Cameo Clips

Booking Agents/Intentional Interference

One booking agency failed to establish intentional interference with contract by another booking agency that procured an offer from the Resorts International casino for the first booking agent's client, the Court of Appeal of California, Second Appellate District, Division Two, decided in an unpublished opinion. Michael Pick International Inc. (MPI) v. International Creative Management (ICM), B167810. MPI had a written agreement to be Capitol Events' exclusive agent for the Irish music show “Spirit of the Dance” at venues, except for performing arts centers.

In April 2001, Capitol Events terminated the agency agreement on the ground that MPI had failed to obtain a booking for the show for at least 4 months, per the agency contract terms. MPI then filed suit alleging, among other things, that as a result of ICM's actions, MPI lost commission on an offer for the Spirit show that ICM had obtained from Resorts International. MPI also claimed that ICM had induced Capitol Events to cancel the agency contract with MPI. The lower court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendant. Affirming, the court of appeal noted that ICM didn't know the details and duration of the Capitol Events/MPI agreement and hadn't been the cause for Capitol Events' termination of the MPI contract. The court also found no intentional or negligent interference with prospective economic advantage.

Section 514 of the Uruguay Round Agreements Act (URAA) ' which restored copyrights to works in the public domain in the United States but still under copyright in their home country ' is constitutional, the U.S. District for the District of Columbia held. Luck's Music Library Inc. v. Ashcroft, 01-2220. The plaintiffs sold sheet music and movies that were in the U.S. public domain. Dismissing their suit challenging the URAA, the district court noted that Congress's “unbroken practice of granting retroactive copyrights and removing works from the public domain since the founding of the Constitution would seriously impede the plaintiffs' argument that Section 514 violates an implicit public domain within the IP clause. [ie, Art. I, Sec.8, cl. 8 of the U.S. Constitution].” The court cited the 1919 Amendments to the Copyright Act and the Emergency Act of 1941 Authorizing Restoration as two examples of U.S. copyright restoration. The district court also ruled that Sec. 514 met the originality requirement for copyright by granting retroactive copyright protection to works that “already contain the modicum amount of creativity necessary to qualify for a copyright.” Finally, the plaintiffs argued that Sec. 514 violated the First Amendment by restricting freedom of expression for public domain works. But the district court concluded that, “Congress has not altered the traditional contours of copyright protection by enacting Section 514.”

Hip-hop artist Eminem was improperly named a defendant in a copyright counterclaim in a case over use of the artist's recordings and lyrics on Source magazine's Web site, a Manhattan federal court ruled. Shady Records Inc. v. Source Enterprises Inc., 03 Civ. 9944. Shady had obtained a temporary restraining order (TRO) requiring Source to delete from its Web site all but part of early recordings purportedly by Eminem that included racist remarks about black women. Source had posted the materials as part of an ongoing debate about Eminem's hip-hop authenticity. The publisher claimed that it obtained ownership of the works from a purported co-author of Eminem. Dismissing Source's counterclaims against Eminem, the district court noted, “Here, the only legal rights at issue concern the ownership of the copyright to the songs, and the only uncertainty and insecurity surrounding those rights stems from the competing claims of Shady and Source to own the copyright. Mathers [ie, Eminem] is not a contestant in that dispute, and there is no basis for involving him as a defendant.” Source argued, however, that Eminem controlled Shady records, but the court responded, “It is elementary that a corporation is a separate legal person from its officers, directors or shareholders, and that those individual persons are not liable for the acts of the corporation simply because they can be said to control it.” The court went on to dismiss a counterclaim for unjust enrichment on the ground that it hadn't shown that Eminem gained a benefit at Source's expense. But the court denied Eminem's motion for sanctions over the filing of the counterclaims. (In a separate order, the district court found Source in contempt for posting the disputed materials on its website in violation of the TRO, but found that while the violation was “slipshod and ineffectual,” it wasn't willful. The court ordered Source to pay the plaintiffs' costs incurred in the contempt motion.)

A published photo caption that incorrectly labeled an outspoken homosexual as Madonna's heterosexual bodyguard didn't defame the bodyguard, the U.S. District Court for the District of Massachusetts held. Albright v. Morton, 02-11458-NG. James Albright, who served as Madonna's bodyguard in the early 1990s and had an affair with the celebrity, filed suit over publication of the mislabeled photo in the book “Madonna” and in People Weekly and News of the World. The district court dismissed the complaint. Using the test for non-public figures, the court found that to find the caption defamatory would require knowledge that the man actually in the photo was Jose Guitierez and that he was gay. The court added, “In any event, even if the Court were to assume that the community was familiar with the sexual preference of Guitierez, but, at the same time, did not know that the individual portrayed was Guitierez, not Albright, the context in which the photograph appears, namely a book or article that details Madonna's relationship with Albright, would immediately suggest otherwise. … Indeed, quite apart from the book, the photograph's caption [which cites Albright's 'overwhelming love' for Madonna] itself portrays Albright as a heterosexual.” The district court also dismissed Albright's related claims. The bodyguard had argued a right of publicity violation, claiming commercial value in the photo was demonstrated by the fact that he had been paid by a defendant for telling his story for use in the book. The court found no violation because, under Mass. Gen. Laws c. 214 Sec. 3A, it was an incidental use. In addition, there was no viable claim for false-light invasion of privacy because Albright had sold the information used in the book.

Booking Agents/Intentional Interference

One booking agency failed to establish intentional interference with contract by another booking agency that procured an offer from the Resorts International casino for the first booking agent's client, the Court of Appeal of California, Second Appellate District, Division Two, decided in an unpublished opinion. Michael Pick International Inc. (MPI) v. International Creative Management (ICM), B167810. MPI had a written agreement to be Capitol Events' exclusive agent for the Irish music show “Spirit of the Dance” at venues, except for performing arts centers.

In April 2001, Capitol Events terminated the agency agreement on the ground that MPI had failed to obtain a booking for the show for at least 4 months, per the agency contract terms. MPI then filed suit alleging, among other things, that as a result of ICM's actions, MPI lost commission on an offer for the Spirit show that ICM had obtained from Resorts International. MPI also claimed that ICM had induced Capitol Events to cancel the agency contract with MPI. The lower court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendant. Affirming, the court of appeal noted that ICM didn't know the details and duration of the Capitol Events/MPI agreement and hadn't been the cause for Capitol Events' termination of the MPI contract. The court also found no intentional or negligent interference with prospective economic advantage.

Section 514 of the Uruguay Round Agreements Act (URAA) ' which restored copyrights to works in the public domain in the United States but still under copyright in their home country ' is constitutional, the U.S. District for the District of Columbia held. Luck's Music Library Inc. v. Ashcroft, 01-2220. The plaintiffs sold sheet music and movies that were in the U.S. public domain. Dismissing their suit challenging the URAA, the district court noted that Congress's “unbroken practice of granting retroactive copyrights and removing works from the public domain since the founding of the Constitution would seriously impede the plaintiffs' argument that Section 514 violates an implicit public domain within the IP clause. [ie, Art. I, Sec.8, cl. 8 of the U.S. Constitution].” The court cited the 1919 Amendments to the Copyright Act and the Emergency Act of 1941 Authorizing Restoration as two examples of U.S. copyright restoration. The district court also ruled that Sec. 514 met the originality requirement for copyright by granting retroactive copyright protection to works that “already contain the modicum amount of creativity necessary to qualify for a copyright.” Finally, the plaintiffs argued that Sec. 514 violated the First Amendment by restricting freedom of expression for public domain works. But the district court concluded that, “Congress has not altered the traditional contours of copyright protection by enacting Section 514.”

Hip-hop artist Eminem was improperly named a defendant in a copyright counterclaim in a case over use of the artist's recordings and lyrics on Source magazine's Web site, a Manhattan federal court ruled. Shady Records Inc. v. Source Enterprises Inc., 03 Civ. 9944. Shady had obtained a temporary restraining order (TRO) requiring Source to delete from its Web site all but part of early recordings purportedly by Eminem that included racist remarks about black women. Source had posted the materials as part of an ongoing debate about Eminem's hip-hop authenticity. The publisher claimed that it obtained ownership of the works from a purported co-author of Eminem. Dismissing Source's counterclaims against Eminem, the district court noted, “Here, the only legal rights at issue concern the ownership of the copyright to the songs, and the only uncertainty and insecurity surrounding those rights stems from the competing claims of Shady and Source to own the copyright. Mathers [ie, Eminem] is not a contestant in that dispute, and there is no basis for involving him as a defendant.” Source argued, however, that Eminem controlled Shady records, but the court responded, “It is elementary that a corporation is a separate legal person from its officers, directors or shareholders, and that those individual persons are not liable for the acts of the corporation simply because they can be said to control it.” The court went on to dismiss a counterclaim for unjust enrichment on the ground that it hadn't shown that Eminem gained a benefit at Source's expense. But the court denied Eminem's motion for sanctions over the filing of the counterclaims. (In a separate order, the district court found Source in contempt for posting the disputed materials on its website in violation of the TRO, but found that while the violation was “slipshod and ineffectual,” it wasn't willful. The court ordered Source to pay the plaintiffs' costs incurred in the contempt motion.)

A published photo caption that incorrectly labeled an outspoken homosexual as Madonna's heterosexual bodyguard didn't defame the bodyguard, the U.S. District Court for the District of Massachusetts held. Albright v. Morton, 02-11458-NG. James Albright, who served as Madonna's bodyguard in the early 1990s and had an affair with the celebrity, filed suit over publication of the mislabeled photo in the book “Madonna” and in People Weekly and News of the World. The district court dismissed the complaint. Using the test for non-public figures, the court found that to find the caption defamatory would require knowledge that the man actually in the photo was Jose Guitierez and that he was gay. The court added, “In any event, even if the Court were to assume that the community was familiar with the sexual preference of Guitierez, but, at the same time, did not know that the individual portrayed was Guitierez, not Albright, the context in which the photograph appears, namely a book or article that details Madonna's relationship with Albright, would immediately suggest otherwise. … Indeed, quite apart from the book, the photograph's caption [which cites Albright's 'overwhelming love' for Madonna] itself portrays Albright as a heterosexual.” The district court also dismissed Albright's related claims. The bodyguard had argued a right of publicity violation, claiming commercial value in the photo was demonstrated by the fact that he had been paid by a defendant for telling his story for use in the book. The court found no violation because, under Mass. Gen. Laws c. 214 Sec. 3A, it was an incidental use. In addition, there was no viable claim for false-light invasion of privacy because Albright had sold the information used in the book.