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Part Two of a Two-Part Series
The first part of this article, published in last month's issue, addressed the importance of the distinction between true leases and loans and began a detailed analysis of the rules that courts use for state law and bankruptcy purposes to determine the category in which a given transaction belongs.
As outlined in part one of this article, courts utilize the Two-Part Test provided in '1-201(37) of the Uniform Commercial Code, and any transaction that satisfies that Two-Part Test creates a security interest as a matter of law. The first prong of the test is satisfied if the lessee does not have the option of terminating the lease early or if any such early termination option requires the lessee to pay the lessor a significant sum. The second prong, which addresses the issues that are most often litigated, is discussed below.
This article highlights how copyright law in the United Kingdom differs from U.S. copyright law, and points out differences that may be crucial to entertainment and media businesses familiar with U.S law that are interested in operating in the United Kingdom or under UK law. The article also briefly addresses contrasts in UK and U.S. trademark law.
With each successive large-scale cyber attack, it is slowly becoming clear that ransomware attacks are targeting the critical infrastructure of the most powerful country on the planet. Understanding the strategy, and tactics of our opponents, as well as the strategy and the tactics we implement as a response are vital to victory.
The Article 8 opt-in election adds an additional layer of complexity to the already labyrinthine rules governing perfection of security interests under the UCC. A lender that is unaware of the nuances created by the opt in (may find its security interest vulnerable to being primed by another party that has taken steps to perfect in a superior manner under the circumstances.
In Rockwell v. Despart, the New York Supreme Court, Third Department, recently revisited a recurring question: When may a landowner seek judicial removal of a covenant restricting use of her land?