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On April 5, 2005, the New York Court of Appeals upheld long-standing New York law that a policyholder's late notice defeats coverage under a commercial liability policy without any specific requirement that an insurer demonstrate prejudice. The court disagreed with any assessment that the “no prejudice” rule was a doctrine whose time had come. It rejected a policyholder's request to apply a prejudice rule to “notice of a suit in commercial policies where the notice was admittedly late.” See Argo Corporation, et al. v. Greater New York Mutual Insurance Co., (N.Y. April 5, 2005). In a separate opinion issued on the same day as Argo, the court did apply a “prejudice” standard in the limited context of supplemental underinsured motorist (“SUM”) coverage where late notice of a SUM claim followed timely notice of the underlying accident. Rekemeyer v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., (N.Y. April 5, 2005).
The recent Court of Appeals opinions were especially significant because New York is a worldwide center of finance, including insurance. These decisions maintain clear and consistent jurisprudence in New York regarding the interpretation of commercial contracts. Further, New York, as a financial Mecca and strong adherent to the “no prejudice” rule, had become a target for policyholders seeking to erode that rule. These decisions put to rest any doubt about the direction of New York late notice law.
Collectively, the New York high court's April 5 opinions clarified the “late notice” landscape, which had been muddied by conflicting intermediate appellate court rulings following the Court of Appeals decision 3 years ago in the case of Matter of Brandon v. Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co., 97 N.Y.2d 491 (2002). Compare Great Canal Realty Corp., 787 N.Y.S. 2d at 28 (stating that Brandon militates toward moving to a prejudice standard as to initial notice requirements); Rekemeyer v. State Farm Mutual Automobile, 2004 N.Y. Slip. Op. No. 04074, 7 A.D.3d 955, 777 N.Y.S.2d 551 (App. Div. 3rd Dep't 2004) (holding that policyholder's late notice barred coverage for its underinsured motorist benefits claim); Blue Ridge Ins. Co. v. Jiminez, 777 N.Y.S.2d 204 (App. Div. 2d Dep't 2004) (explaining that whether New York should abandon its long-standing “no prejudice” rule, as advanced by the policyholder, is a matter left to the discretion of the Court of Appeals); Argo Corporation, et al. v. Greater New York Mutual Insurance Co., 1 A.D.3d 264, 767 N.Y.S.2d 577 (App. Div. 1st Dep't 2003) (finding no coverage for failure of policyholder to give timely notice of the underlying action without requiring showing of prejudice finding that Brandon was inapplicable to facts). By decisively affirming that the “no prejudice” rule is alive and well in New York jurisprudence, the Court of Appeals has retained an important level of certainty in contractual relations between insurer and policyholder.
This article highlights how copyright law in the United Kingdom differs from U.S. copyright law, and points out differences that may be crucial to entertainment and media businesses familiar with U.S law that are interested in operating in the United Kingdom or under UK law. The article also briefly addresses contrasts in UK and U.S. trademark law.
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