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In response to CSC's proffered legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons for Leyva's departure, which included her 'strained interpersonal relations with her co-workers,' her 'inability effectively to transfer knowledge to other members of the GTS project,' the project she had been working on since the Spring of 2002, and 'the fact that the GTS project was moving into a 'support' phase in which her 'development' skills were no longer needed,' Leyva set forth insufficient evidence to defeat summary judgment. While, under the first Fuentes prong, Leyva claimed that CSC's proffered reasons were weak and implausible, she did not present sufficient evidence from which this claim could be reasonably established.

Under the second prong, Leyva argued that the fact that she was terminated just 6 weeks prior to her pension vesting date was evidence of age discrimination. However, the Third Circuit found that vesting under CSC's plan depended on years of service, rather than age. The court thus found that Leyva's argument failed based on the Supreme Court's holding that ”[b]ecause age and years of service are analytically distinct, an employer can take account of one while ignoring the other, and thus it is incorrect to say that a decision based on years of service is necessarily 'age based.” Likewise, the Third Circuit rejected Leyva's other argument under the second prong of Fuentes, that she was treated less favorably than other, similarly situated employees outside of her protected class, in that she 'cite[d] only two events in which she was similarly situated to a co-worker younger than she, and neither support[ed] her claim that CSC was biased against her on the basis of age.' Therefore, in affirming the district Court's grant of summary judgment to CSC, the Third Circuit held that '[i]n short, Leyva did not provide a sufficient basis for a reasonable fact-finder to determine 'that an invidious discriminatory reason was more likely than not a motivating or determinative cause [of Leyva's discharge].”

Sixth Circuit Finds Hiring Decisions Based on Personal and Family Connections Not Discriminatory Under Federal Law

The Sixth Circuit has held that a college department chair's preference for a faculty applicant whom he had known personally through his undergraduate tenure was not evidence of discriminatory animus toward a Middle Eastern applicant under ' 1981, which guarantees equal contract rights regardless of race. Amini v. Oberlin College, 2006 WL 566871 (March 10).

Upholding the district court's grant of summary judgment for defendant Oberlin College, the Sixth Circuit found that plaintiff Saeid B. Amini, an Iranian-born Muslim, had not proffered sufficient evidence to survive a motion for summary judgment in that he did not show that his race had played a role in defendant's decision not to hire him on as a member of its faculty. Amini filed this lawsuit in the district court after Oberlin College rejected his application for a job as an assistant professor of mathematics. Dr. Chris Andrews, the ultimately successful candidate and a former Oberlin College student, had requested a recommendation from the Mathematics Department Chairman Michael Henle, whom he knew as an undergraduate student, had experience teaching at Oberlin and was applying for the job that his father, a statistician at Oberlin, was vacating. In support of his race discrimination claim under ' 1981, Amini contended that the record contained direct evidence of defendant's discriminatory intent in the following forms: '[T]he college never hired an African-American or Mid-Eastern faculty member; Dr. Witmer, the chair of the search committee, did not recall reviewing an application from any candidate 'other than a non-European White'; the college hired a non-white faculty member after the plaintiff filed his complaint with the EEOC; and the successful candidate, Dr. Christopher Andrews, was given favorable and preferential treatment.' In response to this contention, the Sixth Circuit found that this evidence did not amount to direct evidence of discrimination, but rather 'constituted at most an anecdotal report.'

Sixth Circuit Finds No Age Discrimination Based on Worker's Termination 6 Weeks Prior to Pension Vesting

The Third Circuit has held that where an employer proffered legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons for an employee's discharge, its termination of that employee 6 weeks before her pension vested was not a pretext for age discrimination prohibited by the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. ' 621, et seq., (ADEA). Leyva v. Computer Sciences Corporation, 2006 WL 542526 (March 7).

Affirming the lower court's grant of summary judgment to the employer, Computer Sciences Corporation (CSC or 'the Company'), the Third Circuit found that assuming plaintiff Maureen Leyva had made out a sufficient prima facie case, she had not met her additional burden to rebut CSC's stated reasons for her termination with evidence that such reasons were pretextual. Under Fuentes v. Perskie, 32 F.3d 759, 764 (3d Cir. 1994), once the employer confronts an employee's prima facie case of age discrimination with a nondiscriminatory reason for its adverse employment action, the employee may then defeat summary judgment by ”point[ing] to some evidence, direct or circumstantial, from which a factfinder could reasonably either: 1) disbelieve the employer's articulated legitimate reasons; or 2) believe that an invidious discriminatory reason was more likely than not a motivating or determinative cause of the employer's action.”

In response to CSC's proffered legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons for Leyva's departure, which included her 'strained interpersonal relations with her co-workers,' her 'inability effectively to transfer knowledge to other members of the GTS project,' the project she had been working on since the Spring of 2002, and 'the fact that the GTS project was moving into a 'support' phase in which her 'development' skills were no longer needed,' Leyva set forth insufficient evidence to defeat summary judgment. While, under the first Fuentes prong, Leyva claimed that CSC's proffered reasons were weak and implausible, she did not present sufficient evidence from which this claim could be reasonably established.

Under the second prong, Leyva argued that the fact that she was terminated just 6 weeks prior to her pension vesting date was evidence of age discrimination. However, the Third Circuit found that vesting under CSC's plan depended on years of service, rather than age. The court thus found that Leyva's argument failed based on the Supreme Court's holding that ”[b]ecause age and years of service are analytically distinct, an employer can take account of one while ignoring the other, and thus it is incorrect to say that a decision based on years of service is necessarily 'age based.” Likewise, the Third Circuit rejected Leyva's other argument under the second prong of Fuentes, that she was treated less favorably than other, similarly situated employees outside of her protected class, in that she 'cite[d] only two events in which she was similarly situated to a co-worker younger than she, and neither support[ed] her claim that CSC was biased against her on the basis of age.' Therefore, in affirming the district Court's grant of summary judgment to CSC, the Third Circuit held that '[i]n short, Leyva did not provide a sufficient basis for a reasonable fact-finder to determine 'that an invidious discriminatory reason was more likely than not a motivating or determinative cause [of Leyva's discharge].”

Sixth Circuit Finds Hiring Decisions Based on Personal and Family Connections Not Discriminatory Under Federal Law

The Sixth Circuit has held that a college department chair's preference for a faculty applicant whom he had known personally through his undergraduate tenure was not evidence of discriminatory animus toward a Middle Eastern applicant under ' 1981, which guarantees equal contract rights regardless of race. Amini v. Oberlin College, 2006 WL 566871 (March 10).

Upholding the district court's grant of summary judgment for defendant Oberlin College, the Sixth Circuit found that plaintiff Saeid B. Amini, an Iranian-born Muslim, had not proffered sufficient evidence to survive a motion for summary judgment in that he did not show that his race had played a role in defendant's decision not to hire him on as a member of its faculty. Amini filed this lawsuit in the district court after Oberlin College rejected his application for a job as an assistant professor of mathematics. Dr. Chris Andrews, the ultimately successful candidate and a former Oberlin College student, had requested a recommendation from the Mathematics Department Chairman Michael Henle, whom he knew as an undergraduate student, had experience teaching at Oberlin and was applying for the job that his father, a statistician at Oberlin, was vacating. In support of his race discrimination claim under ' 1981, Amini contended that the record contained direct evidence of defendant's discriminatory intent in the following forms: '[T]he college never hired an African-American or Mid-Eastern faculty member; Dr. Witmer, the chair of the search committee, did not recall reviewing an application from any candidate 'other than a non-European White'; the college hired a non-white faculty member after the plaintiff filed his complaint with the EEOC; and the successful candidate, Dr. Christopher Andrews, was given favorable and preferential treatment.' In response to this contention, the Sixth Circuit found that this evidence did not amount to direct evidence of discrimination, but rather 'constituted at most an anecdotal report.'