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“A patent may not be obtained … if the … subject matter [sought to be patented] as a whole would have been obvious at the time the invention was made.” 35 U.S.C. '103(a). Establishment of prima facie obviousness requires satisfaction of three separate criteria. First, there must be some suggestion or motivation to one of ordinary skill in the art to modify a reference or to combine reference teachings. Second, there must be a reasonable expectation of success. Third, the prior art reference (or references when combined) must teach or suggest each and every limitation in the claim under examination. In re Vaeck, 947 F.2d 488, 20 U.S.P.Q.2d 1438 (Fed. Cir. 1991). With respect to chemical compounds, a prima facie case of obviousness may be made based on structural similarity of the claimed compound to other known compounds since “one skilled in the art [would be motivated] to make a claimed compound, in the expectation that compounds similar in structure will have similar properties.” In re Payne, 606 F.2d 303, 313 (CCPA 1979).
To rebut a prima facie case of obviousness, aside from an analysis of the prior art, secondary considerations, such as evidence of commercial success or of unexpected functions and results of the invention may be considered. For example, a prima facie case of obviousness based on structural similarity is rebuttable by proof that the claimed compound possesses unexpectedly advantageous or superior properties. In re Papesch, 315 F.2d 381 (CCPA 1963). The utility of considering such secondary considerations is that they “focus attention on economic and motivational rather than technical issues and are, therefore, more susceptible of judicial treatment than are the highly technical facts often present in patent litigation,” Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 35-36 (1966), and they guard against the improper use of hindsight reasoning based on knowledge gleaned from the inventor's own work. Glaros v. H.H. Robertson Co., 600 F. Supp. 342, 344 (N.D. Ill. 1984), aff'd, 797 F.2d 1564 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (“The Federal Circuit has … repeatedly emphasized the importance of the inquiry into secondary considerations, such as the commercial success of the invention and the prior failure of others, as the strongest precaution against judging an invention from the perspective of 20/20 hindsight.”).
At least with respect to commercial success, courts often rely on secondary consideration evidence obtained even after issuance of a patent. Furthermore, reliance on evidence of commercial success obtained after issuance of the patent is typical, “because the inventor usually waits until his patent issues before he swings production into full gear.” In re Sernaker, 702 F.2d 989 (Fed. Cir. 1983). Even where commercial success is achieved after some delay, the Federal Circuit in Windsurfing International, Inc. v. AMF Inc., 782 F.2d 995, 100 (Fed. Cir. 1986) noted that “[a]bsent some intervening event to which success must be attributed, the delay in achieving the great commercial success of the claimed invention in this case does not detract from the probative value of the evidence of that success.” This does not clash with the rule that obviousness of an invention is determined according to the state of the art at the time the invention was made, because such evidence, even though obtained after patent issuance, tends to indicate the nature of the state of the prior art before issuance of the patent. See E. Kitch, “Graham v. John Deere Co.: New Standards for Patents,” 1966 Sup. Ct. Rev. 293, 330-35 (1966). For example, commercial success tends to indicate that attempts had been previously made to find a solution to the problem solved by the patented invention. In a similar vein, where individuals other than the patentee developed a solution to the problem solved by the patented structure at approximately the same time as the development by the patentee of the patented structure, the Fifth Circuit in Graham v. Jeoffroy Mfg. Co., 206 F.2d 769 (5th Cir. 1953) ruled that such development tends to refute any claim that the patent involved any invention, even though the patented structure probably antedated the individuals' development, such that the development does not qualify as prior art. That is, such later development tends to indicate that the state of the art at the time the invention was made was such as to render obvious the patented structure.
This article highlights how copyright law in the United Kingdom differs from U.S. copyright law, and points out differences that may be crucial to entertainment and media businesses familiar with U.S law that are interested in operating in the United Kingdom or under UK law. The article also briefly addresses contrasts in UK and U.S. trademark law.
The Article 8 opt-in election adds an additional layer of complexity to the already labyrinthine rules governing perfection of security interests under the UCC. A lender that is unaware of the nuances created by the opt in (may find its security interest vulnerable to being primed by another party that has taken steps to perfect in a superior manner under the circumstances.
With each successive large-scale cyber attack, it is slowly becoming clear that ransomware attacks are targeting the critical infrastructure of the most powerful country on the planet. Understanding the strategy, and tactics of our opponents, as well as the strategy and the tactics we implement as a response are vital to victory.
Possession of real property is a matter of physical fact. Having the right or legal entitlement to possession is not "possession," possession is "the fact of having or holding property in one's power." That power means having physical dominion and control over the property.
In 1987, a unanimous Court of Appeals reaffirmed the vitality of the "stranger to the deed" rule, which holds that if a grantor executes a deed to a grantee purporting to create an easement in a third party, the easement is invalid. Daniello v. Wagner, decided by the Second Department on November 29th, makes it clear that not all grantors (or their lawyers) have received the Court of Appeals' message, suggesting that the rule needs re-examination.