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On appeal, the officers argued that the judge should not have determined damages on a pro rata basis, but rather should have awarded each plaintiff the full compensatory value of the position sought. Specifically, they argued, a pro rata methodology was not appropriate because there had been no specific number of promotions to be made, so the number of promotions that would have been made in the absence of discrimination was indeterminate. The Fifth Circuit found the officers' argument unpersuasive. “We have previously approved of district courts using a pro rata methodology in determining damages for Title VII plaintiffs when there were not enough positions for all of the eligible employees,” the court wrote, noting that other circuit courts of appeals had found that it was not an abuse of discretion to do so. The court found similarly unpersuasive the officers' contention that the trial judge should have calculated the full value of each promotion and divided it among the 35 officers, as that argument assumed that the white officers would have received all available promotions. The City, on the other hand, argued that damages should have been cut off on the date that lists from which officers would be promoted were next created by the city — ie, when the officers regained a position of equal opportunity. The Fifth Circuit rejected this argument as well. The court noted that “the district court has wide latitude in fashioning remedies in Title VII cases.” “[T]he City,” the court continued, “has not shown that any appellate court has ever ruled that a district court erred in failing to limit damages by applying a cut off date.”

Section 1981 Claims Not Subject to Heightened Pleading Standards

A federal trial court that dismissed a black doctor's race claims under the Civil Rights Act of 1866 (42 U.S.C. ' 1981) erred in failing to follow U.S. Supreme Court precedent holding that employment discrimination lawsuits are not subject to heightened pleading requirements, the Ninth Circuit has held. Maduka v. Sunrise Hosp., 2004 U.S. App. LEXIS 14604 (9th Cir. July 15).

Godwin Maduka, an African-American anesthesiologist, started working for Sunrise Hospital in 1997. In 1999, he committed two errors while administering anesthesia. In one instance, the patient experienced no side effects. In another, however, a surgery had to be aborted because of the mistake, and the patient later died from an arrhythmia brought on by a cardiac condition. Sunrise's fair hearing committee held a meeting at which a doctor, acting as prosecutor, discussed the incidents with Maduka. Although the supervising doctors in the two incidents had never filed reports, the fair hearing committee relied on statements of two nurses who were present for the surgeries in making its determination. Their identities were withheld at the hearing, however, so Maduka was unable to cross-examine them. He also alleged that he was denied other standard procedural protections. The committee voted to suspend his staff privileges, and Maduka sued in federal court under 42 U.S.C. ' 1981, alleged that white doctors who had made similar mistakes did not receive the same treatment from the hospital. Sunrise moved for dismissal under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), arguing that Maduka's complaint failed to state a claim for which relief could be granted. The trial court granted the motion on the grounds that the complaint contained “only conclusory allegations of racial discrimination, and … fail[ed] to allege any fact or facts constituting either direct or circumstantial evidence of discrimination.” The trial court dismissed Maduka's complaint, holding that he had failed to state specific facts in support of a Section 1981 claim.

The Ninth Circuit reversed. In Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506 (2002), the court noted, the U.S. Supreme Court had held that an employment discrimination complaint does not have to contain specific allegations relating to an employee's prima facie case. In Swierkiewicz, the Court was considering a Title VII claim; here, the Ninth Circuit held, the teaching of Swierkiewicz was equally applicable to a Section 1981 claim. In dismissing Dr. Godwin Maduka's complaint against Sunrise Hospital and other defendants, the district court “does not appear to have applied” this standard or in any event “did not follow [its] teaching,” the appeals court said. Accordingly, it reversed the dismissal of his complaint, and remanded the matter to the trial court for a determination of whether his pleading meets the “simple requirements” of Rule 8(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Under Swierkiewicz, an employment discrimination plaintiff need not plead facts to make out a prima facie case. Rather, under that precedent, a lawsuit may go forward “based on conclusory allegations of discrimination[.]” However, the court reserved judgment on the issue of whether Maduka had, in fact, pled fact sufficient to satisfy even the liberal Rule 8 pleading standards and remanded the case to the district court for a determination of that issue.

Disabled Employee Not Barred from Requesting Accommodation

The Sixth Circuit has held that a disabled U.S. Postal Service employee who was promoted into a position with new job requirements should not be prevented from requesting modification of certain requirements merely because she knew about the new requirements before she accepted the promotion. Smith v. Henderson, 2004 U.S. App. LEXIS 14594 (6th Cir. July 15).

Mary Smith was hired by the U.S. Postal Service in 1979 and, in 1986, informed her supervisors that she suffered from rheumatoid arthritis. As a result of her physical limitations, Smith's doctor advised that she should not work more than 8 hours per day, 40 hours per week, and not lift more than 20 pounds. Smith's supervisors accepted these conditions. In 1998, Smith was promoted to a supervisory position. Part of her new job responsibilities included financial accounting work, which was time-consuming. Smith was thus forced to work more hours than approved by her doctor. Smith's supervisors, however, refused to allow her to delegate the accounting work as an accommodation. Smith resigned her job, claiming that she was forced out. On these and other grounds, Smith sued in federal court in 2000, claiming that the Postal Service had failed reasonably to accommodate her medical conditions as required by the Rehabilitation Act. (She also included in her complaint Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act sex bias and claims under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act and the Equal Pay Act.) The federal district court held that Smith had not presented a prima facie case of sex, age, or disability discrimination because she resigned voluntarily and was not constructively discharged. The trial court thus granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment, and Smith appealed.

On appeal, the Sixth Circuit reversed, first noting that “this case is not the typical constructive discharge case,” in that Smith alleged that it was USPS's failure reasonably to accommodate her disability that precipitated her involuntary resignation. The U.S. Postal Service argued that, prior to Smith's promotion, her supervisors had repeatedly emphasized to her the expansion of her responsibilities once she would be in the new position and the resulting longer hours. Since the Postal Service had admitted that Smith's arthritis rendered her disabled in 1986 and that a 40-hour week was a reasonable accommodation of that disability, the supervisors' demands of more time from Smith was tantamount to rescinding the accommodation they had previously afforded her. Further, the court rejected the Postal Service's contention that Smith had waived her right to request accommodation since her supervisors told her prior to promotion that she would not be able to delegate her accounting responsibilities. “If this were the rule of law,” the court wrote, “it is difficult to see how a disabled individual ever would be entitled to a reasonable accommodation, since people usually are aware of what their duties will be before they start a new job.”

Damages Award Upheld in Favor of Under-promoted White Officers

The Fifth Circuit has affirmed a compensatory damages award of $434,279 to a group of white New Orleans police officers who were denied promotions because of their race, rejecting the parties' differing arguments as to the sufficiency of the award. Albright v. New Orleans, 2004 U.S. App. LEXIS 15123 (5th Cir. July 21).

In 2001, a federal trial court found that the City of New Orleans had denied Charles Albright III and 34 other white officers promotional opportunities, despite a city decree that African-Americans would be favored in the promotional process. Specifically, the trial judge found that the City had exceeded the requirements of the decree, thereby unfairly denying white officers promotions. The judge later awarded the officers a total of $434,279 in compensatory damages. Since there were fewer promotional opportunities than there were candidates, the judge determined the damages on a pro rata basis.

On appeal, the officers argued that the judge should not have determined damages on a pro rata basis, but rather should have awarded each plaintiff the full compensatory value of the position sought. Specifically, they argued, a pro rata methodology was not appropriate because there had been no specific number of promotions to be made, so the number of promotions that would have been made in the absence of discrimination was indeterminate. The Fifth Circuit found the officers' argument unpersuasive. “We have previously approved of district courts using a pro rata methodology in determining damages for Title VII plaintiffs when there were not enough positions for all of the eligible employees,” the court wrote, noting that other circuit courts of appeals had found that it was not an abuse of discretion to do so. The court found similarly unpersuasive the officers' contention that the trial judge should have calculated the full value of each promotion and divided it among the 35 officers, as that argument assumed that the white officers would have received all available promotions. The City, on the other hand, argued that damages should have been cut off on the date that lists from which officers would be promoted were next created by the city — ie, when the officers regained a position of equal opportunity. The Fifth Circuit rejected this argument as well. The court noted that “the district court has wide latitude in fashioning remedies in Title VII cases.” “[T]he City,” the court continued, “has not shown that any appellate court has ever ruled that a district court erred in failing to limit damages by applying a cut off date.”

Section 1981 Claims Not Subject to Heightened Pleading Standards

A federal trial court that dismissed a black doctor's race claims under the Civil Rights Act of 1866 (42 U.S.C. ' 1981) erred in failing to follow U.S. Supreme Court precedent holding that employment discrimination lawsuits are not subject to heightened pleading requirements, the Ninth Circuit has held. Maduka v. Sunrise Hosp., 2004 U.S. App. LEXIS 14604 (9th Cir. July 15).

Godwin Maduka, an African-American anesthesiologist, started working for Sunrise Hospital in 1997. In 1999, he committed two errors while administering anesthesia. In one instance, the patient experienced no side effects. In another, however, a surgery had to be aborted because of the mistake, and the patient later died from an arrhythmia brought on by a cardiac condition. Sunrise's fair hearing committee held a meeting at which a doctor, acting as prosecutor, discussed the incidents with Maduka. Although the supervising doctors in the two incidents had never filed reports, the fair hearing committee relied on statements of two nurses who were present for the surgeries in making its determination. Their identities were withheld at the hearing, however, so Maduka was unable to cross-examine them. He also alleged that he was denied other standard procedural protections. The committee voted to suspend his staff privileges, and Maduka sued in federal court under 42 U.S.C. ' 1981, alleged that white doctors who had made similar mistakes did not receive the same treatment from the hospital. Sunrise moved for dismissal under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), arguing that Maduka's complaint failed to state a claim for which relief could be granted. The trial court granted the motion on the grounds that the complaint contained “only conclusory allegations of racial discrimination, and … fail[ed] to allege any fact or facts constituting either direct or circumstantial evidence of discrimination.” The trial court dismissed Maduka's complaint, holding that he had failed to state specific facts in support of a Section 1981 claim.

The Ninth Circuit reversed. In Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A. , 534 U.S. 506 (2002), the court noted, the U.S. Supreme Court had held that an employment discrimination complaint does not have to contain specific allegations relating to an employee's prima facie case. In Swierkiewicz, the Court was considering a Title VII claim; here, the Ninth Circuit held, the teaching of Swierkiewicz was equally applicable to a Section 1981 claim. In dismissing Dr. Godwin Maduka's complaint against Sunrise Hospital and other defendants, the district court “does not appear to have applied” this standard or in any event “did not follow [its] teaching,” the appeals court said. Accordingly, it reversed the dismissal of his complaint, and remanded the matter to the trial court for a determination of whether his pleading meets the “simple requirements” of Rule 8(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Under Swierkiewicz, an employment discrimination plaintiff need not plead facts to make out a prima facie case. Rather, under that precedent, a lawsuit may go forward “based on conclusory allegations of discrimination[.]” However, the court reserved judgment on the issue of whether Maduka had, in fact, pled fact sufficient to satisfy even the liberal Rule 8 pleading standards and remanded the case to the district court for a determination of that issue.

Disabled Employee Not Barred from Requesting Accommodation

The Sixth Circuit has held that a disabled U.S. Postal Service employee who was promoted into a position with new job requirements should not be prevented from requesting modification of certain requirements merely because she knew about the new requirements before she accepted the promotion. Smith v. Henderson, 2004 U.S. App. LEXIS 14594 (6th Cir. July 15).

Mary Smith was hired by the U.S. Postal Service in 1979 and, in 1986, informed her supervisors that she suffered from rheumatoid arthritis. As a result of her physical limitations, Smith's doctor advised that she should not work more than 8 hours per day, 40 hours per week, and not lift more than 20 pounds. Smith's supervisors accepted these conditions. In 1998, Smith was promoted to a supervisory position. Part of her new job responsibilities included financial accounting work, which was time-consuming. Smith was thus forced to work more hours than approved by her doctor. Smith's supervisors, however, refused to allow her to delegate the accounting work as an accommodation. Smith resigned her job, claiming that she was forced out. On these and other grounds, Smith sued in federal court in 2000, claiming that the Postal Service had failed reasonably to accommodate her medical conditions as required by the Rehabilitation Act. (She also included in her complaint Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act sex bias and claims under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act and the Equal Pay Act.) The federal district court held that Smith had not presented a prima facie case of sex, age, or disability discrimination because she resigned voluntarily and was not constructively discharged. The trial court thus granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment, and Smith appealed.

On appeal, the Sixth Circuit reversed, first noting that “this case is not the typical constructive discharge case,” in that Smith alleged that it was USPS's failure reasonably to accommodate her disability that precipitated her involuntary resignation. The U.S. Postal Service argued that, prior to Smith's promotion, her supervisors had repeatedly emphasized to her the expansion of her responsibilities once she would be in the new position and the resulting longer hours. Since the Postal Service had admitted that Smith's arthritis rendered her disabled in 1986 and that a 40-hour week was a reasonable accommodation of that disability, the supervisors' demands of more time from Smith was tantamount to rescinding the accommodation they had previously afforded her. Further, the court rejected the Postal Service's contention that Smith had waived her right to request accommodation since her supervisors told her prior to promotion that she would not be able to delegate her accounting responsibilities. “If this were the rule of law,” the court wrote, “it is difficult to see how a disabled individual ever would be entitled to a reasonable accommodation, since people usually are aware of what their duties will be before they start a new job.”