Development

South Street Seaport Area Rezoning is Not Discriminatory

Peck Slip Associates, LLC v. City Council

NYLJ 2/16/06, p. 25, col. 2

AppDiv, First Dept

(memorandum opinion)

In an action for a determination that zoning amendments adopted by the New York City Council constituted discriminatory, 'reverse spot' zoning, landowner appealed from the Supreme Court's grant of summary judgment to the City Council. The Appellate Division affirmed, holding that landowner had not demonstrated that the zoning was inconsistent with a well-considered land use plan.

In 2003, the City Council amended the New York City Zoning Resolution to rezone a 10-block area in the South Street Seaport area from C6-4, which permitted high-density buildings, to C6-2A, which permits medium-density, contextual commercial development. Landowner's parcel is within the rezoned area. Landowner brought this action contending that it had been targeted for downzoning, and that the amendment deprived landowner of any reasonable gain on the property. Supreme Court awarded summary judgment to the city.

In affirming, the Appellate Division first noted that a claim of discriminatory zoning requires a showing that the zoning is site-specific and inconsistent with the well-considered plan for the area. Moreover, the court noted that in the case of a debatable change, the municipality's change controls. In this case, the court noted that the city has, since 1972, turned away from high-rise development in the Seaport Subdistrict in order to preserve the neighborhood's historic character. The court further found that landowner had not demonstrated that its property alone was affected by the zoning amendments.

Declaratory Judgment Action Not Barred By 4-Month Statute of Limitations

Matter of Jones v. Amicone

NYLJ 3/13/06, p. 38, col. 1

AppDiv, Second Dept

(memorandum opinion)

In a hybrid action/proceeding, neighbors appealed from the Supreme Court's dismissal, on statute of limitations grounds, of their challenge to determinations by the City of Yonkers adopting a final environmental impact statement and transferring parkland for non-park purposes. The Appellate Division reversed, holding that the challenge to the transfer of parkland was not governed by the 4-month statute of limitations applicable to article 78 proceedings.

In order to develop a minor league baseball park and upscale retail district, the City of Yonkers planned to condemn 100,000 square feet of property and to transfer the property to an industrial development agency. As lead agency under SEQRA, the Yonkers City Council issued a positive declaration, requiring preparation of a draft environmental impact statement. After public hearings, the city adopted and issued a findings statement on June 27, 2003. On Oct. 16 of that year, the City Council enacted an ordinance authorizing and directing the city to acquire properties by condemnation. On Jan. 28, 2004, neighbors brought this action/proceeding, contending that the City Council's SEQRA findings statement was irrational, and that the city did not have authority to transfer city-owned parkland because the land was impressed with a public trust precluding alienation without the consent of the state legislature. Supreme Court granted the city's motion to dismiss the action/proceeding as time-barred, and neighbors appealed.

In reversing, the Appellate Division started by concluding that the Supreme Court had properly dismissed the article 78 proceeding challenging the city's SEQRA determination, because adoption of the SEQRA findings statement completed the SEQRA review process, and neighbors waited 7 months after that adoption to bring the proceeding, despite the 4-month statute of limitations applicable to such challenges. But the court went on to hold that neighbors' claim based on the public trust doctrine was properly brought as a declaratory judgment action, not an article 78 proceeding, and was not, therefore, subject to the same short statute of limitations. Hence, the court reinstated that claim.

South Street Seaport Area Rezoning is Not Discriminatory

Peck Slip Associates, LLC v. City Council

NYLJ 2/16/06, p. 25, col. 2

AppDiv, First Dept

(memorandum opinion)

In an action for a determination that zoning amendments adopted by the New York City Council constituted discriminatory, 'reverse spot' zoning, landowner appealed from the Supreme Court's grant of summary judgment to the City Council. The Appellate Division affirmed, holding that landowner had not demonstrated that the zoning was inconsistent with a well-considered land use plan.

In 2003, the City Council amended the New York City Zoning Resolution to rezone a 10-block area in the South Street Seaport area from C6-4, which permitted high-density buildings, to C6-2A, which permits medium-density, contextual commercial development. Landowner's parcel is within the rezoned area. Landowner brought this action contending that it had been targeted for downzoning, and that the amendment deprived landowner of any reasonable gain on the property. Supreme Court awarded summary judgment to the city.

In affirming, the Appellate Division first noted that a claim of discriminatory zoning requires a showing that the zoning is site-specific and inconsistent with the well-considered plan for the area. Moreover, the court noted that in the case of a debatable change, the municipality's change controls. In this case, the court noted that the city has, since 1972, turned away from high-rise development in the Seaport Subdistrict in order to preserve the neighborhood's historic character. The court further found that landowner had not demonstrated that its property alone was affected by the zoning amendments.

Declaratory Judgment Action Not Barred By 4-Month Statute of Limitations

Matter of Jones v. Amicone

NYLJ 3/13/06, p. 38, col. 1

AppDiv, Second Dept

(memorandum opinion)

In a hybrid action/proceeding, neighbors appealed from the Supreme Court's dismissal, on statute of limitations grounds, of their challenge to determinations by the City of Yonkers adopting a final environmental impact statement and transferring parkland for non-park purposes. The Appellate Division reversed, holding that the challenge to the transfer of parkland was not governed by the 4-month statute of limitations applicable to article 78 proceedings.

In order to develop a minor league baseball park and upscale retail district, the City of Yonkers planned to condemn 100,000 square feet of property and to transfer the property to an industrial development agency. As lead agency under SEQRA, the Yonkers City Council issued a positive declaration, requiring preparation of a draft environmental impact statement. After public hearings, the city adopted and issued a findings statement on June 27, 2003. On Oct. 16 of that year, the City Council enacted an ordinance authorizing and directing the city to acquire properties by condemnation. On Jan. 28, 2004, neighbors brought this action/proceeding, contending that the City Council's SEQRA findings statement was irrational, and that the city did not have authority to transfer city-owned parkland because the land was impressed with a public trust precluding alienation without the consent of the state legislature. Supreme Court granted the city's motion to dismiss the action/proceeding as time-barred, and neighbors appealed.

In reversing, the Appellate Division started by concluding that the Supreme Court had properly dismissed the article 78 proceeding challenging the city's SEQRA determination, because adoption of the SEQRA findings statement completed the SEQRA review process, and neighbors waited 7 months after that adoption to bring the proceeding, despite the 4-month statute of limitations applicable to such challenges. But the court went on to hold that neighbors' claim based on the public trust doctrine was properly brought as a declaratory judgment action, not an article 78 proceeding, and was not, therefore, subject to the same short statute of limitations. Hence, the court reinstated that claim.