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Statute of Limitations Bars Excess Takings Claim
City of New York v. Grand Lafayette Properties LLC
NYLJ 4/5/06, p. 19, col. 3
Court of Appeals
(Opinion by Graffeo, J.)
In the city's 'vesting' proceeding to acquire title to land by condemnation, landowner appealed from the Appellate Division's determination that the statute of limitations barred landowner's contention that the taking was excessive. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the 4-month statute of limitations began to run upon expiration of the period during which the City Council could have reviewed the City Planning Commission's condemnation determination.
The city sought to acquire the subject parcel for use in a project involving improvement of the city's water system. The city opted to proceed under its own land use acquisition statute (the Uniform Land Use Review Procedure (ULURP)), as authorized by section 206c of the Eminent Domain Procedure Law. Under that procedure, the City Planning Commission, on April 14, 2004, concluded that the property was necessary for the project. Then, in November 2004, the City brought this proceeding, pursuant to EDPL 402, to formally acquire title. Landowner responded by advancing the claim that even if the land was needed for public use, the city's taking of the entire premises was excessive because the city could have achieved it objective by less intrusive means, such as by acquiring only an easement or a smaller portion of the parcel. Supreme Court dismissed this counterclaim as time-barred, and the Appellate Division affirmed. Landowner appealed.
In affirming, the Court of Appeals held that when the city proceeds pursuant to EDPL 206 and ULURP, the four-month statute of limitations generally applicable to article 78 proceeding is applicable. In this case, the court held that the statute began to run 20 days after the City Planning Commission's determination, be-cause the City Council had 20 days to conduct a substantive review of the Planning Commission's determination. Because landowner did not advance its counterclaim until December 2004 ' more than 7 months later ' landowner's claim was time-barred. The court rejected landowner's argument that the period did not start to run until the mayor approved the project in August 2004, because the mayor's determination did not involve any substantive analysis, and was not, therefore, the determination by which landowner became aggrieved.
Statute of Limitations Bars Excess Takings Claim
City of
NYLJ 4/5/06, p. 19, col. 3
Court of Appeals
(Opinion by Graffeo, J.)
In the city's 'vesting' proceeding to acquire title to land by condemnation, landowner appealed from the Appellate Division's determination that the statute of limitations barred landowner's contention that the taking was excessive. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the 4-month statute of limitations began to run upon expiration of the period during which the City Council could have reviewed the City Planning Commission's condemnation determination.
The city sought to acquire the subject parcel for use in a project involving improvement of the city's water system. The city opted to proceed under its own land use acquisition statute (the Uniform Land Use Review Procedure (ULURP)), as authorized by section 206c of the Eminent Domain Procedure Law. Under that procedure, the City Planning Commission, on April 14, 2004, concluded that the property was necessary for the project. Then, in November 2004, the City brought this proceeding, pursuant to EDPL 402, to formally acquire title. Landowner responded by advancing the claim that even if the land was needed for public use, the city's taking of the entire premises was excessive because the city could have achieved it objective by less intrusive means, such as by acquiring only an easement or a smaller portion of the parcel. Supreme Court dismissed this counterclaim as time-barred, and the Appellate Division affirmed. Landowner appealed.
In affirming, the Court of Appeals held that when the city proceeds pursuant to EDPL 206 and ULURP, the four-month statute of limitations generally applicable to article 78 proceeding is applicable. In this case, the court held that the statute began to run 20 days after the City Planning Commission's determination, be-cause the City Council had 20 days to conduct a substantive review of the Planning Commission's determination. Because landowner did not advance its counterclaim until December 2004 ' more than 7 months later ' landowner's claim was time-barred. The court rejected landowner's argument that the period did not start to run until the mayor approved the project in August 2004, because the mayor's determination did not involve any substantive analysis, and was not, therefore, the determination by which landowner became aggrieved.
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