Landlord & Tenant

Allegations Make Out Prima Facie Case of Housing Discrimination

Dunleavy v. Hilton Hall Apartments Co.

NYLJ 1/18/05, p. 30, col. 2

AppDiv, Second Dept

(memorandum opinion)

In an action to recover damages for housing discrimination, the tenant appealed from the Supreme Court's grant of the landlord's motion to dismiss a cause of action. The Appellate Division reversed and reinstated the cause of action, concluding that the tenant's allegations had made out a prima facie case under Executive Law, sec. 296.

The tenant, an unmarried woman, alleged that the landlord had asked her to vacate her apartment for failure to provide the landlord with a key to the apartment. She also alleged that male or married tenants who had failed to provide the landlord with a key were not asked to leave their apartments. The tenant contended that the landlord's practice violated the state Human Rights Law, and entitled her to damages. The Supreme Court granted the landlord's motion to dismiss.

In reinstating the cause of action, the Appellate Division noted that to make out a prima facie case, the tenant had to allege that she was a member of a protected group, that she was qualified to lease the premises but was asked to leave, and that this occurred under circumstances that give rise to an inference of unlawful discrimination. The court concluded that in this case, the tenant's allegations made out a prima facie case of discrimination based upon gender and marital status.

Landlord's Hardship Application Not Affected By Subsequent Death of Tenant

Rizzo v. New York State Division of Housing and Community Renewal

NYLJ 2/15/05, p. 18, col. 1

AppDiv, First Dept

(3-2 decision; opinion by Tom, J.P., dissenting opinion by Nardelli, J.)

In a rent-controlled tenant's article 78 proceeding challenging DHCR's grant of a landlord's hardship application to subdivide the tenant's apartment, the landlord appealed from the Supreme Court's remand to DHCR to consider the impact of the subsequent death of another rent-controlled tenant. A divided Appellate Division reversed, holding that the subsequent death was not grounds for reconsideration of the tenant's application.

The subject townhouse includes four floor-through apartments, each of about 1200 square feet. The landlord occupies an unregulated unit in the building. Two of the other three units were rent-controlled in 1996 when the landlord filed a hardship application seeking to subdivide those two apartments, leaving the existing tenants with the back portion of their existing apartments, and combining the front portion of their units into a new duplex apartment. The existing tenants challenged the landlord's compliance with regulations promulgated pursuant to the Sound Housing Act (NYC Administrative Code, sec. 26-408[b][5]). The regulations require a finding that the landlord cannot make a net annual return of 8.5 percent without the eviction, and that the landlord did not willfully manage the property to impair the landlord's ability to make the required return (9 NYCRR sec. 2204.4). An administrative law judge concluded that the landlord had satisfied the required standard, and DHCR denied the tenant's petition for administrative review (PAR). The tenant then brought this article 78 proceeding. Just after DHCR denied the PAR, however, the other rent-controlled tenant affected by the subdivision died. The Supreme Court, in considering the article 78 proceeding, decided sua sponte that the case should be remanded to the agency for further proceedings in light of that death. The landlord appealed.

In reversing, the Appellate Division majority emphasized that judicial review of administrative determinations affecting rent-controlled properties is limited by statute. The court then noted that the death of a tenant in 2002 had no bearing on the building's profitability in 1996 — the issue before DHCR in evaluating the landlord's application. As a result, the Supreme Court should not have remanded. The Appellate Division then reached the merits — which the Supreme Court had not reached because of its remand — and concluded that substantial evidence supported DHCR's determination. Justice Nardelli, dissenting, emphasized that the rent-control statutes are remedial in nature and should be construed liberally. The court dissent argued that permitting the landlord to go forward with the proposed remodeling at this point would result in a windfall to the landlord.

Allegations Make Out Prima Facie Case of Housing Discrimination

Dunleavy v. Hilton Hall Apartments Co.

NYLJ 1/18/05, p. 30, col. 2

AppDiv, Second Dept

(memorandum opinion)

In an action to recover damages for housing discrimination, the tenant appealed from the Supreme Court's grant of the landlord's motion to dismiss a cause of action. The Appellate Division reversed and reinstated the cause of action, concluding that the tenant's allegations had made out a prima facie case under Executive Law, sec. 296.

The tenant, an unmarried woman, alleged that the landlord had asked her to vacate her apartment for failure to provide the landlord with a key to the apartment. She also alleged that male or married tenants who had failed to provide the landlord with a key were not asked to leave their apartments. The tenant contended that the landlord's practice violated the state Human Rights Law, and entitled her to damages. The Supreme Court granted the landlord's motion to dismiss.

In reinstating the cause of action, the Appellate Division noted that to make out a prima facie case, the tenant had to allege that she was a member of a protected group, that she was qualified to lease the premises but was asked to leave, and that this occurred under circumstances that give rise to an inference of unlawful discrimination. The court concluded that in this case, the tenant's allegations made out a prima facie case of discrimination based upon gender and marital status.

Landlord's Hardship Application Not Affected By Subsequent Death of Tenant

Rizzo v. New York State Division of Housing and Community Renewal

NYLJ 2/15/05, p. 18, col. 1

AppDiv, First Dept

(3-2 decision; opinion by Tom, J.P., dissenting opinion by Nardelli, J.)

In a rent-controlled tenant's article 78 proceeding challenging DHCR's grant of a landlord's hardship application to subdivide the tenant's apartment, the landlord appealed from the Supreme Court's remand to DHCR to consider the impact of the subsequent death of another rent-controlled tenant. A divided Appellate Division reversed, holding that the subsequent death was not grounds for reconsideration of the tenant's application.

The subject townhouse includes four floor-through apartments, each of about 1200 square feet. The landlord occupies an unregulated unit in the building. Two of the other three units were rent-controlled in 1996 when the landlord filed a hardship application seeking to subdivide those two apartments, leaving the existing tenants with the back portion of their existing apartments, and combining the front portion of their units into a new duplex apartment. The existing tenants challenged the landlord's compliance with regulations promulgated pursuant to the Sound Housing Act (NYC Administrative Code, sec. 26-408[b][5]). The regulations require a finding that the landlord cannot make a net annual return of 8.5 percent without the eviction, and that the landlord did not willfully manage the property to impair the landlord's ability to make the required return (9 NYCRR sec. 2204.4). An administrative law judge concluded that the landlord had satisfied the required standard, and DHCR denied the tenant's petition for administrative review (PAR). The tenant then brought this article 78 proceeding. Just after DHCR denied the PAR, however, the other rent-controlled tenant affected by the subdivision died. The Supreme Court, in considering the article 78 proceeding, decided sua sponte that the case should be remanded to the agency for further proceedings in light of that death. The landlord appealed.

In reversing, the Appellate Division majority emphasized that judicial review of administrative determinations affecting rent-controlled properties is limited by statute. The court then noted that the death of a tenant in 2002 had no bearing on the building's profitability in 1996 — the issue before DHCR in evaluating the landlord's application. As a result, the Supreme Court should not have remanded. The Appellate Division then reached the merits — which the Supreme Court had not reached because of its remand — and concluded that substantial evidence supported DHCR's determination. Justice Nardelli, dissenting, emphasized that the rent-control statutes are remedial in nature and should be construed liberally. The court dissent argued that permitting the landlord to go forward with the proposed remodeling at this point would result in a windfall to the landlord.