they physically separated on or about Jan. 1, 2002. In March of that year, a Mississippi court entered a temporary support order entitled “Nancy R. Watkins v. John Williams Watkins,” requiring the husband to pay temporary support to the wife until a divorce was final. Thereafter, the husband filed a complaint for a divorce bearing the same docket number, but entitled “John W. Watkins v. Nancy R. Watkins.” In November 2002, the court dismissed that complaint, and, on the same day, the husband filed a petition seeking a divorce in Louisiana, claiming he was a resident of the state.

In December 2002, the wife filed exceptions for lack of personal jurisdiction in the Louisiana matter, and thereafter filed her own complaint for a divorce in Mississippi. A hearing on the wife's exceptions was held in the Louisiana trial court, and the trial court granted the wife's exception for lack of personal jurisdiction. The husband appealed, and the appellate court reversed, finding that the Louisiana court had jurisdiction over the divorce, but did not have jurisdiction over the ancillary relief related to the divorce. It considered that under state law, the Louisiana courts have jurisdiction over an action for a divorce if one or both of the spouses were domiciled in the state. In this case, the evidence established that the husband had been a domiciliary of Louisiana since approximately Jan. 1, 2002, when the parties physically separated in Mississippi, and the husband relocated to Louisiana. The court found credible the husband's proof of residency through paychecks and bills with his Louisiana address. It further held that there was a distinction between the wife's exception to lack of personal jurisdiction and status jurisdiction. The court concluded that, although it did not have personal jurisdiction over the wife, it did have status jurisdiction over the divorce. It did not consider the wife's argument that finding status jurisdiction over the divorce would, in effect, find personal jurisdiction over the wife merely because the divorce would terminate the wife's temporary support awarded in the Mississippi action.

Spouse Not Entitled to Pre-retirement Death Benefits

Without specific mention of the distribution of pre-retirement death benefits in a Qualified Domestic Relations Order (QDRO), a spouse is not entitled to such a distribution. Kazel v. Kazel, CA 02-02617, New York Appellate Division, Fourth Department, Dec. 31, 2003.

Sandra Kazel was married to Robert Kazel for 28 years prior to their divorce in 1991. Robert was employed by Niagra Mohawk Power Corporation at the time of the parties' divorce. The parties' Qualified Domestic Relations Order (QDRO) relating to Robert's pension only addressed Robert's post-retirement distribution, and was silent on the issue of his pre-retirement death benefits. Prior to the entry of the amended judgment of divorce, the court heard testimony regarding the “value of [Robert's] pension interests.” The amended judgment of divorce stated that only Robert's “pension plan” was a marital asset. After the divorce, Robert remarried, and died in March 2001 while still employed by Niagra Mohawk. After Robert's death, Sandra moved to modify the QDRO so that she could share with the second wife in Robert's pre-retirement death

benefits. The trial court denied Sandra's motion and held that she was not entitled to share in Robert's pre-retirement death benefits. The appellate court affirmed. It considered that there was no mention in the QDRO or the amended judgment of divorce regarding Robert's pre-retirement death benefits. Furthermore, Sandra never sought to establish a value of Robert's pre-retirement death benefits during the divorce action or the hearing on Robert's pension interests prior to the entry of the amended judgment of divorce. The appellate court held that even if the Majauskas formula regarding the distribution of Robert's pension was set forth in the QDRO as the standard for the distribution of Robert's pension, the mere mention of Majauskas did not entitle Sandra to a portion of Robert's pre-retirement death benefit. Without specific mention of the distribution of these benefits, a spouse is not entitled to such a distribution. One justice dissented, stating that Sandra was entitled to a distribution from Robert's pre-retirement death benefits because the section of the amended judgment of divorce addressing the distribution of Robert's “pension plan” was “without exception or limitation” and, therefore, included Robert's preretirement death benefits.

Personal vs. Status Jurisdiction in Louisiana

Under Louisiana law, there is a distinction between an exception to lack of personal jurisdiction and status jurisdiction. A court can have status jurisdiction over a divorce even if it does not have personal jurisdiction over one spouse. Watkins v. Watkins, No. 37,906-CA, Louisiana Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, Dec. 10, 2003.

The husband and wife were married in Mississippi in 1988 and resided in the state until they physically separated on or about Jan. 1, 2002. In March of that year, a Mississippi court entered a temporary support order entitled “Nancy R. Watkins v. John Williams Watkins,” requiring the husband to pay temporary support to the wife until a divorce was final. Thereafter, the husband filed a complaint for a divorce bearing the same docket number, but entitled “John W. Watkins v. Nancy R. Watkins.” In November 2002, the court dismissed that complaint, and, on the same day, the husband filed a petition seeking a divorce in Louisiana, claiming he was a resident of the state.

In December 2002, the wife filed exceptions for lack of personal jurisdiction in the Louisiana matter, and thereafter filed her own complaint for a divorce in Mississippi. A hearing on the wife's exceptions was held in the Louisiana trial court, and the trial court granted the wife's exception for lack of personal jurisdiction. The husband appealed, and the appellate court reversed, finding that the Louisiana court had jurisdiction over the divorce, but did not have jurisdiction over the ancillary relief related to the divorce. It considered that under state law, the Louisiana courts have jurisdiction over an action for a divorce if one or both of the spouses were domiciled in the state. In this case, the evidence established that the husband had been a domiciliary of Louisiana since approximately Jan. 1, 2002, when the parties physically separated in Mississippi, and the husband relocated to Louisiana. The court found credible the husband's proof of residency through paychecks and bills with his Louisiana address. It further held that there was a distinction between the wife's exception to lack of personal jurisdiction and status jurisdiction. The court concluded that, although it did not have personal jurisdiction over the wife, it did have status jurisdiction over the divorce. It did not consider the wife's argument that finding status jurisdiction over the divorce would, in effect, find personal jurisdiction over the wife merely because the divorce would terminate the wife's temporary support awarded in the Mississippi action.

Spouse Not Entitled to Pre-retirement Death Benefits

Without specific mention of the distribution of pre-retirement death benefits in a Qualified Domestic Relations Order (QDRO), a spouse is not entitled to such a distribution. Kazel v. Kazel, CA 02-02617, New York Appellate Division, Fourth Department, Dec. 31, 2003.

Sandra Kazel was married to Robert Kazel for 28 years prior to their divorce in 1991. Robert was employed by Niagra Mohawk Power Corporation at the time of the parties' divorce. The parties' Qualified Domestic Relations Order (QDRO) relating to Robert's pension only addressed Robert's post-retirement distribution, and was silent on the issue of his pre-retirement death benefits. Prior to the entry of the amended judgment of divorce, the court heard testimony regarding the “value of [Robert's] pension interests.” The amended judgment of divorce stated that only Robert's “pension plan” was a marital asset. After the divorce, Robert remarried, and died in March 2001 while still employed by Niagra Mohawk. After Robert's death, Sandra moved to modify the QDRO so that she could share with the second wife in Robert's pre-retirement death

benefits. The trial court denied Sandra's motion and held that she was not entitled to share in Robert's pre-retirement death benefits. The appellate court affirmed. It considered that there was no mention in the QDRO or the amended judgment of divorce regarding Robert's pre-retirement death benefits. Furthermore, Sandra never sought to establish a value of Robert's pre-retirement death benefits during the divorce action or the hearing on Robert's pension interests prior to the entry of the amended judgment of divorce. The appellate court held that even if the Majauskas formula regarding the distribution of Robert's pension was set forth in the QDRO as the standard for the distribution of Robert's pension, the mere mention of Majauskas did not entitle Sandra to a portion of Robert's pre-retirement death benefit. Without specific mention of the distribution of these benefits, a spouse is not entitled to such a distribution. One justice dissented, stating that Sandra was entitled to a distribution from Robert's pre-retirement death benefits because the section of the amended judgment of divorce addressing the distribution of Robert's “pension plan” was “without exception or limitation” and, therefore, included Robert's preretirement death benefits.