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In January 2005, Illinois passed basic protections against discrimination on the basis of both sexual orientation and gender identity. In doing so, it became one of only 15 states to enact such legislation (and the first to do so in 2 years), and one of only six states to include in such protection prohibition against discrimination expressly based on gender identity.
The amendments (most recently denominated SB 3186) to the Illinois Human Rights Act (IRHA), 775 ILCS 5/101 et seq., bar discrimination on the basis of “sexual orientation” in employment, real estate transactions, access to financial credit, and to public accommodations. The signature of Illinois Gov. Rod Blagojevich marked the end to a nearly 30-year struggle to pass such legislation, aided by Democrats' control of both houses of the Illinois General Assembly and the governorship. It occurred despite myriad legal and political obstacles and incongruities, including state constitutional amendments barring same-sex marriage and, in some instances, same-sex unions generally; continuing efforts in Illinois to amend the state constitution to ban same-sex marriage, as well as relatively restrictive and by some accounts excessive prohibitions against same sex relationships within the state's marriage laws; and, among the states, Illinois' restrictive case law barring the enforcement of most rights or interests attendant upon unmarried relationships irrespective of gender. Hewitt v Hewitt, 77 Ill.2d 49 (1979).
The enactment of this legislation within the context of prevailing law and politics both nationally and in Illinois is nothing short of remarkable, and the question is posed: Has the now nearly 2-year national debate about same-sex marriage changed public attitudes toward increasing favor of basic civil rights protections for persons based upon sexual orientation? Did members of the Assembly who voted for the Amendment in January 2005, but who had previously refused to do so, change their position because the debate had made them more favorably disposed to such fundamental protections?
This article highlights how copyright law in the United Kingdom differs from U.S. copyright law, and points out differences that may be crucial to entertainment and media businesses familiar with U.S law that are interested in operating in the United Kingdom or under UK law. The article also briefly addresses contrasts in UK and U.S. trademark law.
The Article 8 opt-in election adds an additional layer of complexity to the already labyrinthine rules governing perfection of security interests under the UCC. A lender that is unaware of the nuances created by the opt in (may find its security interest vulnerable to being primed by another party that has taken steps to perfect in a superior manner under the circumstances.
With each successive large-scale cyber attack, it is slowly becoming clear that ransomware attacks are targeting the critical infrastructure of the most powerful country on the planet. Understanding the strategy, and tactics of our opponents, as well as the strategy and the tactics we implement as a response are vital to victory.
Possession of real property is a matter of physical fact. Having the right or legal entitlement to possession is not "possession," possession is "the fact of having or holding property in one's power." That power means having physical dominion and control over the property.
UCC Sections 9406(d) and 9408(a) are one of the most powerful, yet least understood, sections of the Uniform Commercial Code. On their face, they appear to override anti-assignment provisions in agreements that would limit the grant of a security interest. But do these sections really work?