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When Brennan requested that CTG provide similar accommodations to those he received during his training with UTI, he was denied and told that it was not CTG's policy to afford such accommodations. After failing an exam and being removed from the elite program, Brennan filed an employment discrimination charge and received a right to sue letter from the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. The district court held that he lacked standing to bring his ADA claim.

In upholding the district court's finding that Brennan lacked standing to sue under the ADA, the Fifth Circuit held that because Brennan could not prove that he was in an employment relationship and since the ADA does not allow a cause of action where such relationship is absent, Brennan had no recourse for his employment discrimination claim under the statute. Under ' 12112 of the ADA, “qualified individuals with a disability” receive protection from adverse treatment in the employment context. While Brennan argued that he could derive standing from the “job training” provision of the ADA, the court noted that this reading of the statute would require that every educational program directed to preparing its students for employment provide the requisite accommodations. The court found that while the CTG program was developed with an eye toward training its students for employment with Mercedes Benz dealerships and service centers, not only was an employment relationship absent in this case, but Brennan was never paid for his work at the elite program, nor did he ever apply for a job with the named defendants. Therefore, the Fifth Circuit held that the district court was correct in dismissing Brennan's ADA claim.

Third Circuit Regards Kidney Failure As Impairment of Major Life Activity

The Third Circuit has held that the inability to cleanse one's own blood and eliminate body waste resulting from end-stage renal disease qualify as major life activities under the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”). Fiscus v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 2004 WL 2219323 (Oct. 5, 2004).

When Plaintiff Cathy A. Fiscus, an employee of Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.'s Sam's Warehouse Club Store (Sam's Club), was diagnosed with end-stage renal disease and her condition deteriorated, she was initially allowed to perform her dialysis treatments on work premises. However, after suffering a fall at work which required a short absence, Fiscus was removed from her night-shift bakery-wrapper position and offered a day-shift job as a “Greeter.” Her request for similar accommodations to those she received as a baker-wrapper were denied, and she was subsequently told that there were no longer any available jobs for her at the store and that she should take disability leave. While on leave, Fiscus underwent a kidney transplant necessitating five and a half months recovery. This extended absence prompted Wal-Mart to fire Fiscus after she was unable to return to work within a year. Fiscus filed charges with both the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) and the District Court alleging discrimination based on her condition, and asserting that “'renal disease is a disability within the ADA as it is [a] physical impairment that substantially limits major life activities.'” The complaint further stated Fiscus' belief that she had been removed from her former position as baker-wrapper because of her disability, had been refused accommodation for her condition, and had ultimately been terminated as a result of her superior's attitudes toward her disability. In granting summary judgment for Wal-Mart, the District Court adopted the Magistrate Judge's Report and Recommendation concluding that processing bodily waste and cleansing blood are not “major life activities” under the ADA, and that Fiscus, therefore, had not identified any of her “major life activities” that were “substantially limited” by end-stage renal disease.

Reversing the District Court's judgment, the Third Circuit held that cleansing the blood of bodily waste is a major life activity, and that, therefore, Fiscus should have been allowed to prove that her end-stage renal disease “substantially limited” her ability to care for herself. In reaching this conclusion, the Third Circuit distinguished the District Court's reading of Fiscus' complaint, which erroneously defined her “major life activity” as “kidney function,” from the proper reading of Fiscus' allegation, which asserted “kidney function” as the physical impairment causing “substantial impairment” to her “major life activity” of “blood cleansing and body waste processing.” Finding the defining characteristic of a “major life activity” to be its “importance or significance,” the Third Circuit held that the processing and elimination of waste from the blood, an activity “central to the life process,” clearly falls into this class of activities protected by the ADA. Furthermore, while upholding Fiscus' right to prove a “substantial limitation” on her ability to care for herself, the court also acknowledged Wal-Mart's argument that Fiscus' dialysis treatments might have fully mitigated the consequences of her renal disease to the extent that she was no longer “substantially limited” in this respect. On remand, therefore, the Third Circuit asked that the District Court weigh the limitations caused by Fiscus' kidney failure against any mitigating effects of dialysis, apart from its attendant side-effects.

Mechanic Trainee Not an Employee for Purposes of Obtaining Relief Under ADA

The Fifth Circuit has held that the student of an automotive mechanical school who had dyslexia and attention deficit disorder lacked standing to bring an Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) employment discrimination suit against the school where he was not in an employment relationship with either the school or the automotive manufacturer who provided funding for and developed the admissions policies and curriculum for the school. Brennan v. Mercedes Benz USA, 2004 WL 2224473 (Oct. 5, 2004).

After completing an entry-level automotive skills program offered by United Technical Institute of Texas, Inc. (UTI), in which he requested and obtained several accommodations for his disabilities, Plaintiff John Brennan was admitted into a more advanced training program offered by an affiliate corporation, Custom Training Group, Inc. (CTG), which focuses its training on automobiles from specific manufacturers. Brennan became a student of CTG's Mercedes Benz elite post-graduate training program, for which Mercedes provides funding, establishes admissions and failure standards, and develops a curriculum enabling its students to eventually obtain employment with a Mercedes Benz dealership. Admission into the elite program is not considered an offer of employment, and if graduates of the school desire to be employed by Mercedes they must apply for jobs with independent Mercedes Benz dealerships and service centers. Brennan was therefore never paid wages, benefits, or compensation from UTI, CTG, or Mercedes.

When Brennan requested that CTG provide similar accommodations to those he received during his training with UTI, he was denied and told that it was not CTG's policy to afford such accommodations. After failing an exam and being removed from the elite program, Brennan filed an employment discrimination charge and received a right to sue letter from the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. The district court held that he lacked standing to bring his ADA claim.

In upholding the district court's finding that Brennan lacked standing to sue under the ADA, the Fifth Circuit held that because Brennan could not prove that he was in an employment relationship and since the ADA does not allow a cause of action where such relationship is absent, Brennan had no recourse for his employment discrimination claim under the statute. Under ' 12112 of the ADA, “qualified individuals with a disability” receive protection from adverse treatment in the employment context. While Brennan argued that he could derive standing from the “job training” provision of the ADA, the court noted that this reading of the statute would require that every educational program directed to preparing its students for employment provide the requisite accommodations. The court found that while the CTG program was developed with an eye toward training its students for employment with Mercedes Benz dealerships and service centers, not only was an employment relationship absent in this case, but Brennan was never paid for his work at the elite program, nor did he ever apply for a job with the named defendants. Therefore, the Fifth Circuit held that the district court was correct in dismissing Brennan's ADA claim.

Third Circuit Regards Kidney Failure As Impairment of Major Life Activity

The Third Circuit has held that the inability to cleanse one's own blood and eliminate body waste resulting from end-stage renal disease qualify as major life activities under the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”). Fiscus v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 2004 WL 2219323 (Oct. 5, 2004).

When Plaintiff Cathy A. Fiscus, an employee of Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.'s Sam's Warehouse Club Store (Sam's Club), was diagnosed with end-stage renal disease and her condition deteriorated, she was initially allowed to perform her dialysis treatments on work premises. However, after suffering a fall at work which required a short absence, Fiscus was removed from her night-shift bakery-wrapper position and offered a day-shift job as a “Greeter.” Her request for similar accommodations to those she received as a baker-wrapper were denied, and she was subsequently told that there were no longer any available jobs for her at the store and that she should take disability leave. While on leave, Fiscus underwent a kidney transplant necessitating five and a half months recovery. This extended absence prompted Wal-Mart to fire Fiscus after she was unable to return to work within a year. Fiscus filed charges with both the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) and the District Court alleging discrimination based on her condition, and asserting that “'renal disease is a disability within the ADA as it is [a] physical impairment that substantially limits major life activities.'” The complaint further stated Fiscus' belief that she had been removed from her former position as baker-wrapper because of her disability, had been refused accommodation for her condition, and had ultimately been terminated as a result of her superior's attitudes toward her disability. In granting summary judgment for Wal-Mart, the District Court adopted the Magistrate Judge's Report and Recommendation concluding that processing bodily waste and cleansing blood are not “major life activities” under the ADA, and that Fiscus, therefore, had not identified any of her “major life activities” that were “substantially limited” by end-stage renal disease.

Reversing the District Court's judgment, the Third Circuit held that cleansing the blood of bodily waste is a major life activity, and that, therefore, Fiscus should have been allowed to prove that her end-stage renal disease “substantially limited” her ability to care for herself. In reaching this conclusion, the Third Circuit distinguished the District Court's reading of Fiscus' complaint, which erroneously defined her “major life activity” as “kidney function,” from the proper reading of Fiscus' allegation, which asserted “kidney function” as the physical impairment causing “substantial impairment” to her “major life activity” of “blood cleansing and body waste processing.” Finding the defining characteristic of a “major life activity” to be its “importance or significance,” the Third Circuit held that the processing and elimination of waste from the blood, an activity “central to the life process,” clearly falls into this class of activities protected by the ADA. Furthermore, while upholding Fiscus' right to prove a “substantial limitation” on her ability to care for herself, the court also acknowledged Wal-Mart's argument that Fiscus' dialysis treatments might have fully mitigated the consequences of her renal disease to the extent that she was no longer “substantially limited” in this respect. On remand, therefore, the Third Circuit asked that the District Court weigh the limitations caused by Fiscus' kidney failure against any mitigating effects of dialysis, apart from its attendant side-effects.