<b>Litigation:</b> Paternity and Child Support

In 1985, Loyd gave birth to a child. The local child services agency sought a paternity order from Lovelady. He failed to appear, and a default judgment was entered establishing paternity of the subject child and ordering Lovelady to pay child support. Thereafter, in 2003, Lovelady filed a motion appealing from the 1996 order under R.C. 3119.961 et seq., claiming that recent DNA testing established that he was not the father of the subject child. The trial court denied Lovelady's motion, holding that RC 3119.961 et seq. violated the separation of powers by interfering with the Ohio Supreme Court's exclusive authority to regulate state court procedures. Lovelady appealed, and the court of appeals reversed and remanded, finding the RC 3119.961 et seq. do not violate the constitutional separation of powers because those sections establish a substantive, rather than a procedural right. The supreme court affirmed the court of appeals. It considered language of Ohio's General Assembly that was exactly on point, stating that the R.C. 3119.96 et seq. deals with a person's substantive right to obtain relief from a final judgment of an order that requires that person to pay child support. The court concluded that the Ohio General Assembly intended to create a substantive right to address potential injustice and remanded the case to determine whether Lovelady should be granted relief under the statute.

Putative father could obtain relief under state statute that granted a substantive, not procedural, right to address potential injustice. The State Ex rel. Loyd, v. Lovelady , 108 Ohio St.3d 86 (Ohio 2006).