Right of Publicity

Copyright Preemption

The U.S. District Court for the Western District of Tennessee, Western Division, decided that right of publicity and misappropriation claims by an individual hired to be a fictional character were preempted by federal copyright law. Stanford v. Caesars Entertainment Inc., 05-2298 Ml/V.

Plaintiff Crisper Stanford was hired to be the image and voice of 'Loose Slot Louie' for a campaign to promote the defendants' Tunica, MS, casino business. Stanford claimed that either the model release he signed was invalid for lack of proper consideration, or that the release applied only to 'audios, videos and photographs that preceded the execution of the release.' The district court reached its decision under the complete-preemption doctrine, adopted by the Sixth Circuit ' within which the Western District of Tennessee resides ' in Ritchie v. Williams, 395 F.3d 283 (6th Cir. 2005). The district court noted that under the doctrine, though a federal-preemption defense doesn't typically provide for removal of a state-filed case to federal court, if the 'pre-emptive force' of federal law is so 'extraordinary,' it can change 'an ordinary state common-law complaint into one stating a federal claim for purposes of the well-pleaded complaint rule.'

The district court concluded: '[Stanford's] claims do not involve the use or appropriation of Plaintiff's personal traits, but rather, the use of copyrightable advertisements featuring a fictional character portrayed by Plaintiff. ' The advertisement campaign features 'Loose Slot Louie,' not Crisper Stanford. The fact that Plaintiff is disputing Defendants' use of his image, not as Crisper Stanford, but as Crisper Stanford playing 'Loose Slot Louie,' makes his case unlike those in which courts have found that federal copyright law does not preempt a state-law right of publicity. ' Moreover, the Court agrees with Defendants that the equivalency [to a copyright claim] requirement is satisfied in this case because Plaintiff's right-to-publicity and misappropriation claims 'may be abridged by an act which in and of itself would infringe one of the exclusive rights' ' namely, interference with the Defendants' right to reproduce, distribute, or display their copyrighted advertisements.'

Copyright Preemption

The U.S. District Court for the Western District of Tennessee, Western Division, decided that right of publicity and misappropriation claims by an individual hired to be a fictional character were preempted by federal copyright law. Stanford v. Caesars Entertainment Inc., 05-2298 Ml/V.

Plaintiff Crisper Stanford was hired to be the image and voice of 'Loose Slot Louie' for a campaign to promote the defendants' Tunica, MS, casino business. Stanford claimed that either the model release he signed was invalid for lack of proper consideration, or that the release applied only to 'audios, videos and photographs that preceded the execution of the release.' The district court reached its decision under the complete-preemption doctrine, adopted by the Sixth Circuit ' within which the Western District of Tennessee resides ' in Ritchie v. Williams , 395 F.3d 283 (6th Cir. 2005). The district court noted that under the doctrine, though a federal-preemption defense doesn't typically provide for removal of a state-filed case to federal court, if the 'pre-emptive force' of federal law is so 'extraordinary,' it can change 'an ordinary state common-law complaint into one stating a federal claim for purposes of the well-pleaded complaint rule.'

The district court concluded: '[Stanford's] claims do not involve the use or appropriation of Plaintiff's personal traits, but rather, the use of copyrightable advertisements featuring a fictional character portrayed by Plaintiff. ' The advertisement campaign features 'Loose Slot Louie,' not Crisper Stanford. The fact that Plaintiff is disputing Defendants' use of his image, not as Crisper Stanford, but as Crisper Stanford playing 'Loose Slot Louie,' makes his case unlike those in which courts have found that federal copyright law does not preempt a state-law right of publicity. ' Moreover, the Court agrees with Defendants that the equivalency [to a copyright claim] requirement is satisfied in this case because Plaintiff's right-to-publicity and misappropriation claims 'may be abridged by an act which in and of itself would infringe one of the exclusive rights' ' namely, interference with the Defendants' right to reproduce, distribute, or display their copyrighted advertisements.'