Call 855-808-4530 or email [email protected] to receive your discount on a new subscription.
In a recent decision written by Judge Richard Posner, The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit determined that the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (CFAA) may be used to bring a private cause of action against a former employee who permanently erased confidential data from his company-issued laptop before returning it to the company. International Airport Centers, L.L.C. v. Citrin, (Slip Op.) No. 05-1522 (7th Cir. March 8, 2006). In so holding, the Seventh Circuit has joined the current tide of federal courts that have permitted companies to use the CFAA as a means with which to defend themselves against the malicious and competitive acts of departing employees.
Since passing the CFAA in 1984 to criminalize 'classic' attacks on government computer databases by hackers, Congress has expanded its scope to include a private right of action covering not only government-owned computers, but also 'protected computers' used in interstate commerce. (According to the CFAA's express terms, a 'protected computer' is defined as one that 'is used in interstate or foreign commerce or communication, including a computer located outside the Untied States that is used in a manner that affects interstate or foreign commerce or communication of the United States.' 18 U.S.C. ' 1030(e)(2)(B).) As a result, individuals and companies may now bring civil claims alleging violations of the CFAA to seek compensatory damages, injunctive and other equitable relief.
The CFAA's scope has also been extended beyond computer hacking activities to encompass all manner of sins. Plaintiffs have sued individuals under the CFAA for placing 'cookies' on a business's computers in order to gather personal and confidential information, see, eg, In re Doubleclick Privacy Litig., 154 F. Supp. 2d 497 (S.D.N.Y. 2001), for infecting a business's e-mail network with unsolicited commercial bulk e-mails (ie, 'spam'); America Online, Inc. v. National Health Care Discount, Inc., 121 F. Supp. 2d 1255, 1267 (D. Iowa 2000) and for taking confidential and proprietary information from a former employer's computers for delivery to their new employers, see, eg, Shurgard Storage Centers, Inc. v. Safeguard Self Storage, Inc., 199 F. Supp. 2d 1121 (W.D. Wash. 2000).
ENJOY UNLIMITED ACCESS TO THE SINGLE SOURCE OF OBJECTIVE LEGAL ANALYSIS, PRACTICAL INSIGHTS, AND NEWS IN ENTERTAINMENT LAW.
Already a have an account? Sign In Now Log In Now
For enterprise-wide or corporate acess, please contact Customer Service at [email protected] or 877-256-2473
This article highlights how copyright law in the United Kingdom differs from U.S. copyright law, and points out differences that may be crucial to entertainment and media businesses familiar with U.S law that are interested in operating in the United Kingdom or under UK law. The article also briefly addresses contrasts in UK and U.S. trademark law.
The Article 8 opt-in election adds an additional layer of complexity to the already labyrinthine rules governing perfection of security interests under the UCC. A lender that is unaware of the nuances created by the opt in (may find its security interest vulnerable to being primed by another party that has taken steps to perfect in a superior manner under the circumstances.
With each successive large-scale cyber attack, it is slowly becoming clear that ransomware attacks are targeting the critical infrastructure of the most powerful country on the planet. Understanding the strategy, and tactics of our opponents, as well as the strategy and the tactics we implement as a response are vital to victory.
Possession of real property is a matter of physical fact. Having the right or legal entitlement to possession is not "possession," possession is "the fact of having or holding property in one's power." That power means having physical dominion and control over the property.
UCC Sections 9406(d) and 9408(a) are one of the most powerful, yet least understood, sections of the Uniform Commercial Code. On their face, they appear to override anti-assignment provisions in agreements that would limit the grant of a security interest. But do these sections really work?