Law.com Subscribers SAVE 30%
Call 855-808-4530 or email [email protected] to receive your discount on a new subscription.
Update: Four California Courts Rule that Proposition 64 is Retroactive
Courts in California have issued contradictory rulings in the past 2 months about whether a reform of the state's Unfair Competition Act, California Business & Professions Code Sections 17200, et seq. (the “UCA”) is retroactive. Section 17200 was changed when California voters passed Proposition 64 in the Nov. 2004 election. Proposition 64 amends the UCA to delete the broad standing rules and to add a requirement that suit may be brought by a private plaintiff (as opposed to a suit brought by a County Attorney or Attorney General) only if the plaintiff has suffered “injury in fact” and has lost money or property as a result of the unfair competition. These reforms will likely reduce the incidence of Section 17200 litigation ' a development that is strongly supported by businesses across the state.
In the first decision, referenced in a “News Brief” in the March 2005 issue of FBLA, the court held that Proposition 64 did not apply to cases that were pending at the time of the election, Californians for Disability Rights v. Mervyn's, LLC, 2005 Cal.App.Lexis 160 (1st App. Dist., Feb. 1, 2005). The Mervyn's court relied on the general rule that “a new statute is presumed to operate prospectively absent an express declaration of retrospectivity or a clear indication that the electorate, or the Legislature, intended otherwise.” After determining that the voters had not voted on nor intended that the Proposition be applied retroactively, the court applied the general rule and held that a prospective application was appropriate.
However, on the heels of Mervyn's, a rapid-fire series of cases rejected that reasoning. On Feb. 9, 2005, in Branick v. Downey Savings and Loan Assoc., 2005 Cal.App.Lexis 201 (2d App. Dist., 2005), the court held that Proposition 64 does apply retroactively and the plaintiff lacked standing to sue “on behalf of the general public.” The Branick court agreed with the general rule enunciated in Mervyn's, but found that the Mervyn's court erred by not applying an exception to the general rule of prospective application. The exception, known as the “repeal principle,” holds that retroactivity applies “when a statutory enactment repeals a statute that provides a purely statutory cause of action.”
Major Differences In UK, U.S. Copyright Laws
This article highlights how copyright law in the United Kingdom differs from U.S. copyright law, and points out differences that may be crucial to entertainment and media businesses familiar with U.S law that are interested in operating in the United Kingdom or under UK law. The article also briefly addresses contrasts in UK and U.S. trademark law.
The Article 8 Opt In
The Article 8 opt-in election adds an additional layer of complexity to the already labyrinthine rules governing perfection of security interests under the UCC. A lender that is unaware of the nuances created by the opt in (may find its security interest vulnerable to being primed by another party that has taken steps to perfect in a superior manner under the circumstances.
Strategy vs. Tactics: Two Sides of a Difficult Coin
With each successive large-scale cyber attack, it is slowly becoming clear that ransomware attacks are targeting the critical infrastructure of the most powerful country on the planet. Understanding the strategy, and tactics of our opponents, as well as the strategy and the tactics we implement as a response are vital to victory.
Legal Possession: What Does It Mean?
Possession of real property is a matter of physical fact. Having the right or legal entitlement to possession is not "possession," possession is "the fact of having or holding property in one's power." That power means having physical dominion and control over the property.
Removing Restrictive Covenants In New York
In Rockwell v. Despart, the New York Supreme Court, Third Department, recently revisited a recurring question: When may a landowner seek judicial removal of a covenant restricting use of her land?