Call 855-808-4530 or email [email protected] to receive your discount on a new subscription.
Whether calculating lost profits or performing a 'reasonable royalty' analysis under the Georgia-Pacific factors, a damages expert in a patent case is required to consider a large variety of data ' not just data from the plaintiff or the defendant, but also data from third-party sources, such as trade industry publications or market analyst reports. The admissibility of an opinion based on third-party information, however, has been a source of conflict since 1993, when the U.S. Supreme Court decided Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc.
To be admissible, an expert opinion must overcome the twin hurdles of Federal Rules of Evidence 702 and 703. Rule 702, 'Testimony by Experts,' sets forth the trial court's 'gatekeeper' function for expert testimony as required by the U.S. Supreme Court's decisions in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993) (regarding scientific expert testimony), and Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999) (extending Daubert's holding to all expert testimony). However, Rule 703, 'Bases of Opinion Testimony by Experts,' was not the subject of either decision. While some trial courts have treated the two rules as if they shared a single standard, others have recognized them as entirely distinct. These conflicting approaches have resulted in inconsistent opinions on the use of market or industry data. Nowhere are these conflicting approaches more important than in patent damages analyses, where the case law requires the expert to consider the very data that some trial courts have rejected.
The key difference between Rules 702 and 703 is the phrase 'reasonably relied upon,' which appears in Rule 703 but not in Rule 702. Judicial interpretations of Rule 703's 'reasonably relied upon' provision have been inconsistent since its origin in 1975 and remain so today. According to Wright & Miller, Federal Practice & Procedure '6274 (1990), 'The most difficult issue raised by rule 703 is determining the extent of the trial court's power to exclude expert opinion under the 'reasonably relied upon' clause.' (emphasis added)
ENJOY UNLIMITED ACCESS TO THE SINGLE SOURCE OF OBJECTIVE LEGAL ANALYSIS, PRACTICAL INSIGHTS, AND NEWS IN ENTERTAINMENT LAW.
Already a have an account? Sign In Now Log In Now
For enterprise-wide or corporate acess, please contact Customer Service at [email protected] or 877-256-2473
This article highlights how copyright law in the United Kingdom differs from U.S. copyright law, and points out differences that may be crucial to entertainment and media businesses familiar with U.S law that are interested in operating in the United Kingdom or under UK law. The article also briefly addresses contrasts in UK and U.S. trademark law.
The Article 8 opt-in election adds an additional layer of complexity to the already labyrinthine rules governing perfection of security interests under the UCC. A lender that is unaware of the nuances created by the opt in (may find its security interest vulnerable to being primed by another party that has taken steps to perfect in a superior manner under the circumstances.
With each successive large-scale cyber attack, it is slowly becoming clear that ransomware attacks are targeting the critical infrastructure of the most powerful country on the planet. Understanding the strategy, and tactics of our opponents, as well as the strategy and the tactics we implement as a response are vital to victory.
Possession of real property is a matter of physical fact. Having the right or legal entitlement to possession is not "possession," possession is "the fact of having or holding property in one's power." That power means having physical dominion and control over the property.
UCC Sections 9406(d) and 9408(a) are one of the most powerful, yet least understood, sections of the Uniform Commercial Code. On their face, they appear to override anti-assignment provisions in agreements that would limit the grant of a security interest. But do these sections really work?