Cameo Clips

Performer Garth Brooks wasn't liable under a Washington state statute for failing to provide a wheelchair user with access to an arena's main floor during a 1998 concert in Seattle, the Court of Appeals of Washington, Division One, decided in an unpublished opinion. Lawrence v. Brooks, 52743-6-I. In this case, floor seating was temporary and wheelchair seating was included as part of the fixed-seats design on tiers above the main floor. Affirming the lower court, the court of appeals noted that Brooks wasn't liable under RCW Sec. 49.60.215 “because Brooks' business is a traveling entertainment show, not a place of public accommodation.” But Brooks could be liable for aiding and abetting discrimination in public accommodations under RCW Sec. 49.60.220 if the city of Seattle discriminated against the plaintiff in a fashion abetted by Brooks. On this the court of appeals concluded: “[Plaintiff Joanne] Lawrence is entitled to seats comparable to those offered to nondisabled patrons. No fan, disabled or otherwise, could buy a seat in the first row on the floor. Because the public was excluded entirely from those seats, excluding Lawrence was not a restriction or discrimination based upon her disability. Because no wheelchair user could see the stage from anywhere else on the floor, seating Lawrence in the tiers was a reasonable accommodation.”

The trial court erred in granting a motion for summary judgment by Prince's Paisley Park Enterprises (PPE) on a claim for defamation per se brought by a former girlfriend of the artist, the Court of Appeal of California, Second Appellate District, Division One, decided in an unpublished opinion. Friend v. Paisley Park Enterprises Inc. (PPE), B169989. Charlene Friend had listed items, that she said Prince had given her as gifts, for sale through the Fine Arts Brokerage Service. Friend filed suit after PPE's counsel sent the auction agent correspondence that stated that the items had been obtained “by fraud and/or theft.” PPE argued that the letter contained no direct reference to Friend. But the court of appeal noted, “[PPE counsel Traci] Bullock's principal goal may have been to express her client's desire to prevent the auction of the items, but she also accused the 'originator' of having obtained the items through fraud and/or theft. That allegation was the justification for the demands made in the letter and made serious charges about the originator. Accordingly, the letter was 'of or concerning' both the items and the consignor.”

The court of appeal also reversed a grant of summary judgment for PPE on Friend's contractual interference claim but directed the trial court to grant summary judgment for PPE on Friend's emotional distress claims.

A plaintiff alleging that the defendants' motion picture “The Cell” violated his rights in an original screenplay couldn't proceed under Sec. 43(a) of the federal Lanham Act with a claim of false and misleading designation of the origin of the movie, a Manhattan federal court ruled. Smith v. New Line Cinema, 03-5274. Citing the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 539 U.S. 23, 37, 123 S.Ct. 2041 (2003), the federal district court noted that the Lanham Act protects the producer of tangible goods, rather than the author whose work is embodied in the goods. Thus, according to the district court, “Even assuming that [plaintiff Shamel] Smith's original work was stolen and 'passed off' when 'The Cell' was released, his claim is not actionable under the Lanham Act. Here, the tangible 'goods' offered for sale are the motion picture 'The Cell' and related products such as DVDs ' not the screenplay upon which 'The Cell' is based.”