Eminent Domain Law

Condemnation Partially Invalid

Matter of Feeney v. Town/Village of Harrison

NYLJ 2/17/04, p. 29, col. 6

AppDiv, Second Dept

(memorandum opinion)

Landowner brought a proceeding to review the town/village's determination to condemn a parcel of land. The court granted the petition in part, holding that the town/village had not demonstrated that the entire parcel was necessary for a water infrastructure project.

At a public hearing, the town/village offered evidence that landowner's parcel was to be acquired to run a water line that would provide a cleaner, more reliable source of water, and also provide access to town-owned land that does not currently abut a waterway. Landowner brought this proceeding, pursuant to article 2 of the Eminent Domain Procedure Law (EDPL), to challenge the taking.

In granting the petition in part, the court started by conceding that a public use, benefit, or purpose would be served by condemnation, and that the town/village's determination was not irrational. The court went on to hold, however, that the taking of landowner's entire parcel was unnecessary, because the town's public purpose could be satisfied with an easement rather than fee ownership. Hence, the court remitted the matter to the town with instructions to limit the condemnation to the part needed for the project and an easement for the access project.

COMMENT

Em. Dom. Proc. Law ' 207(A) authorizes any party aggrieved by a condemnation to seek judicial review of the condemnor's findings. However, EDPL ' 207(C) limits the scope of judicial review to four considerations: whether 1) the proceeding was in conformity with the federal and state constitutions; 2) the proposed acquisition is within the condemnor's statutory jurisdiction or authority; 3) the condemnor's determination and findings were made in accordance with procedures set forth in this article; and 4) a public use, benefit or purpose will be served by the proposed acquisition.

Upon review, the courts treat with great deference findings by a condemning authority that the condemned property will be put to public use or purpose. As the court stated in Greenwich Associates v. Metropolitan Transp. Authority, 152 A.D.2d 216, the review is restricted to whether procedural requirements are met and whether “there exists a rational factual basis” for the substantive determinations and findings of the condemner. In Greenwich, the Metropolitan Transp. Authority (MTA) sought to condemn a parcel of land to improve Grand Central Terminal. More specifically, the MTA wished to restore a 30-foot driveway to its original width of 45 feet so as to improve the “delivery of materials and handling of solid waste.” Plaintiffs were landowners and tenants of the subject parcel, and challenged the condemnation based on the lack of public purpose. The court dismissed the challenge and found that a review of the “public purpose” of the project was beyond the court's purview.

The Feeney court's holding that the condemnation was quantitatively excessive conflicts with the general tendency of courts to defer to fact determinations by the condemning authority. In support of its authority to make a de novo determination, the Feeney court cited Hallock v State of New York, 32 N.Y.2d 599, and Matter of Rafferty v Town of Colonie, 300 A.D.2d 719. But in both Hallock and Rafferty, the condemning authority conceded that not all of the appropriation would be utilized for a public purpose. Notwithstanding that concession, the condemning authorities sought to condemn the entire parcel. In Hallock, the Power Authority justified its action by asserting that its determinations were not subject to any judicial review. In Rafferty, the Town reasoned that if it were only to take the parcel necessary for the project, the landowner would not have road access to the remainder of his parcel. In each of these cases, then, the court accepted the condemning authority's factual determination, but held that as a matter of law condemnation was impermissible when the condemned land would not be put to public use or purpose. In contrast, the Feeney court failed to defer to the fact-findings of the condemning authority, but rather made its own determinations of fact.

Condemnation Partially Invalid

Matter of Feeney v. Town/Village of Harrison

NYLJ 2/17/04, p. 29, col. 6

AppDiv, Second Dept

(memorandum opinion)

Landowner brought a proceeding to review the town/village's determination to condemn a parcel of land. The court granted the petition in part, holding that the town/village had not demonstrated that the entire parcel was necessary for a water infrastructure project.

At a public hearing, the town/village offered evidence that landowner's parcel was to be acquired to run a water line that would provide a cleaner, more reliable source of water, and also provide access to town-owned land that does not currently abut a waterway. Landowner brought this proceeding, pursuant to article 2 of the Eminent Domain Procedure Law (EDPL), to challenge the taking.

In granting the petition in part, the court started by conceding that a public use, benefit, or purpose would be served by condemnation, and that the town/village's determination was not irrational. The court went on to hold, however, that the taking of landowner's entire parcel was unnecessary, because the town's public purpose could be satisfied with an easement rather than fee ownership. Hence, the court remitted the matter to the town with instructions to limit the condemnation to the part needed for the project and an easement for the access project.

COMMENT

Em. Dom. Proc. Law ' 207(A) authorizes any party aggrieved by a condemnation to seek judicial review of the condemnor's findings. However, EDPL ' 207(C) limits the scope of judicial review to four considerations: whether 1) the proceeding was in conformity with the federal and state constitutions; 2) the proposed acquisition is within the condemnor's statutory jurisdiction or authority; 3) the condemnor's determination and findings were made in accordance with procedures set forth in this article; and 4) a public use, benefit or purpose will be served by the proposed acquisition.

Upon review, the courts treat with great deference findings by a condemning authority that the condemned property will be put to public use or purpose. As the court stated in Greenwich Associates v. Metropolitan Transp. Authority, 152 A.D.2d 216, the review is restricted to whether procedural requirements are met and whether “there exists a rational factual basis” for the substantive determinations and findings of the condemner. In Greenwich, the Metropolitan Transp. Authority (MTA) sought to condemn a parcel of land to improve Grand Central Terminal. More specifically, the MTA wished to restore a 30-foot driveway to its original width of 45 feet so as to improve the “delivery of materials and handling of solid waste.” Plaintiffs were landowners and tenants of the subject parcel, and challenged the condemnation based on the lack of public purpose. The court dismissed the challenge and found that a review of the “public purpose” of the project was beyond the court's purview.

The Feeney court's holding that the condemnation was quantitatively excessive conflicts with the general tendency of courts to defer to fact determinations by the condemning authority. In support of its authority to make a de novo determination, the Feeney court cited Hallock v State of New York, 32 N.Y.2d 599, and Matter of Rafferty v Town of Colonie, 300 A.D.2d 719. But in both Hallock and Rafferty, the condemning authority conceded that not all of the appropriation would be utilized for a public purpose. Notwithstanding that concession, the condemning authorities sought to condemn the entire parcel. In Hallock, the Power Authority justified its action by asserting that its determinations were not subject to any judicial review. In Rafferty, the Town reasoned that if it were only to take the parcel necessary for the project, the landowner would not have road access to the remainder of his parcel. In each of these cases, then, the court accepted the condemning authority's factual determination, but held that as a matter of law condemnation was impermissible when the condemned land would not be put to public use or purpose. In contrast, the Feeney court failed to defer to the fact-findings of the condemning authority, but rather made its own determinations of fact.